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South Africa

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Forum

The United States and South Africa

The emotion-laden issue of Washington's relations with South Africa recently pitted the White House against the Congress in a confrontation over economic sanctions, and, despite the president's popularity, the administration suffered a stinging setback. Yet, the rhetoric surrounding this confrontation has obscured a central issue in the policy debate: Is it in the U.S. interest to weaken the South African economy?

Discussing this question for the ORBIS Forum are LEON H. SULLIVAN, *pastor of the Zion Baptist Church in Philadelphia;* PETER DUIGNAN, *senior fellow at the Hoover Institution;* J. DOUGLAS HOLLADAY, *director of the South Africa working group, U.S. Department of State;* HERMAN W. NICKEL, *former U.S. ambassador to South Africa; and* HENRY BIENEN, *director of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.*

THE ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Leon H. Sullivan

Ten years ago, on March 1, 1977, twelve American companies signed an equal rights pact, later known as the "Sullivan Principles," for their business operations in South Africa. The Principles sought to use the economic and social clout of multinational companies in South Africa, along with other levers, to help end apartheid. From the outset, I saw the Principles as a way to help end apartheid, for it was clear that the Principles alone could not be the total solution to the South African problem. They could, along with other thrusts, help dismantle the system.

Essentially, the Principles require U.S. companies in South Africa to end all racial discrimination in their operations; to train and elevate blacks to all levels of technical, managerial, and supervisory positions in large numbers; to recognize integrated and black free trade unions; and generally to work at improving the quality of life for black workers both inside and outside the workplace. The Principles were later strengthened to require that companies work for total

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social, economic, and political justice. They have become the standard for corporate social responsibility in South Africa.

From the beginning I believed that the structurally segregated society in South Africa could not continue to exist if hundreds of businesses began practicing equal rights. Further, I believed that if the Principles were aggressively pursued and constantly strengthened as changes occurred, they could have a major impact on dismantling apartheid. For what I intended, the Principles worked. By 1982 more than 150 American companies had signed the Sullivan Principles. Today there are 170 Sullivan signatory companies. They have initiated programs to improve the quality of life outside the workplace. They have also built schools and health facilities and have helped change property rights for blacks.

These businesses have stimulated other anti-apartheid endeavors as well. They have changed laws affecting workers throughout South Africa; further, they have begun a revolution in industrial race relations in that country. For example, they helped the independent free trade unions gain recognition for the first time. South African business leaders have become deeply involved in these efforts, and they have formed anti-apartheid groups of their own, such as the Corporate Council for United States CEOs (Chief Executive Officers). Also, foreign corporations from other foreign states initiated other equal rights codes patterned on the Principles.

The Principles served as a lever to influence hundreds of non-American companies throughout South Africa, affecting millions of black workers. They became a catalyst for change far beyond the small number of blacks employed by U.S. firms. The Sullivan Principles and their signatory companies have done more to end discrimination and improve conditions for black workers in South Africa than all the governments of the world or the United Nations.

In recent years, greater awareness of the evils of apartheid has spread far and wide. Prior to the clampdown on the press by the South African government, the media focused the world's attention on this problem, raising the consciousness of millions. Also, sanctions legislation developed in Congress and other parliaments of the world, while divestment actions on college campuses and by municipal and state governments intensified.

The Sullivan Principles have been a central part of these developments. The Principles were designed to make companies a part of this process for fundamental change. The first phase of the Principles, dealing primarily with fair employment practices within the companies, has ended. The Principles were then amplified, requiring United States companies to actively support actions that will help eradicate all apartheid laws. The second phase has been under way since May 2, 1986. The Principles now request that U.S. companies practice "corporate civil disobedience" by refusing to comply with

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any apartheid laws or requirements within their corporations, and use their full legal and financial resources to assist blacks in obtaining equal access to all public and private amenities. These include parks, beaches, hospitals, schools, transportation, and housing. A third version of the Principles calls for corporate support for equal political rights for blacks.

Amidst all the repression and anger, there is a small window of hope. Some blacks and whites are beginning to talk about conciliation, equal rights, and political enfranchisement for blacks. Now is the time for every moral, economic, and political force to be brought to bear upon the South African government for decisive change. Actions of American companies and the United States government can play a crucial role in this process. American companies must take stronger actions, and the Congress must remain diligent in assuring that the sanctions it passed last year, over the president's veto, are vigorously enforced by the administration. Above all, the president of the United States must be pressured to speak out more forcefully against the apartheid system. He has to call on the South African government to end the emergency regulations, the continuing jailings, and the beatings and killings; he must call for an end to apartheid and the granting of full political rights to the black population.

We have seen movement in the right direction, yet, we must go further. The South African government is becoming more and more intransigent to fundamental change. This year promises to offer a basic choice for South Africa. It will either go in the direction of massive chaotic revolution, leading to the death of millions of people, the destruction of a nation, and a possible conflagration through the entire southern region of Africa, or it will go in the direction of a unitarian and a free South Africa. At this time, every moral and economic force must be brought to bear to influence the South African government for meaningful and decisive social and political change.

In May 1985, I set a deadline of twenty-four months for statutory apartheid to be legally and actually abolished, with full citizenship rights for the black population and a clear commitment for full and equal participation for blacks in the political process. If this deadline is not met I will call for the total withdrawal of all American companies from South Africa and a total U.S. embargo against that country. I intend to stand by that deadline. I fervently hope that the billions in investments in U.S. companies with subsidiaries in South Africa will stand with me.

In the meantime, I am continuing to work with U.S. companies, as well as those of many other countries, to bring all their moral and economic influence to bear on the South African government to dismantle apartheid. I am continuing to call on the Congress and the president for the strongest actions possible against apartheid. The

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evils of apartheid must cease, or all American economic involvement in South Africa should end.

This can be a bright day in the history of free enterprise. Efforts for justice and freedom will show a new face of American and Western business to the world. Those who represent the multinational companies of the world should let the hammer of freedom ring on the anvil of international justice in South Africa. I am asking the businesses of the world, led by the companies of America, to swing that hammer and let it ring, until it is heard across South Africa and around the world, to help bring justice and freedom to the black people of that troubled country.

I recognize that in a complex situation such as that in South Africa, there are many strategies, but one moral fact is common to most opinion: the unjust practices in South Africa are wrong and somehow they must be stopped. If peaceful and constructive negotiations fail, they will come to an end through destruction, violence, and revolution. The repercussions will be felt throughout the world, even possibly bringing about a confrontation between the two great nuclear powers.

Maybe the peaceful initiatives represented in the Sullivan Principles can only go so far. Maybe all that is being done is too little, too late. But somehow, we must try.

THE CASE AGAINST DISINVESTMENT

by Peter Duignan

It is not in America's interest to weaken the South African economy. Boycotts, sanctions, and disinvestment will not only fail to end apartheid but will slow economic development and reform in South Africa, creating conflict and misery for blacks in the entire region of southern Africa. Rather than put economic pressure on South Africa, the United States should invest more to accelerate progressive change. An expanding economy is the best hope for ending apartheid and for reducing U.S. trade deficits. The United States needs trade with and investments in South Africa, especially the trade in strategic minerals and gold.

Almost in unison, clergymen call for sanctions; students demand "divestment" by American business interests and universities; militants agitate for revolution; and Congress imposes more sanctions. The United States wants peaceful change in South Africa, however; and economic pressure will not achieve that end.

There is a form of inverted American chauvinism that exaggerates U.S. influence in foreign affairs and interprets all the world's

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evils as real or supposed wrongs committed abroad by American investors and American spies. According to this view, South Africa — or, for that matter, Iran or Chile, or South Korea — would speedily become happy and contented democracies if only the Elders of Wall Street were to cease their plotting. This American ethnocentricity has many other forms. It assumes, for instance, that a system of franchise and of political organization that functions well in the United States would be equally successful in a multi-ethnic and multiracial country like South Africa.[1]

The Congress and other critics of South Africa have made four basic errors in judging that state. One, they overestimate the United States' ability to effect change in South Africa. Two, they think that boycotts and sanctions will bring about the end of apartheid because the whites will not risk their economic well-being to sustain it. Three, they believe that South Africa is in a revolutionary condition, and that external pressure can force the government to reform before a bloody civil war erupts. Four, they hold that South Africa is like the American South and needs only to enfranchise blacks in a one-man, one-vote principle to achieve democracy and stability.

White South Africans, however, are convinced that a one-man, one-vote system would imply ethnic suicide for the whites, that a powerless white minority would be treated no better by the ruling blacks than the Indians were treated in Uganda, and that black rule would entail civil war and economic collapse. The whites may be wrong in their assumptions. After all, whites in Zimbabwe have been protected, but, given the experiences of most post-colonial states — Zanzibar (where the Arab minority was destroyed), or Burundi (where the Hutu were cruelly persecuted), or Northern Nigeria (where the Ibo were robbed or massacred), or Algeria, Angola, or Mozambique (where the European population was compelled to emigrate) — white fears are not unreasonable and should be treated with consideration rather than with the contempt they receive from so many American academics.

American interests — political, economic, and humanitarian — would best be served by the kind of "convergence" diplomacy that so many liberals advocate with regard to the Soviet Union. We should quietly press for improvements in return for economic favors. We should extend rather than diminish academic, cultural, athletic, diplomatic, and economic contacts with South Africa. We should be conciliatory in tone and firm in intention. Quiet pressure for change, the gradual ending of apartheid, more education and job opportunities for blacks and coloreds, more self-government for urban blacks, and more democracy in the Homelands: these are attainable goals.

[1] Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, "A Case for Detente with South Africa," *Business Week*, July 3, 1978, pp. 7-8.

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Quiet diplomacy will achieve more than will harangues in Congress. The Congressional approach has hardened white resolve in South Africa, has encouraged some black youths to unrealistic expectations, and has destroyed the middle ground of discussion and compromise.

The difficulties in applying abstract morality to diplomacy are many. Few governments outside of Western Europe and North America are democratic. Few governments are moral or just, or rule for the benefit of their people. If the United States hesitates to deal with Chile, it can hardly deal with any communist regime. Stop talking to South Africans because of their racial policies, and Washington has to stop talking to half the nations of the world who oppress their minorities, their political opposition, their religious groups, or persons who own property.

Washington should forego public preaching when dealing with foreign states. It should press for reforms in the hope that piecemeal changes will have a multiplier effect. Using the carrot as well as the stick, the United States should try to accelerate change through increased foreign investment in South Africa. With vast sums pouring in to expand the economy, there would be a greater need for skilled workers than could be supplied by the white population. White trade unions would allow the blacks to enter all the skilled trades, for example, if there were more jobs than the whites could handle. This has happened informally in recent years: blacks now hold the majority of jobs in industries that a few years ago had excluded them — e.g., the auto, construction, and garment industries.

The Reagan administration nevertheless has swung back to the policy of harassment followed during previous administrations. Washington has given unequivocal support to majority rule in South Africa — though not anywhere else in the Second or Third Worlds. Sanctions have been tightened; U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa are being pressured. Yet this policy of harassment has failed in the past, and it will fail in the future, with a resultant hardening of white rule over blacks, Indians, and coloreds.

American investments in South Africa occupy too small a place — 18 percent of foreign investment — in the nation's economy to be a major bargaining counter. South Africa today generates the bulk of its own capital (90 percent) and even exports it. An American trade embargo on South Africa is not likely to succeed. The balance of trade is in favor of the United States rather than the reverse. What America supplies can readily be obtained from other sources, whereas the United States needs South Africa's minerals. Formal trade embargoes (violated by many African states) are no more likely to succeed than were American attempts to coerce Cuba, or the Stalinist attempts to subjugate Yugoslavia.

Is the disruption of South Africa truly in the American interest? South Africa at present controls the Cape route, a major consideration

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when Soviet naval power has become predominant in the western Indian Ocean. South Africa, moreover, is the only African country capable during wartime of supplying its allies in the western Indian Ocean with a vast industrial infrastructure — factories, supply depots, repair facilities, dry docks. South Africa plays a major role in the global economy as the world's greatest producer of gold and as a major exporter of uranium, diamonds, chrome, manganese, and other minerals. South Africa's policy may offend the governments of countries like Guinea and Rwanda, which between them wield two paper votes at the United Nations. But the real power — as opposed to the voting power — of all African countries is small, and the Western nations cannot afford to buy their capricious favors by concessions that would further weaken the West itself.[2]

With regard to moral considerations, South Africa, for all its restrictions, is a great deal more successful economically and more free than Cuba or Russia, or China, not to mention a score of African countries. Consider the murderous regimes in Angola, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Equatorial Guinea, to mention the worst. It is surely inconsistent to argue that while détente is a good thing to help reform the Soviets, it is a bad thing when applied to South Africa.

Weakening South Africa by imposing economic pressure is not an effective means to end apartheid, no matter how intense U.S. hatred of that racist system. History documents the results of economic pressure and can help policy makers judge when it serves U.S. goals and interests.[3]

The goals of economic pressure are compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, and domestic symbolism. Historical analysis demonstrates three results of applying sanctions. First, sanctions almost always fail if they seek compliance, subversion, or deterrence even though they have great appeal as symbols of opposition. Their value then is largely symbolic for the external actors: apply them if you will, but realize they will not topple a regime or force significant change. Supporters of economic pressure have failed to learn this lesson from history, nor have they correctly estimated the costs that will be borne disproportionately by blacks in South Africa and in the surrounding states. The price will be slowed economic growth and rising unemployment throughout the region. Without free access to railroads and harbors, black areas will not be able to export their labor (1.5 to 2 million); and there will be less South African money for investment. History's second lesson shows that economic pressure unites the sanctioned nation and reinforces its behavior, while forfeiting the sanctioner's future leverage over the

[2] L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), passim.

[3] James M. Lindsay, "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination," *International Studies Quarterly* (1986), 30, pp. 153-73.

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targeted state. The third axiom postulates that the goals of internal and domestic symbolism usually undermine the goals of compliance and subversion.

Sanctions and boycotts, the historical records show, have only worked when the targeted state was a weak and poverty-stricken ally. Economic pressure has not succeeded against the Soviet Union, Cuba, or Nicaragua. Stopping the sale of krugerrands or the landing of South African airplanes will not change President P. W. Botha's mind. Although the United States is South Africa's leading trade partner, we need what South Africa sells. What we supply, South Africa can obtain from other sources. Past restrictions on U.S. arms sales not only deprived the United States of a market but spurred South African whites to develop an independent major arms industry. Since the West requires South African gold, diamonds, and strategic minerals, South Africa could well retaliate if the United States embarked on further economic sanctions by refusing to sell us platinum for car converters, chrome for super alloys used in tanks and cars, or gold.

In any case, South African whites would not be the greatest losers if trade were further embargoed. The European Community — with 50 percent of total investments — would suffer a great loss of income and jobs. Great Britain supposedly stands to lose 250,000 jobs if economic warfare is declared against South Africa.

Sanctions would be counterproductive not only for South Africa's black citizens but also for its black neighbors — Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland (BLS), and Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. These states depend on South Africa to handle the bulk of their imports and exports, to absorb their surplus labor, to borrow money, to buy food and machines, and, for the BLS states, even to collect their custom duties. There is no talk of honoring sanctions or boycotts in the countries adjoining South Africa. Zimbabwe's ruler Robert Mugabe has already said he cannot afford to impose economic pressure on South Africa. (The costs of economic pressure against South Africa for the neighboring states is estimated at $5 to $6 billion over two years.)

The loss of foreign captial will certainly slow economic growth in South Africa, but, again, blacks would suffer most from the resulting slowdown. And despite the claims of divestment advocates, the majority of blacks do not want sanctions if it hurts their material well-being.[4]

Thus, sanctions can work only in one sense: they can slow the growth of an economy and raise the cost of doing business. Ironically,

[4] See L. Schlemmer, "Black Opinion on Disinvestment — Weighing the Survey Evidence," Center for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal, Durban, 1986. Polling data shows that the majority of black South Africans do not want more sanctions if it will reduce their living standards or cause stagnation in the South African economy, p. 7.

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as in Rhodesia, embargoes can produce a short-lived boom for whites by encouraging import-substitution industries in South Africa. The Afrikaner bourgeoisie would benefit further by being able to buy up foreign plants and technology cheaply.

Sanctions busting will further reduce the effectiveness of economic pressure. South Africa will use the same techniques that Rhodesia used so successfully between 1964 and 1979: vague produce names, deceptive labeling, falsified shipping orders, appeals to greed, exploitation of self-interest, use of third parties, and physical pressure. Since South Africa dominates the economies and transportation systems of southern Africa, Botha's government will force the weak neighboring states to become sanctions busters.

Americans agree: South Africa must reform; apartheid must go. But reforms are more likely to come to South Africa in a time of prosperity, than in a depression. Historically, industrial development has formed the most powerful solvent of racial segregation. No more sanctions, more trade not less, and more investment, not disinvestiment, offer the best chance to end apartheid.

Men such as Bishop Tutu disagree, but Bishop Tutu would be wise to start working for peaceful change, not civil disobedience. Blacks in South Africa should follow the advice of the Chinese Communist party and begin "the long march through the institutions" so they can come to power peacefully and inherit a prosperous, developed state not a wartorn mess.

A free, democratic society cannot emerge in South Africa without some Western pressure through quiet diplomacy and support and without strong economic growth. Economic growth of 7 to 8 percent a year will not be reached unless South Africa secures foreign investment. Internal savings are not enough to fuel economic growth sufficient to absorb the two or three million currently unemployed and to insure work for over 250,000 graduates who have come onto the job market each year since 1981. (Black population growth is 3 to 3.5 percent a year.)

Severe economic pressure on South Africa would probably promote a siege economy and encourage the most reactionary elements within the white community. We need to support the *verlictes* (liberals) in the Nationalist party; they alone can effect reform. Hopes for a strong and expanding economy, on the other hand, form a powerful incentive for the government to enact those reforms required by local business. Economic pressure would certainly diminish the West's influence in South Africa and remove most incentives to change. Foreign investment, however, would stimulate economic growth in the entire region, bringing greater stability and creating conditions for peaceful change. But to sustain 7 to 8 percent growth

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per year, South Africa will need foreign credit, investment, and encouragement.[5]

Even the modest sanctions imposed by the West so far have hurt South Africa's growth; since 1981 about 600,000 jobs have been lost. Business confidence has been shaken and new investment has dried up, while old investment is being sold off — eighty-five U.S. companies have left South Africa in the past six years and the British firm, Barclays Bank, has recently pulled out.

What's to be done?[6] Sanctions and boycotts have not worked and will not. Let's return to "constructive engagement," which had some successes. Let's stop calling for one-man, one-vote; and let's not negotiate with the African National Congress until it rejects terrorism, purges itself of communist members, and guarantees white property and rights, much as Mugabe did in Zimbabwe. (Mugabe has acknowledged that he came to power through negotiation, not fighting.)

A liberal democratic solution is not in the cards for now. The whites believe that one-man, one-vote is not a realistic goal. Where democracies can allow power to pass from party to party by a simple electoral majority, societies that are deeply divided along ethnic or racial lines cannot. When a party loses power in a pluralistic democracy, the basic rights and cultural integrity of its supporters are not endangered. But when political parties represent ethnic groups, as they typically do in deeply divided societies, ethnic groups that lose political power often lose everything. Historically, ethnic politics have been harsh, with one group dominating the others. Unfortunately, white leaders in South Africa have continued to decide unilaterally how much to concede to black demands, although Botha has promised more consultation with and less dictation to blacks.

For now, a consensus society based on majority rule is out of the question because whites will not accept it. The United States then should stop pushing for it, because conflict will not resolve the country's problems, and consensus appears impossible in the short run. A third way should be tried; a consociational system that would be democratic but not based on the principle of one man, one vote. Consociation has operated effectively in the past in Lebanon; Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland continue to operate consociational systems with success.

Consociation implies continued social and ethnic diversity based on a policy of pragmatism and tempered by cooperation between the elites of each group. These elites could act as brokers to limit conflict and to reach accommodation and a balance of power between their conflicting interests.

[5] Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive,* pp. 288-96.

[6] Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The United States and Africa:* A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 293-97.

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Within the context of a South African consociational structure, each ethnic community would rule itself and would hold veto power over decisions affecting it. The central parliament of the coalition government would be elected by proportional representation.

A peaceful South Africa can be created, albeit with great difficulty. For any regime to succeed, it must recognize the diversity of South Africa's ethnic, political, and economic groups and mediate between them. The striking differences in status and material wealth between blacks, browns, and whites must be reduced.

Political power cannot be restricted to whites, Indians, and coloreds, and to traditional tribal rulers; leadership roles must be shared among all group elites. South Africa will have to accept a federal system, but not one based on the Homelands (Bantustans) concept.

All racially discriminatory legislation and practices must end. Some progress has already been made in this direction: segregation has ended in most urban hotels, bars, and restaurants; the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts have been repealed; and black unions are recognized. (The two major remaining racist laws are the Group Areas Act and Racial Registration.)

What is needed now is not further confrontation and polarization, but the beginning of a dialogue on how power can be shared in South Africa in a way that protects the diverse interests of all ethnic and racial groups. Congress's recent legislation imposing economic pressure does not promote this cooperation and consultation, nor does the campaign by American universities to get American companies to pull out of South Africa.

Disinvestment in whatever form poses complex legal questions.[7] The trustees of a pension fund or university endowment are obligated to administer their trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. It is not the trustees' job to consider the real or assumed benefit of any third party. Neither does the law make provision for exceptions in the case of socially desirable causes. There is, after all, no consensus about what causes are socially worthy. Disinvestment strategies have been and are apt to be futile and unproductive. Hence the campaign to affect the South African economy enough to induce political reforms is unlikely.

There are also constitutional objections, given the federal monopoly over foreign relations, as illustrated by the case of *Zschernig v. Miller* (1968) where the Supreme Court forbade "an intrusion by [a] state into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts

[7] Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, "Disinvestment from South Africa: A Dissident View" (Working Paper, Hoover Institution, 1986). See for a contrasting view, "The Disinvestment Debate in South Africa: Should We Be Moving Towards U.S. Withdrawal?" (A Discussion Paper by the Stanford Commission on Investment Responsibility, December 1986).

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to the President and Congress."[8] The attorney general of the United States in 1978 also said it is inappropriate for investment managers to consider any factors other than safety and income from the investments they make, i.e., no political, moral, or social concerns.

Similar considerations apply to charitable trusts and charitable corporations, including university endowments. Regardless of form, a university's charter is usually restrictive; it dedicates the institution to educational and related purposes. Many legal scholars point out that causes espoused in the name of social investing — for example, expressing disapproval of selected foreign governments — are not within the purpose of such charters. For university trustees to spend university funds on such causes would put the trustees in breach of their fiduciary trust to their institution.

In addition, past donors — or their heirs and successors — may claim that social investing constitutes a diversion from the educational purposes for which such funds were given; hence, such operations breach an implied or express decision and ought to trigger defeasance of the fund in that donor's favor. Universities should therefore stop disinvesting.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION

by J. Douglas Holladay

South Africa poses a daunting challenge for U.S. policy makers. The issues there engage American sympathies and test American resolve as well as patience. Perplexed Americans are pondering the question of an appropriate U.S. response to the continued injustice in South Africa. The U.S. domestic debate is not concerned with whether apartheid should end; on that point Americans are in general accord. The serious debate regards precisely which policies will accelerate fundamental change and contribute to the ultimate demise of the pernicious system of apartheid within South Africa. U.S. policy toward this troubled land has the twin objectives of ending apartheid and developing a political system in which all South Africans fully participate in the political, social, and economic life of their nation.

Nothing better describes the gulf that separates the white government and the black majority in South Africa than the question of whether change has occurred in the last several years. The government points to legalization of black trade unions, democratic organizations that now boast more than 800,000 members; non-white

[8] These legal and economic aspects are explained in detail in John H. Langbein, Roy A. Schotland, and Albert P. Blaustein, *Disinvestment: Is It Legal? Is It Moral? Is It Productive?* (Washington: National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1985), a short monograph that the trustees of every university involved in these issues should study carefully.

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participation in the formerly all-white Parliament; multi-racial athletic participation; abolition of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality legislation; scrapping of the hated pass laws; virtual elimination of Job Reservation; opening of central business districts to black entrepreneurs; repeal of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, which banned multiracial political alliances; and admission of blacks to formerly all-white private schools and universities.

Many black South Africans view such changes as mere cosmetic concessions, believing that they avoid the critical issue of power-sharing. Their frustration is compounded by the unwillingness of the government to articulate a vision of a democracy that includes all South Africans.

Sadly, the political situation in South Africa has worsened in recent months. South Africans of all races are constrained by the broad state of emergency, which allows security forces to detain individuals up to six months without trial and without charge. (Estimates are that more than 20,000 individuals have been detained since June 1986.) Individuals have been stripped of basic rights, stringent press restrictions abound, and freedom of speech is seriously curtailed by fear of detention. Many leaders of labor unions — organizations that the United States regards as important vehicles for negotiation and for democracy — have been imprisoned. The Group Areas Act, by which people are severely restricted to living in racially segregated areas, remains in force. The Population Registration Act, which classifies every citizen according to race and provides the basis for segregation, is still law of the land. Police brutality is documented both in and out of prison and is only matched by the brutality and teror inflicted by the burning "necklaces" and murder of innocent moderates by black extremists. Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners remain incarcerated. The African National Congress (ANC) and other political organizations are still banned. Blacks have no vote. Negotiations have not begun. Amidst these circumstances, the cycle of violent protest and repression continues unabated.

Trends are clearly moving in the wrong direction in South Africa. Reform has been set aside as South African leaders apply their energies and imagination to repressing dissent and circumventing international economic sanctions. And while the imposition of punitive sanctions by the United States has sent another signal to Pretoria, such measures have also strained diplomatic relations between the two nations and have further diminished U.S. influence.

The administration is laboring to see apartheid end, to hasten the advent of a government based on the consent of all the governed that respects minority and individual rights. The American government is working to help release the economic and social potential of a black population locked in the rusted cage of apartheid. Unfortunately, non-white South Africans face economic as well as political

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obstacles to full participation in South African society. Understanding these economic obstacles is necessary to appreciate the folly of further weakening the South African economy.

In urban areas, black unemployment stands between 25 and 50 percent, and the black population is expected to double by the year 2000. Merely to keep pace with the increased demand for employment, the economy must generate an additional 250,000 jobs per year. In the present economy, severely damaged by the violence and repression caused by apartheid, the market offers decreasing opportunities for all South Africans, but particularly for black South Africans.

Similarly, three to four million new housing units will be required over the next fifteen years to keep pace with demand. This shortage inhibits freedom even when legal reforms finally occur. For instance, the South African government last year implemented reforms of the "influx control" system, allowing some 1.7 million blacks greater freedom of movement to seek employment and housing. This freedom is restricted, however, by the unavailability of housing throughout the country. In the face of a weakening economy, double-digit inflation, and soaring interest rates, the prospects to make use of this opportunity are meager.

South African education is also in desperate need. Per capita, seven times as much is spent for white students as for black students. This is wrong, and the United States, having made its position known, has taken active steps to help improve black education. The South Africa Working Group, which I direct, coordinated a trip for the presidents of twelve historically black U.S. colleges and universities to discover ways to improve the inadequate education of black South Africans. As black educators, they were accustomed to the challenge of working with students suffering the residual effects of racist policies from our own history. Subsequent to the trip, they concluded that certain lessons from their experience were transferrable to South Africa. Some of the institutions represented are planning to implement teacher-training programs for black South Africans. Their help is deeply appreciated.

This leads to an important point. As Washington Post columnist William Raspberry argues, even if apartheid were to end tomorrow, South African blacks would be "as doomed and as damned as ever." Economic and social development must go hand in hand with political empowerment if individuals are to be truly free. It is for this reason that the administration has continued to seek to exert its influence — both diplomatic and moral — in South Africa in a manner that will hasten the end of apartheid, and that will provide the means and opportunity for social and economic advancement in a post-apartheid South Africa. Fundamental change must occur — but must South Africa be economically destroyed to be saved? We do not believe

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that further measures, designed to weaken the South Africa economy, will promote fundamental freedoms for black South Africans. Symbolic gestures are important but *not* at the expense of achieving our policy objectives. The essential question is what mix of negative and positive pressures will further our goal of meaningful change in South Africa.

In addition to understanding the obstacles to peaceful progress in South Africa, Americans have to understand the interdependence of all the southern African countries. Eight countries are inextricably linked to South Africa, and our policies must not shift the suffering in South Africa to its neighbors in Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, or Zaire. More than 350,000 Africans from neighboring countries work legally within South Africa — another one million are in South Africa illegally. Why are they there? Certainly not because they wish to work under apartheid. Clearly, they seek employment in South Africa's mines and industries. Remittances from these guest workers have great economic importance for Mozambique, Lesotho, and several other countries. Estimates show that each guest worker supports six to ten dependents back home.

Economic dependence goes further. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland receive most of their imports (including half of all food consumed) from South Africa. Two-thirds of the total government revenues of Swaziland, and one-third of that of Botswana and Lesotho, come from tariffs collected on imported goods by South Africa. All electricity used in Lesotho and most of that used by Botswana, Swaziland, and Maputo in Mozambique comes from South Africa. And Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, and Zaire rely heavily on South Africa's rail network and port system.

In short, South Africa is the engine that drives the economy of southern Africa. These neighboring states, innocent of the policies of apartheid, are extremely vulnerable to retaliation by South Africa. And although some of these states have added their voices to the sanctions chorus, the record speaks otherwise.

While the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has passed resolutions on South Africa for over twenty years, its members have not connected such words with concrete action. Thirty-two of the fifty members of the OAU trade with South Africa. Also, members of the OAU, while clamoring for tougher sanctions, have actually increased trade by 43 percent over four months last year. This trade now totals some $300 million per year. The apparent discrepancy between the rhetoric and actions of the OAU membership evidences a broader problem: the difficulty of living in the shadow of South Africa's might. The South African government possesses enormous military and economic might; some believe its powerful armies could defeat the combined armies of sub-Saharan Africa. And contrary to popular notion,

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South Africa's economy is not propped up by American interests, nor by any other foreign interests. The United States has accounted for less than 1 percent of total direct investment in South Africa; South Africa itself generates 96 percent of its direct investment, and only 4 percent is derived from foreign sources. The U.S. stake hardly offers the kind of economic leverage that can bring a country to its knees.

There is now a general hardening of positions within South Africa. A siege mentality dominates the ruling Afrikaner leadership. The Conservative party, although still quite small, seems to be gaining in strength and influence; it may cause the ruling National party to halt efforts to mitigate apartheid as a way to stem erosion of its membership to the hard right. Moderates of any color find it increasingly difficult to assert a viable program. Black moderates realize that if they enter discussions with the South African government, their lives and the lives of their families are imperiled; yet this is the time for individuals of courage to step forward. The United States must support those willing to risk their lives in order to avoid a protracted cycle of violent protest and repression. That is why we must remain involved, applying a combination of pressures to hasten fundamental change.

Many Americans suffer from the misperception that if only the United States possessed sufficient will, injustice in South Africa would end. This is untrue. The United States alone cannot end apartheid. Only South Africans — black and white — can do this. The application of sanctions, for instance, is a tactic, not the solution for South Africa's problems. To act seriously and responsibly, we must go beyond rhetoric and symbol. We must recognize the hard, long work that remains if we are to promote political and economic opportunities for all South Africans in a post-apartheid South Africa. The United States must remain involved to make a difference.

Last year the U.S. Agency for International Development spent $20 million to support the victims of apartheid; $25 million is budgeted for this year. It is the only AID program in the world where the funds are neither approved by nor funneled through the host government but go directly to people and organizations Americans seek to assist. The money is used for scholarships, for human rights purposes (such as for the defense of those charged with violating segregation laws), to support trade unions, to provide legal representation for blacks, for black entrepreneurship, and for leadership development in the black communities. In 1986, when the Crossroads shantytown outside Cape Town was burned, leaving tens of thousands homeless, our embassy was the first to respond with more than $250,000 in emergency funds for shelter, food, and medical care. Our assistance program in South Africa aims at equipping blacks to take advantage of opportunities that will accompany apartheid's in-

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evitable demise. We are working to assure that blacks will benefit from the changes ahead.

The private sector has a major role in South Africa, one that it has served well in recent years. U.S. businesses in South Africa, the great majority of which have signed the Sullivan Code of Corporate Conduct, have committed over $200 million in the last few years to improve conditions for blacks outside the workplace. They have built schools and provided teaching materials to black communities, assisted black legal defense organizations, paid for the legal defense of their employees who are arrested for apartheid law violations, sought and obtained the release of trade union leaders arrested during the state of emergency, and even undertaken a public program of corporate civil disobedience vis-à-vis apartheid laws.

These initiatives by the U.S. government and the private sector go beyond the moralizing and simplifying that have occupied so much attention in the South Africa debate. They are substantial efforts, but much more must be done. For that reason, the administration will continue its AID program in South Africa and promote the continued good work of the American business community there.

The administration also has proposed a multi-year, economic initiative to lessen the dependence of neighboring states on South Africa. This proposal would furnish $93 million through 1988 to rehabilitate alternate transport routes, promote economic reform, attract foreign investment, and facilitate trade between states.

What does the United States stand for in South Africa? Obviously we stand in solidarity against apartheid. But our message must emphasize preparation for a post-apartheid South Africa — a South Africa where all South Africans share in the fruits of a free market economy in the context of a viable democratic order.

A BATTLE-SCARRED VETERAN REFLECTS

by Herman W. Nickel

Having fought hard (if not skillfully) but having lost big in the battle over sanctions legislation, the Reagan administration cannot deny that U.S. relations with South Africa have entered a new, more difficult phase. Any inhibitions in the behavior of South Africa's government owing to the incentive of an improved relationship with the Reagan administration on one hand, and the Congressional threat of sanctions on the other have now been removed. As a result, Pretoria has become contemptuously oblivious of American influence. Just when an alarming polarization within South Africa and between South Africa and her neighbors is making the situation ever more

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dangerous, the U.S. ability to affect the course of events — never nearly as great as the internal and external foes of the apartheid regime assume — has been reduced to an all-time low.

Although these consequences were completely predictable to knowledgeable observers of the South African scene, they were not the principal concern of the sanctions movement. When the Senate joined the House and overrode the presidential veto, Senator Don Riegle of Michigan rightly observed that the vote showed how the American people felt. First and foremost, the sanctions expressed not only how Americans felt about the Simon Legree images of racist repression that flashed across their television screens nightly, but also how Americans like to feel about themselves. It would be strange if these scenes had not evoked indignation — an urge to "do something" to express anger and punish the villain, no matter how blunt or ineffective the punishment. How the legislation would actually help produce a more just order in South Africa, how it would affect the political dynamic in that strife-torn country were treated as essentially secondary questions, if at all. When I tried to broach these matters with a liberal East Coast senator in Cape Town late last summer, he cut me short impatiently. "Ambassador," he said, "this is not a question that you can simply address with logic." I then changed the subject.

We have been told incessantly that the Congressional action was needed to send South Africa a clear and unequivocal message. But what were the messages that actually came across to the intended addressees, South Africa's white rulers and the country's black majority?

That the American people and their government find apartheid an abhorrent obstacle to normal relations between the United States and South Africa could hardly have been news to the men who govern South Africa. The notion that the United States had not clarified its position for P. W. Botha, both through private and public communications, is ludicrous. As a battle-scarred veteran of bruising sessions with State President Botha, I know whereof I speak. If he failed to move faster to meet American time schedules for the dismantlement of apartheid and the beginning of negotiations with representative leaders of the black majority, it certainly was not because he was unaware of American impatience and the pressure for sanctions. On his scale of priorities other considerations simply mattered more, notably his perceptions of what was needed for his own, his party's, his government's, and his Afrikaner *volk*'s political survival.

What the rise of sanctions and disinvestment fever in the United States conveyed to Botha was something quite different — namely, the emergence of South Africa as an extension of the most sensitive American domestic issue, a phenomenon with a political life and dynamic of its own, which he had no way of containing, short of

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political surrender. That even a major reform like the scrapping of the pass laws, long cited as a prime grievance and listed in the 1985 Kennedy-Gray bill as a basis for lifting sanctions, failed to win him any significant credit confirmed his deeply ingrained Afrikaner distrust of foreign guile and his conviction that currying favor abroad was the path to self-destruction. His mounting truculence left little doubt that by at least the spring of 1986, P. W. Botha had not only accepted the inevitability of sanctions but had decided that the reality of sanctions was preferable to allowing himself to be "held up to ransom" by the threat of them. Both internally and regionally, the hawks of the security establishment, always more in tune with P. W. Botha's temperament than the doves, were flying as high as ever.

The equanimity with which Botha viewed the likely consequences of sanctions for his country's economy has been attributed to his own lack of economic sophistication and to the absence of the business community from his political constituency. But what one might describe as a state of grudging fatalism about the inevitability of sanctions and American disinvestment had taken hold even among many of his strongest white critics. Some of the very business leaders who had been pressing the government to move faster and farther on reform in order to stop the drift into isolation were becoming increasingly frustrated by what they called the "moving goalposts" syndrome, the escalation of foreign demands beyond the feasible. A meeting between a blue-ribbon group of South African business leaders and their counterparts from the U.S. Corporate Council on South Africa, held in Britain in early 1986, left the South African contingent with the clear impression that the U.S. business community was raising the ante of demanded changes primarily to put a moral and political gloss on a basic decision to wash their hands of a problem that simply was causing more headaches than the commercial returns warranted. Consequently, the leverage of the U.S. business community was reduced considerably.

The theory advanced most enthusiastically by former Australian Prime Minister and Commonwealth Eminent Person Malcolm Fraser, that sanctions were needed to mobilize the business community to push the government towards reform, ignores not only the business community's prior efforts and the limits of its influence with P.W. Botha, but also the essential fact that now business, willy-nilly, shares with the government the preoccupation with beating sanctions. While business leaders may continue to bemoan Botha's lack of vision, the sanctions have actually increased mutual interest and dependence in what used to be an adversarial relationship.

Botha's decision to call an early May election for the white chamber of the tricameral Parliament demonstrates that he saw the imposition of sanctions as an opportunity to reunite his National party constituency under the time-tested banner of standing together

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(*saamstan*) against his country's enemies, foreign and domestic. It will be recalled that after Vice President Walter F. Mondale had met with Botha's predecessor John Vorster, in Vienna in 1977, and announced that the United States would accept nothing short of one-man, one-vote, Vorster adroitly seized the opportunity to call an election and score a landslide victory by running against the Carter administration. It would seem that the United States has a special knack for playing to the defiant streak in the Afrikaner psyche. This time around, however, P. W. Botha may discover that many members of the white elite, including influential Afrikaners, will not allow him to use the sanctions bogey to distract them from their disenchantment with the style and substance of his leadership. The dramatic defections of South Africa's ambassador in London, Dennis Worrall, and Wynand Malan, a promising Young Turk MP, and the support they are attracting from leading Afrikaner intellectuals, are interesting straws in the wind.

But even more disturbing to the National party is evidence of growing strength of the extreme right-wing movements, whose rallies in old National party strongholds are drawing record crowds. It is P. W. Botha's political dilemma that his limited reforms, which anti-apartheid forces inside and outside South Africa contemptuously dismiss as a sham, are seen by conservative South African whites as the thin end of the wedge and a surrender to foreign meddlers. In the technical sense, to be sure, the National party majority in the white Parliament is safe. But Botha now stands a real chance of emerging from the elections as a loser if, instead of a strenghtened mandate, he ends up with a weakened one and an even more deeply divided white electorate. Whether at his age of seventy-one he would want to carry on much longer under such circumstances remains to be seen.

The one certain forecast is that no post-election South African government will rush to fulfill the conditions Congress has set for the lifting of sanctions within its deadline. As politicians, the members of Congress should best understand that to be seen to be caving in to a foreign ultimatum makes any such move far more difficult than it normally would be, even if it were desirable. Obviously members of Congress were more concerned with their own political problems than with those of their South African counterparts. Certainly, the notion that in order to reduce whatever mild pain sanctions inflict on its well-shielded constituents, a South African government would commit political suicide is absurd on its face. With very few exceptions, people prefer to take their chances on any other form of death, no matter how painful.

If the message sent by Congress to white South Africa was thus essentially destructive to American influence and relevance, was there at least a commensurate gain among the black majority? For

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many months such international media stars as Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Alan Boesak had established the willingness to impose sanctions as the litmus test of U.S. opposition to apartheid; and while various competing opinion polls have shown with remarkable consistency that the hard core of sanctions supporters — i.e., those who say they would even countenance widespread job losses, including their own — only makes up one-quarter of South African blacks, there is no doubt that the notion of the United States getting tough and applying thumbscrews to the South African government has wide appeal among South African blacks. Frustrated by their own inability to make a greater dent on the white power structure, many South African blacks cling to the sincere if unrealistic belief that if only the mighty United States wanted to, it could end the nightmare of apartheid "tomorrow," as Tutu puts it. The reverse side of this coin, of course, is that if the United States does not achieve this liberating result, it must be because it is not really trying. The suspicion that a predominantly white government in the United States cares more about South African whites than it does for the black majority blends easily with fanciful, but nonetheless popular, ideological notions that the driving force behind American policy is Wall Street capitalism.

It remains to be seen whether the initial euphoria among some black sanctions advocates at getting Congress to overturn Reagan administration policy will survive the discovery that the sanctions are making a bad situation worse, both economically and politically. Those who have staked their prestige on the sanctions issue will doubtless argue that sanctions are ineffective only because there have not been enough of them. Fingers are already pointing to the latest U.S.-British veto of mandatory sanctions in the Security Council. Similarly, the decision to exempt from the sanctions those strategic minerals that the United states can only obtain from South Africa was greeted with equal derision by both white and black South Africans. Yet it is hard to see how a responsible administration could accede to either of these demands. First, given the Security Council's unanimity requirement for lifting sanctions, a vote for mandatory sanctions would have the effect of making the Soviet Union the ultimate arbiter of an acceptable southern African settlement. And, second, so long as neither adequate strategic stockpiles nor substitutes are available, no administration is likely to risk the industrial breakdowns that would result from a sudden cut-off of South African supplies of critical minerals or, for that matter, a dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union.

In the end Americans will have to learn that there is no quick fix for the suspicions that cloud the perception of the United States in the faction-ridden world of black South African politics. Characteristically in polarized situations, each camp demands total identi-

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fication with its agenda, and anyone who insists on retaining even-handed access to rival groups — not to mention the government — is met with suspicion. Symbolic gestures or rhetoric will not remove these difficulties, for the simple reason that the United States is viewed as a great power capable of serious and consequential action. Once it becomes clear, therefore, that sanctions only make matters worse and do nothing to hasten political liberation, it is unlikely that the "message" sent by the United States will earn the everlasting gratitude of South African blacks. Though it is good for them to know that Americans care about their plight, one thing that is not a major concern to them is how Americans like to feel about themselves.

Moreover, and more worrisome, the imposition of sanctions may have diminished the South African government's tolerance of direct U.S. assistance programs that help the victims of apartheid in such fields as education, legal assistance, community self-help projects, black business advancement, and training programs for black trade unionists. While the $20 million annual volume of these programs seems small, it has provided a practical and effective way to reach out to scores of black communities all over South Africa, and all across the black spectrum. Through these programs, dedicated and gifted U.S. Mission officers were able to maintain excellent contacts with black community leaders of all shades of opinion. Since none of the programs were channeled through official authorities, they were always viewed suspiciously by the more conservative elements in the government, though officials in the field of black education found that they were made a practical contribution in an area of desperate need. Whether that enlightened view will survive the post-sanctions freeze in U.S.-South African relations and P. W. Botha's current anti-American wrath is uncertain. With the government no longer inclined to heed American appeals on human rights and reform issues, the demise of the programs would leave the U.S. embassy without effective tools.

Even more critical, however, is the damage done by the sanctions legislation to one of its explicitly stated goals — namely, getting the South African government to sit down with the representative leaders of the country's black majority to work out a political and constitutional accommodation. Any measure that increases white existential fears on one hand, while on the other fueling delusions among black leaders, that with the world on their side, they can hold out for total victory, runs counter to that objective. Yet, the realities of the South African situation cry out for accommodation. Any effort, any scheme by one side to dominate the other, no matter how cosmetically disguised, carries within itself the seeds of continued conflict and is therefore doomed to failure. That the present system of racial domination can only be maintained by a state of emergency attests to its political bankruptcy. Government reform schemes that

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create a mere facade of power sharing in a race-based constitutional system underscore the bankruptcy, as do those who demand the transfer of all power, with the declamatory language of the Freedom Charter disguising the absence of effective constitutional checks and balances and the protection of individual rights by an independent judiciary.

Many astute observers have sadly concluded that the time for accommodation is not yet ripe — simply because the parties to the conflict have not yet fathomed the full depths of pain that the other side can inflict. There is an element of truth, of course, in the old adage that things must get worse before they get better. But how much worse?

Allowing the situation to drift would be a terrifying scenario for the people of South Africa, and for the 150 million people of the entire region, of which it is an inseparable and crucial part. Accommodation sooner rather than later is imperative in terms of American and Western interests. Already the downward spiral of unrest and repression has cost South Africa dearly in human lives and suffering, in the loss of international banking confidence, and in sanctions and disinvestment.

The principal responsibility to muster the political will and vision to break out of this vicious circle rests with South Africans themselves, and most particularly with the South African government. Last year's efforts by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) seemed to be making unexpected progress in separate discussions of a "negotiating concept" with Foreign Minister Pik Botha and the imprisoned Nelson Mandela, and was awaiting an answer from the exiled African National Congress (ANC) leadership in Lusaka, when State President P. W. Botha authorized his military security chiefs to stage commando raids on purported ANC targets in neighboring Commonwealth countries, which effectively killed the initiative (taking the ANC leadership off the hook in the process).

Under the present circumstances the inclination of the South African government to seek or to accept international mediation is even lower than at the time of the EPG initiative. Even then, the idea of releasing Mandela in the same context as unbanning and dealing with the ANC, an organization he has consistently attacked as Communist controlled and terrorist, was anathema to P. W. Botha (though he may have seen the tactical benefits of not declining the EPG initiative out of hand). The notion of having to accept outside help to end conflict in his country, and in the process raising the ANC to the same level as his government, grated on P. W. Botha. The high visibility reception of ANC leader Oliver Tambo by Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington (a city he himself has never been invited to visit) has no doubt reinforced his deep-seated suspicion that at the first impasse the outside world would come

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down on the side of the ANC. Unfortunately, when the issues at stake are seen as a matter of survival, people are not inclined to commit their fate to intermediaries, even less so when the latter are seen as hostile or naive, or both.

One can only speculate on prospects for negotiation if heavy election losses to the right-wing opposition traumatize the National party. Such an outcome will likely reinforce the present inclination to use the state of emergency to reassure whites and impress blacks that the party is prepared to be tough and to talk only to those blacks who have gotten the message and are prepared to accept the terms of reference of a race-based system.

Does this mean that in the face of a deteriorating southern African situation, the United States is reduced to the role of a helpless onlooker?

No one who has served in South Africa for four and a half years can fail to be painfully aware of the gap between the perceptions and the reality of effective American leverage in an internal conflict that touches the raw nerves of survival and the vital interest and aspirations of all the players. As a multiracial society committed to democratic values, the United States will always have greater concern about running higher influence in South Africa. This creates a political problem for a rational and sustained diplomacy that will be compounded by the tendency of the victims of the system to attribute to the United States greater powers than it actually has. The United States must accept that the major impetus for change must come from within South Africa itself and that U.S. influence alone is marginal unless it combines with and is helpful to internal forces that share its interest and commitment to accommodation and democratic values. That is how the United States can help to create the critical mass needed to move things forward.

Since the odds against a direct effort to broker an agreement at this time are far too great in relation to the risk, a more useful contribution for the United States and its Western and Japanese allies would be to clarify to all sides what the alliance stands for, both as to the method and the substance of the desired changes. In the wake of sanctions, it is essential to let all sides know that the measures taken — whether by the Congress or the European Community or the Japanese government — do not signal support for any party's total victory scenario, but, on the contrary, support for negotiations in which the just and vital concerns of all South Africans are addressed and adequately protected. This would make clear that U.S. interest goes beyond the end of apartheid to what President Reagan has defined as "a democratic system in which the rights of majorities and minorities and individuals are protected by a bill of rights and firm constitutional guarantees."

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Such a benchmark statement — the next economic summit in Venice might provide the occasion — would be fully compatible with the language the Congress overwhelmingly endorsed in the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. It would also reflect the interests of the front-line states who, fiery rehetoric notwithstanding, have every reason to do all in their power to encourage accommodation, so that the internal South African conflict does not destroy them through economic and political disruption and escalating cross-border violence. Over the long run there is simply no way in which their urgent economic problems can be effectively addressed outside the context of political accommodation with the country that happens to be the economic and logistical hub of the region. But that accommodation will not occur unless the political deadlock in South Africa's internal conflict is broken. It is in their vital interest to assist this process.

If the popular phrase "being on the right side of history" means anything in the southern African context, it must be to do all we can to foster the ultimately indispensable accommodation, rather than fanning the fires of holocaust. At the very least we should avoid all actions that make accommodation more difficult. Occasionally activists would do well to ponder the Socratic principle that if you cannot do good, you should do nothing rather than do evil.

A NEW POLICY — SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

by Henry Bienen

United States policy towards South Africa has been marked by continuity and change over the last decade, a period that spans the Carter administration and the two Reagan administrations. Changes have occurred both within and between Republican and Democratic administrations as U.S. policy makers responded to major events in South Africa, to changes in the southern African region, and to swings in Soviet-American relations.

The Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement aimed at a process of change, such that South Africa should be seen to move towards reform. The idea was that South Africa needed time to work out domestic political and economic arrangements that would be more conducive to the resolution of its severe racial conflicts. If South Africa could demonstrate to the neighboring front line states a genuine willingness to negotiate on Namibia and to make internal changes, its neighbors would, in turn, be more tolerant of a reform process and cease to harbor South African dissidents. This required ending apartheid. Beyond that, the actual end state to be achieved within South Africa was not defined. Indeed, the Reagan adminis-

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tration claimed again and again that it was for South Africans, all South Africans, to decide the shape of the polity, although the United States — or at least some U.S. officials, especially Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker — has seemed to accept the idea of a nonracial South Africa, one with universal franchise. The administration has also seemed committed to an undivided South African territory (no Homelands) and to a South Africa with majority rule, although this has never been defined in racial terms.

While these very general goals have been retained, they seem increasingly elusive in the face of stalemate on Namibia, continuing military incursions by South Africa against its neighbors; and above all in the context of the significant violence within South Africa over the last two years. Given the South African government's imposition of emergency decrees and its unwillingness or inability to negotiate with black leaders, the United States Congress overrode President Ronald Reagan's veto of sanctions legislation in 1986. Prohibitions were imposed on new investment in South Africa; restrictions were placed on trade; landing rights for South African Airways were revoked; and South Africa's sugar quota was given to the Philippines. While these measures break with the past, they do not amount to a policy toward South Africa. Where does the United States go from here? What should U.S. policy towards South Africa be?

The options are limited. There is no turning back to "constructive engagement": there will be no more American carrots for so-called reform measures while the South African government increases repression. But a full-scale onslaught against the Botha regime (or any of its probable successors), is not likely to be undertaken, much less to succeed.

The United States is left with a policy that involves partial sanctions over a long period of time, with less importance given to South Africa. Call this partial disengagement or selective engagement. The label does not matter. What is required is realism about the limits of U.S. influence and clear thinking into the future of South Africa.

Presently, a stalemate exists between the regime and its opponents. Despite the many Africans arrested and the more than two thousand killed over two years, the Botha government cannot crush the widespread dissidence across South Africa's black townships and peri-urban areas. Clearly, the Reagan administration underestimated the blacks' ability to challenge the system of white domination. At this point, neither the regime nor the dissidents have employed all the force they can muster. In the foreseeable future, neither side can force the other to submit to its demands.

Chances are good that today's low-level civil war will escalate. There is an obvious racial base to the conflict in that the struggle is about power defined in racial terms, but fighting among black ethnic groups has also increased over the last year. The very removal of the

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government's authority in the townships increases the prospects of growing strife among blacks.

A creeping paralysis affects the ability of the Botha regime to make and implement decisions consistently. On the black side, even if Nelson Mandela were released from prison, he might not be able to negotiate with the Botha government and maintain his credbility with the masses. Thus, conditions for negotiation of conflict may not exist in South Africa.

In this context, the U.S. commitment to peaceful change in South Africa is worthy but unrealistic. Growing instability must be anticipated. This requires that the United States distance itself from South Africa's present rulers. Washington can do this because it has no major strategic or economic interests in South Africa. The idea of a strategic Cape Route is far-fetched. If the Soviet Union were to interdict oil supplies, it would strike at the Persian Gulf ports and refineries or attack tankers at choke points in the Gulf. South Africa's industrial output is not important for the West. Scenarios of a southern African minerals cartel led by a Soviet-dominated, black-ruled South Africa are not convincing. Southern African countries need to export. Prudent stockpiling (of chromium especially) and development of new sources and substitutes for platinum-based minerals would make a cartel even more improbable. Disruptions in the supply of minerals from South Africa are more likely to come from internal political instability and labor unrest, sabotage of mines or transport grids, and regional inter-state conflict than from Soviet intervention per se.

While the United States is not vulnerable to South Africa, that country is not highly vulnerable either, although South Africa requires external capital for growth. Sanctions will not bring down the white regime. Many could be evaded unless a physical blockade of the country were enforced. The sanctions that are imposed would raise economic costs to South Africa, but these cannot easily be translated into political leverage. Some sanctions are actually counterproductive: it is foolish to cut off transport ties or hinder communications with South Africa.

Still, with all their weaknesses and warts, sanctions are a necessary part of U.S. policy. The United States does care deeply about South Africa's repression of its black people. South Africa is one of the few foreign-policy issues that resonates deeply in our domestic political life. Congress has expressed American abhorrence of this regime. Sanctions can be relaxed, however, if meaningful reforms are implemented.

There are, nonetheless, no good alternatives to using selective and partial sanctions, and to working towards reform albeit with realism, not foolish optimism. Are Americans willing to go so far as to participate in physical blockades to enforce trade embargoes? Can Americans envision U.S. peacekeeping troops in South Africa? The

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answers are no for the time being. But as long as South African white soldiers continue to fire on blacks, and white emigration remains within bounds, a Botha-type South African regime will not topple. South Africa is not the Philippines or Iran.

A day-to-day U.S. involvement in South Africa's troubled future is not likely to be welcomed by any of the contending parties. In this context, both morality and good sense mandate ending support for the Botha regime and better positioning the United States for contacts with blacks who will participate in the governing of South Africa in the future. It is not clear who these will be, or what their prospects are. The United States cannot enmesh itself in South Africa, but it can be forthright in its condemnation and realistic about its influence.

If violence escalates, one possible posture for the United States is to step back from the deep involvement that constructive engagement has implied. In human and political terms, the United States would hope to be able to mitigate violence in South Africa — but is this possible? And, at what cost to other values? Does the United States have a bias for peace and stability in South Africa over meaningful political change?

The United States has often been conflicted in its foreign policy over what policy makers have seen as different forks in the road labeled "ideals" and "self-interest." The resolution of contradictions between ideals and self-interest is said to lie in the grounding of moral principles on political reality. For Secretary of State George Shultz, resolution in the South African context lies in a policy of political negotiation between the government and representative black leaders.[1] But what if black leaders who want to negotiate cannot appear at the table because of violence and intimidation? What if the South African government is too split and paralyzed to negotiate? The United States could distance itself from the current government and still continue to trade with it, maintaining contacts with black leaders.

A policy recommendation for selective engagement may be difficult for the United States to follow for domestic reasons. Even if foreign-policy makers have had a restrained view of their influence in South Africa, many Americans — students who think divestment is a major weapon, Congressmen, and other leaders (black and white), who press for sanctions — may have an exaggerated view of American influence and power. Indeed, it can be predicted that as violence increases within South Africa, American constituencies will fragment over the "what is to be done?" question. A policy of disengagement

[1]Secretary of State George Shultz, "Morality and Realism in American Foreign Policy," address before the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, October 2, 1985, New York City, published as *Current Policy* No. 748, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

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will be as fraught with difficulties and open to attack as the policy of constructive engagement has been.

One final irony. Chester Crocker, in his pre-administration formulation of constructive engagement, seemed to think a more sophisticated understanding of the South African situation alone would increase American influence in South Africa. The American public has become more sophisticated about South Africa as its information has increased. But the level of awareness and understanding among the American people may make a more flexible and self-interested policy in South Africa more difficult, not less. Flexible impositon of sanctions and opening a dialogue with leaders of the African National Congress will be insufficient for many Americans who want to see immediate movement to majority, meaning black, rule.

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SECRETS FROM THE CIA ARCHIVE IN TEHRAN

by Edward Jay Epstein

The heart of the intelligence business is the surreptitious theft of state secrets from other nations. The whole idea is to get unexpected intelligence, i.e., data that a foe does not anticipate being intercepted. Effectiveness requires airtight secrecy, because the usefulness of the intelligence derived from this data depends on the other side's not realizing that it is missing or compromised. Once an adversary realizes that a particular secret is known, it can act to diminish its value. For example, if a nation learns that one of its diplomatic codes has been broken, it can either change the code or use it to channel messages it wants its adversary to read. In other words, it becomes expected intelligence, and, as such, like stories put out by Tass, must be assumed to be possibly under the control of the adversary.

To maintain their flow of unexpected secrets, intelligence services have a double job. First, they must steal secrets of value — which is the easy part; second, they must conceal all traces of the theft for as long as they want the information to remain valuable. To meet this latter requisite, espionage agents are instructed to photocopy documents in place rather than tampering with them or removing them; and, where this is not possible, intelligence services employ expert staffs to obliterate any signs of tampering or temporary removal. The security problem does not end, however, with hiding the original theft. Intelligence services must protect that stolen secret, such as a code, even after it is put to use — to ensure its future use. This final task often requires the creation of a set of alternative false, though plausible, sources to prevent an adversary's ascertaining from the use of the intelligence what — or who — might have compromised or supplied it. The protection of sources and methods also involves fabricating red herrings to divert, confuse, and overload enemy investigations with extraneous and false information. When British intelligence learned of German military operations in World War II through its intercepts of coded signals, it protected the secret by creating fictional human agents who could be plausibly assigned the credit for the coup. In the same manner, human sources are often hidden behind a screen of fictional scientific devices.

This necessary practice of intelligence services — protecting truths with bodyguards of lies or diversions — has resulted in the systematic pollution of public knowledge about espionage through

Edward Jay Epstein is writing a book on international deception.

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deliberately planted fictions. Intelligence services employ entire covert actions staffs to muddy the waters around important cases by leaking selected bits of information. For example, the "story" of Oleg Penkovskiy, a Soviet GRU (military intelligence) officer in contact with British intelligence in the mid-1950s and then again in the early 1960s, has been produced in different versions by three intelligence services — the CIA, the KGB, and the British. The CIA indeed fabricated a diary for him that became a best seller in the United States. Although both CIA and British counterintelligence had grave suspicions about the information Penkovskiy supplied, especially during his latter career, the CIA's public version credited him for events to which he had no connection. While such sprinklings of untruths into the historic record may be justifiable from the point of view of protecting sources and methods, and therefore vital to the integrity of the intelligence organization, the resulting distortions make it virtually impossible for outsiders to understand the intelligence business (which may not be entirely unintentional). Indeed, even in the United States, except for the rare glimpses provided by Congressional hearings, such as those of the Church Committee, the public perception of the secret world of intelligence has always been closely controlled by the services themselves either through contract employees who write books they submit for review or through defectors under contract to the CIA, FBI, or DIA who, after being briefed, contact journalists or Congressional staffs.

This was the situation until November 1979 when Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in fifty-four volumes under the title *Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den*, and are sold in the United States for $246.50. Because the Tehran embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, the scope of this captured intelligence far exceeds reports on Iran alone; it covers the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. There are also secret analyses of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Presumably, these thousands of documents, which include cryptonyms and routing instructions from and to concerned agencies of the U. S. government, have been extensively analyzed by the KGB and other intelligence services interested in the sources and methods used by the CIA.

Most revealing are the CIA's own internal directives that span a twenty-year period. Read in chronological order, they reveal remarkable conceptual changes in the way the CIA conceived of its

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job — and enemy. It casts an entirely new light on the bitter battles that tore the CIA apart in the mid-1970s, and it explains some of its more recent failures to evaluate intelligence defectors properly.

The watershed year was 1973 — just after the retirement of Richard Helms. That year saw a 180 degree switch in the crucial policy concerning the recruitment of Soviet Bloc officials, appropriately called Redtops. At issue, was the way that these Redtops, primarily communist diplomats, intelligence officers, or military attachés stationed abroad, were to be treated if they "walked in" and surreptitiously approached American officials, offering either to defect or to remain in place and supply U.S. intelligence with Soviet secrets. Would they be assumed to be sincere defectors and become enrolled in American espionage? Or would they be suspected of being KGB disinformation agents and held in limbo? This conceptual determination is central to the the spy business.

Until 1973, the CIA had assumed that Soviet intelligence services commonly used "provocations" as a technique to test and manipulate its opponents in the intelligence game. As bait, the KGB would order Soviet embassy officials to make contact with U.S. officials and feign disloyalty. Over the years, the CIA had found that a large number of Redtop officials who contacted the CIA, ostensibly to defect, proved to be under the control of the KGB. They were used to confuse American intelligence with disinformation, to lead it on a wild goose chase, to expose its sources or methods, or to embarrass it by contriving an incident. As early as 1959, to guard against KGB-controlled provocateurs, the CIA insisted that the bona fides of a Redtop walk-in be established through a counterintelligence investigation before he is treated as a source of intelligence. This procedure was explicitly defined in "Director of Central Intelligence Directive 4/2," signed by Allan Dulles. It states :

> The establishment of bona fides of disaffected persons will be given particular attention because of the demonstrated use of defector channels by hostile services to penetrate or convey false or deceptive information to U.S. Intelligence services. [1]

The responsibility for determining "bona fides" was assigned to the chief of the counterintelligence staff, James Angleton, and it obviously gave him great power over the recruitment of Redtops. It also led to considerable rivalries within the CIA, and especially with the Soviet Russia Division, which wanted to control its own recruits among Soviet officials.

In 1973, William E. Colby, whose main experience in the CIA had been in paramilitary and political activities, became first the comptroller, then director, of Central Intelligence. It was the beginning of a revolution. As he explains in his autobiography, he rejected

[1] *Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den*, LIII, p.8. Hereafter, these documents will be abbreviated as D.F.D.

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the complicated view of KGB strategic deception. Instead of worry about such enemy tricks, he saw the job of the CIA as straightforward intelligence gathering for the president. To accomplish this, he believed "walk-in" defectors should be encouraged and given the benefit of a doubt, rather than met with suspicion. He complained that in the past the CIA "spent an inordinate amount of time worried about false defectors and false agents." The Tehran archive reveals how far Colby went in abruptly revising this doctrine on Redtops. A top secret order, "Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins," sent to all CIA stations in 1973, advised:

> Analysis of REDTOP walk-ins in recent years clearly indicates that REDTOP services have been seriously using sophisticated and serious walk-ins as a provocation technique. However, fear of provocations has been more responsible for bad handling than any other cause. We have concluded that we do ourselves a disservice if we shy away from promising cases because of fear of provocation . . . We are confident that we are capable of determining whether or not a producing agent is supplying bona fide information. [2]

Instead of holding Redtops in abeyance until their bona fides could be established, the new doctrine gave case officers in the Soviet Bloc divisions carte blanche to recruit "producing agents" on the assumption that their worth would be established after the fact by the quantity and quality of information they furnished. The new order changed the entire philosophy of the CIA in a single stroke. By effectively eliminating the prior task of establishing bona fides, it undermined Angleton's position in the CIA and made superfluous his counterintelligence staff. Thus, it is not surprising that Angleton, after bitterly fighting this new policy, which contradicted the empirical findings of the past twenty years, was forced out. Although Angleton was fired in December 1974, after Colby first planted a news leak (which won a Pulitzer Prize) with the *New York Times*, the full dimensions of this power struggle only became known through the documents in the Tehran archive.

These top secret internal directives also reveal a sudden increase in 1973 in the CIA's confidence in its ability to run and service agents in hostile territory. Until 1973, the CIA considered such contacts behind enemy lines a difficult and dangerous enterprise. Not only did the KGB maintain a full-court press of surveillance, especially around the embassy, but it was known to use double-agents to entrap intermediaries who might be used as couriers. In January 1973, there was a dramatic change in the CIA's appreciation of this situation. On January 9, in a top secret cable, the CIA's Soviet Bloc division, code named BK Herald, informed all stations abroad:

> BK Herald can and does run many resident agents inside the REDTOP countries. We have the capability to mount and support such operations over an indefinite

[2] D.F.D., LIII, p. 32.

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period, and we currently are able to exfiltrate agents, in most cases with their families, from the REDTOP countries when it is time for them to leave.[3]

In other words, the new CIA believed that it could not only recruit untested Redtop walk-ins at foreign embassies but that after they returned to Moscow, it could contact them with impunity, employ them as "resident agents" (or moles), and then, if necessary, smuggle them, and their families, out of Russia. This fearless bluster, presumably based on doubts about the efficiency of the Soviet security services — "The KGB is not 10 feet tall" — proved to be disastrously short lived. By 1978, the KGB had arrested a large number of the CIA's resident agents in Moscow, including Anatoli Filatov, Alexandr Ogorodnik, and Vladimir Kalinin, and had used other CIA recruits, such as Sanya Lipavsky, as provocateurs to discredit the dissident movement.

The Tehran documents also provide a surprisingly lucid picture of the basic exercises involved in espionage. The "first imperative," according to the January 9, 1973, directive, is to discourage any potential Redtop dissident from actually defecting. If he does, it will be known to the Soviets, and they can be expected to take measures to nullify the value of his information. Instead, he should be persuaded to return to his post and maintain secret contact. In CIA parlance, this is a "turn around." In cases where the Redtop is not a position of access, the CIA explains "we are prepared to guide and assist him in his career [in the Soviet government], running him in place until he develops the access we need." The CIA, in other words, operated on the premise that it could promote Soviet personnel in their careers in the Soviet foreign office, armed forces, and KGB by supplying them with information and, in doing so, maneuver them into positions where they could steal or intercept secrets that were valuable to the United States. The idea is to develop a mole. "Our ultimate objective is to have the walk-in return to his home country and continue his agent relationship while working inside."[4]

These directives also include the nuts and bolts details of espionage. There are, for example, step-by-step instructions for recruiting for the job of a mole a Soviet Bloc official who contacts a U.S embassy. (If the officer on duty does not speak his language, there are convenient cards in Russian and Chinese.) First, the walk-in is told to return to his comrades and say nothing about the contact. Then, he is handed a chemical Secret Writing kit (SW), which allows him to develop invisible addenda to letters. He is also assigned his "Indicator," or code word, which signals that an otherwise innocuous-looking letter contains a message. In return, the Soviet Bloc official is asked to supply a home mailing address or to address an envelope

[3] D.F.D., LIII, p. 29.
[4] D.F.D., LIII, pp. 28-29.

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to himself. He is told he can "expect a letter [mailed securely in his own country by a BK HERALD officer] containing an SW message with instructions two to three months after his return." [5]

Next, the CIA sends a so-called ops package to the Soviet Union (or wherever) "containing covert communications materials, reporting requirements and other instructions" for the agent-to-be which is "deaddropped" — i.e., stashed in a safe location such as a tree trunk. Finally, a message in secret writing is mailed to him telling the walk-in where to pick up this ops package.[6] Once he receives his equipment, the recruit becomes a full-fledged spy — photocopying requested documents, answering CIA questionnaires, and depositing the data in his dead drop.

Other documents in the archives show that the CIA did not merely wait for Redtop walk-ins to stray into the embassy. It set up operations ("ops") to approach, tempt, compromise, and recruit Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers. To begin these "ops," U.S. intelligence officers pored through "biographical" research reports, prepared by U.S. and allied embassies, on Soviet diplomatic personnel in Iran and sifted out possibly vulnerable Redtops. For example, it was reported that one recently transferred Soviet diplomat's wife had been President Nikolai Kosygin's mistress. If true, it might make him amenable to betraying his country. As it turned out, the report was false (she had merely been Kosygin's secretary), and the "op" was scrapped.[7] After a "target" was selected, the "op" frequently employed intermediaries, called "access agents" to approach him. The longest such case involved the use of an American doctor, who worked with Soviet doctors in a hospital in Tehran — for the task of befriending the targets.[8] If the "op" went well, the Redtop was maneuvered into a meeting with the CIA recruiter, who would then attempt to trick or induce him into cooperating. As it turned out, despite persistent efforts by the CIA and by air force intelligence, these "ops" against Redtops rarely, if ever, succeeded in Iran (at least not in the published documents). The CIA had more apparent success in recruiting Iranian diplomats in the period following the overthrow of the shah in 1978. An entire volume of CIA documents is devoted to the intriguing arrangements necessary for clandestine contacts with two such Iranian officials, code named SDLURE and SDROTTER.[9] What is less clear is whether they and other Iranians in contact with the CIA were providing any secret data or whether they were acting on behalf of the Iranian Foreign Ministry in furnishing infor-

[5] D.F.D., LIII, p. 30.
[6] Ibid.
[7] D.F.D., LII, pp. 32-36.
[8] D.F.D., LII, pp. 44-75. The code name for the agent was "Larry Giel."
[9] D.F.D., IX, passim.

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mation intended to moderate American concerns about the new regime (and help release blocked U.S. arms).

Beyond exposing such espionage activities, the archive provides a rare measure of the quality of diplomatic reporting. This cable traffic between U.S. embassies and Washington — which is in effect daily, if unpublished, journalism — was based mainly on conversations with foreign diplomats from both friendly and unfriendly nations. In Iran, for example, U.S. political officers regularly sought out their counterparts in the Soviet embassy, and, while treating them to dinner at the Tehran Steak House, pressed them with questions about Soviet intentions in countries around the world. The answers were presumed to be the quasi-official Soviet line. (In return, the Soviets invited Americans to the sauna in the Soviet embassy.)[10]

These messages from foreign sources, reviewed in the hindsight of history, show the extent to which nations used diplomatic contacts to test, manipulate, and control their adversaries. The way the Soviet Union used diplomatic channels to de-sensitize the United States to its planned coup in Afghanistan in October 1979 is a case in point. Having backed the socialist government of Taraki and Amin that had seized power in April 1978, the Soviets were then facing a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Despite over one billion dollars in Soviet economic and military aid, and some 4,000 Soviet military advisers, the Afghan socialists had been unable to deal with the growing Muslim insurgency, which, as CIA documents reveal, was financed secretly by Saudi Arabia.[11] The Soviet Union decided in the summer of 1979, as later became evident, that to suppress the rebellion, it would have to take direct charge of the war, which meant replacing the Afghan leaders (who still retained some claim of independence from Moscow). In preparing this coup, the Soviets sent a series of messages to the American embassy, beginning in June, through both its own minister, V.S. Safronchuk and the East German ambassador, Dr. Hermann Schwiesau. As the American ambassador reported in the secret section of a July 18 cable to Washington. "Over the last 3 weeks, we had hints of a Soviet assisted internal coup both from GDR Ambassador Schwiesau and from . . . Safronchuk." He explained that Schwiesau had become the "One of our most important sources of . . . Moscow's thinking."

The message from the East German ambassador was stated in no uncertain terms. Moscow would not allow the socialist coup to interfere, even if it meant direct intervention. He explained: "Safronchuk had been given the task, by Moscow, to bring about a 'radical change' in the Government" of Afghanistan. Then, spelling out the course of action — and even giving the approximate date, he "indi-

[10] D.F.D., L, pp.43-88.
[11] D.F.D., XXX, pp.142-43.

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cated that a military intraparty coup, deposing of Amin and perhaps others, is what the Soviets intend."[12] The message of Moscow's planned coup was pointedly repeated on at least three other occasions that month. In addition, numerous instances of undisguised Soviet military moves to support its intervention in Afghanistan were reported in the cable traffic.[13] This was precisely what happened that fall.

In retrospect, it appears that Moscow purposely telegraphed its intentions to intervene to test U.S. reaction. Implicit in these messages was Moscow's claim to a legitimate sphere of influence over this region, and its responsibility for preventing the breakdown of law and order (which is why it advised embassy personnel on their safety). Moreover, if Moscow had any feedback at all from the American embassy, it realized that the United States purposely chose to downplay the possibility of Soviet military intervention — though it had evidence to the contrary. No one, in the cable traffic, contradicted the Soviet thesis that Afghanistan was its problem to solve. The Carter administration neither protested the planned Soviet coup nor publicly revealed the Soviet military escalations in Afghanistan that summer. Its failure to respond was presumably taken by Moscow as a tacit green light for its coup. The subsequent claims of complete surprise by President Jimmy Carter, which were accepted by Congress and the press at the time, are unfathomable in the light of this cable traffic.[14] The more important issue is why this intelligence was furnished by the USSR through diplomatic channels in advance of its intervention.

Such private messages between superpowers are essential to understanding the logic of statecraft. They are not, however, available to historians and political scientists — at least not with their all important secret appendices — except in rare circumstances. In this respect, the captured documents in the Tehran archive yield the missing pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. They afford historians a unique opportunity to examine international relations in the light of contemporaneous communications.

Apart from extraordinary insights into intelligence and diplomacy, these documents include numerous secret studies of problems of both historic and current interest. The DIA's 170-page secret analysis of international terrorism, for example, which traces an overwhelming preponderance of the 1973-78 incidents to Syrian intelligence officers seconded to PLO factions, suggests a sinister continuum with recent incidents linked to Syrian intelligence. This report, based on communications intelligence, and not meant for

[12] D.F.D., XXIX, pp. 180-81.
[13] D.F.D., XXX, passim.
[14] See, for example, Telex from U.S. Embassy Kabul to Secretary of State, September 6, 1979, Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan, D.F.D., XXX, pp. 52-57.

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public release, indicates that the U.S. government was well aware of the Syrian role in terrorism (as well as of the supporting roles played by Iraq and Algeria in furnishing documents to terrorists) eight years before the revelations in London this summer about the attempt to blow up an El Al airliner. Also of considerable interest is the CIA's secret study, "Outlook For Soviet Oil and Gas," touted by Admiral Stansfield Turner as an example of the agency's analytic ability. As it turns out, the study errs egregiously in predicting a sharp decline in Soviet oil and gas production by 1985. Soviet oil production has actually increased to 11 million barrels a day, as has its gas production.[15]

From the viewpoint of keeping secret the legitimate workings of U.S. national security mechanisms, it would have been better if these documents had been destroyed before the embassy was surrendered. But having been published, the documents cannot be ignored. For just as the Soviet archive at Smolensk, captured intact by the German army in 1941, and subsequently taken by the Americans in 1945, gave rise to a new perspective on the governmental operations of the Soviet Union, the Tehran documents will provide much-needed material for scholars interested in the operations of intelligence and diplomatic channels.

[15] D.F.D., L, pp. 3-30.

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THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

by Emmanuel Sivan

Nightmare

It is Muharram, the first month of the Islamic year in Cairo; a city where the two main public squares are no longer called "Liberation" and "Republic," but "Caliph 'Umar" and the "Orthodox Caliphs." Three months have passed since the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution that took power in Egypt. The Revolutionary Leader issues "Proclamation No. 10 of the Islamic Revolution," summing up the ninety-odd days that have elapsed since Mubarak's regime was toppled.

This is the scenario for a piece of political science fiction recently published by an Egyptian diplomat and Islamic scholar, Hussein Ahmad Amin.[1] The aim of the exercise was to answer the questions that students of Islamic radicalism are so often asked: What is the radicals' plan? What would their regime actually look like? In a deft parody of the radicals' style, the "Proclamation" details the new regime's main achievements.

During the first weeks, it explains, a purge exterminated hundreds of "leading secularists, atheists and artists, as well as Copts [Egyptian Christians], Communists, Socialists, Nasserists, Wafdists and members of all other destructive schools of thought." Among the executed were such major Egyptian novelists as Tawfiq al-Hakim, Najib Mahfuz, and Yusuf Idris, as well as Hussein Amin himself, who was punished for his famous diatribe against the radicals, *Guide of the Sad Muslim* (1983).

The Shari'a (Islamic law) was declared the law of the land and, in accordance, "all political parties were banned, newspapers closed down, [forbidden] books burnt, censorship imposed." Political opposition was outlawed and the regime's opponents were imprisoned or put to death. In a word, democracy — which, the Leader admitted, had helped the Muslim radicals flourish and infiltrate society's every nook and cranny under Mubarak — was definitely abrogated where it ran counter to the Shari'a.

A full-fledged cultural revolution was unleashed, including the "closing down of theatres, museums, movie houses and cabarets and

[1] *Al-Musawwar*, September 26, 1986.

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all other nests of mortal sin and purveyors of depravity." Radio and television programs were restricted to religious topics and the same held for the daily and periodical press. A total ban was imposed on song and dance shows ("which serve nothing but to excite base desires"), on plays and films ("those ensnaring and satanical Western imports"), and on modern-style novels and short stories ("which merely serve to divert people's attention from Allah"). Foreign books could no longer be imported into Egypt.

In the school system the established curricula were abolished, the teaching of foreign languages forbidden; "the theories of Darwin, Copernicus and Galileo, Newton and Einstein, which contradict the Koran, were likewise banned from the classroom" and replaced by the works of medieval (and modern fundamentalist) theologians. As a result, many of the educated decided to emigrate, but they were "Westoxicated," and so, good riddance.

To seal the country against "cultural imperialism," foreign tourism was ended. The Commander of the Revolution acknowledged the resultant financial loss but replied that "GNP growth is not the end-all of our mortal existence." He argued that the disappearance of tourism saves Egypt from the invasion of impudent and depraved foreigners: no more shall we suffer the eyesore of their women walking in shorts in our streets or almost nude on our beaches, breaking taboos and polluting the moral sense of our youth."

Nonetheless, much of the danger came from within, and so a strict policing of morals was instituted. Children, the best agents, were encouraged to report to the authorities if their parents or elders failed to observe religious precepts by neglecting prayer, eating during Ramadan, avoiding donations to the building of mosques, or by buying and hanging paintings, let alone ridiculing the regime.

The imposition of the Shari'a meant drastic changes for two major groups, women and non-Muslims. Women lost all political rights and the right to work; their greater devotion to child-rearing and lessened exposure to temptation more than compensated for the loss of their productive capacity. To further secure their virtue, they were forbidden to use public transportation and principal streets — a measure that offered the additional advantage of relieving the overcrowded spaces.

Copts also lost political rights and became subject to the medieval poll-tax (*jizya*) again. They could not serve in the army or fill upper positions in the government. New churches could not be built nor old ones repaired.

The Commander of the Revolution acknowledged some problems. Fissures among the revolutionary leaders ended in two of the Commander's chief aides being executed. (One of them, the prime minister, was accused of hiding alcoholic beverages and pornographic video cassettes in his house.) Prominent fellow-travelers had been

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executed for deviationism. The author takes evident pleasure in making it clear that the latter includes two prominent Leftists, Tariq al-Bishri and 'Adil Hussein, who adopted fundamentalist Islam during the late seventies.[2] These "New Traditionalists" had the temerity, said the Proclamation, to argue that Copts should be granted the same human rights as Muslims and that restrictions on woman's garb were too harsh. "Human rights, what else!" explodes the Commander. "It is as though Man has the right to hold and express views which transgress those laid down by his Creator. Such alleged rights are Western falsehoods and have no place in true Islam."

Graver still was the perseverance of Egypt's perennial ills — insufficient and decaying housing, primitive and crowded means of transportation, an elephantine bureaucracy, illiteracy, and an underlying economic crisis. The Leader half-heartedly admitted that promises made by Islamic radicals in years past were too rosy, too simple. Finally, he indicated, miracles can be expected to happen — perhaps oil would be found in Cairo.

Disregarding the last remarks (or another on the need to curtail nightly entertainment to save electricity) — remarks proferred with tongue in cheek — the Amin scenario is as good a guide to the radicals' likely behavior in power as one can find. The Islamic radicals, he shows, lack detailed plans for the day after the revolution. This was the case with the group that assassinated Sadat. N. Guenena, an Egyptian researcher who studied its ideology in detail, found no plan for the day after the assassination other than the establishment of a "Council of Men of Religion" and a "Consultative Council" to whom the conduct of the country's affairs would have been entrusted. The same holds true for other underground organizations in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco.[3] Even the most ambitious books written in recent years by such Arab Islamic radicals as Sa'id Hawwa (Syria), 'Abd al-Salam Yasin (Morocco), and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (Lebanon)[4] barely move beyond sketching the constitutional outlines of the Islamic regime and the preliminary agenda it must tackle. The same applies to Khomeini's *Islamic Government*, which was written in 1970.

The only direct evidence of radical planning comes from the Shi'is of Lebanon, where a draft constitution for an Islamic Republic of Lebanon was prepared in early 1986 under Iranian auspices.[5] But even this dwells much more on the broad mechanisms of government

[2] See Bishri's article in *al-Safin* (Beirut), July 29, 1986; Hussein's article in *al-Sha'b* (Cairo), August 12, 1986; Bishri and Hussein's articles in *al-Hiwar* (Paris), April 1986; and Bishri, *al-Muslimun wa-l-Aqbat fi itar al-Jama'a al-Wataniyya* (Cairo, 1980).

[3] N. Guenena, "The Jihad: An Islamic Alternative in Egypt," *Cairo Papers in Social Science* (A.U.C.), Summer 1986, p. 72.

[4] S. Hawwa, *Min Ajl Hutwa ila-l-a mam* (Beirut, 1979); A. Yasin, *La Revolution a l'Dure de l'Islam* (Paris, 1981); and M. H. Fadlallah, *Ma'na al-Quwwa fi' l-Islam* (Beirut, 1979).

[5] *Al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), March 26, 1986; cf. *al-Safir* (Beirut), April 17, 1985.

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and their theoretical foundation than on policies. It tells about democracy and minority rights, but reveals little about the conduct of public affairs. As for the Iranian revolution, it provides some indications (particularly with regard to purges and economics), but it is a Shi'i undertaking which has only limited appeal to Sunnis.

Extrapolations

How then is one to anticipate the Sunni radicals' programs? A close reading of their literature provides five major clues to their eventual behavior in power that confirm Hussein Amin's prognostications — not surprisingly, as many of the statements he ascribes to the Revolutionary Commander are taken verbatim from this very literature.

First, the radicals hope to establish a "contemporary state" (*hukuma 'asriyya*), in tune with the twentieth century. Although, their model is the seventh-century state of Muhammad and the early Caliphs, this applies only to moral principles and does not imply a return to a medieval form of government. Unlike the seventh-century state, the new state is to be a strong, actively interventionist state. Radicals understand that the medieval Muslim watchdog state which left civil society to its own devices is gone forever; they know that technological changes, especially in transportation and communications, enable the modern Middle Eastern state to intervene in almost all areas of life. The radicals propose to use the modern state to Islamize society; there is no sense in dismantling this state or outlawing its technology.

Technology cannot be set aside but it can be regulated. A case in point is television, which will continue to serve, under state control, to shape hearts and minds; only the values permeating its contents will change. Likewise, whatever their economic predilections, the radicals agree on one point: there is no going back to the traditional hands-off policy of Middle Eastern states.

Second, matters pertaining to education, communication, and entertainment loom large. "Westoxication" has had its most deleterious impact in these areas; hence, the most urgent task is to counter it. The state's monopoly here will give the revolutionaries the means to do so. While the purge of the media and of the school system depicted by Amin is not always spelt out in so many words in the radical literature, his scenario follows logically from their manner of pinpointing the ills of contemporary society. (In fact these are also the areas where the Iranian regime moved first and swiftly.) Even the outlawing of "anti-Islamic" scientific theories does not constitute an implausibility, neither does it stand in flagrant contradiction to the "contemporary state" envisaged. The radicals are content to use technological applications of science and do not care for the underlying research (particularly in fields like molecular biology, astro-

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physics, and geology, all of which touch on the essential verities of religion). They resign themselves to backwardness in science and rely on up-to-date transfers of technology. Needless to say, they will refuse any technology that creates thorny ethical problems (e.g., genetic engineering). This instrumental attitude towards the pre-eminence of the "Satanic" West in the realm of technology is best exemplified in medicine; when one of the champions of Sunni radicalism, the Pakistani Mawlana Mawdoodi, was gravely ill, he went to the United States for treatment (and eventually died there).

Third, however loudly they proclaim their critique of the "non-democratic practices" of the present regimes, it is evident from tracts written for internal consumption that the radicals flatly reject democracy. Efforts by some Muslims to demonstrate Islam's compatibility with democracy are treated with cold disdain — as typical of the apologetic mode that accepts Western criteria and endeavors to make Islam conform. The reason is obvious: radicals do not seek to conform to the values of contemporary civilization. The liquidation of basic democratic liberties in the name of the Shari'a, as portrayed by Hussein Amin, necessarily follows. Some form of parliamentary representation may endure, but it will take a backseat to revolutionary institutions. This is clear in the draft constitution for the Islamic Republic of Lebanon: in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the source of all authority is the Virtuous Jurist (i.e., at present, Khomeini), who will appoint the chairman of the Lebanese Governance of the Jurist Commission, a local ayatollah. The commission, made up of representatives of all religious communities, will be the ultimate locus of all legislative, judicial, and executive powers. It will oversee the election by universal suffrage of the president of the republic and of the Islamic Consultative (*Shura*) Council and will have the power to dissolve the Council. Significantly, the word democracy does not appear in the draft.

Fourth, the status hierarchy imposed by the Shari'a inevitably implies lower positions for the "wards of Islam," women and non-Muslims. The former are lesser in human potential than males (the evidence of two women equals, in court, that of one man), but have special functions most vital for Islam, in procreation and child-rearing. Their domain is the home and not the public space. Non-Muslims should live under sufferance, as "protected peoples" with limited rights, special obligations, and guarantees for security of life and limb, property, and, within limits, worship. In the radicals' critique of the growing "unnatural" equality of women and non-Muslims in the modern Middle Eastern state, the recurring accusation is that of *ghatrasa* (arrogance, i.e., exceeding the limits of one's morally assigned position). What the radicals would do once in power is unclear. The Iranian post-1979 experience shows that they may be flexible on certain points (e.g., giving women and non-Muslims the right to vote

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while discouraging but not forbidding the right to work), but a sharp deterioration for both groups in certain. In the "draft constitution" for Lebanon, non-Muslims are promised "freedom, justice, and security" but not equality. Clearly, certain positions (such as prime minister) are constitutionally reserved for Muslims, and Shari'a courts, where only Muslims serve as judges, will be the only ones recognized by the state. If this is to be the case in Lebanon (where non-Muslims constitute almost half the population), then it will be all the more so in other countries where their proportion is much smaller.

Fifth, Henry Kissinger's dictum — that you have to think out what you want to do before you get to power, because once there you'll have no time to do any thinking at all — applies well to Islamic economic policy. With the exception of *Our Economy* by the Iraqi Shi'ite Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980), which had some influence in the early days of the Iranian revolution, there is virtually no systematic thinking on economics in radical literature in Arabic. Sadr argues in favor of a greater state role in managing the economy to assure justice, prevent profits from speculations and the production of luxuries. The state must assume the ownership of key economic sectors, especially natural resources. Even in Iran there has been a noticeable retreat from these views in recent years; in the Sunni world, Sadr has had no discernible impact. Radical economic thought is essentially where it was more than thirty years ago when Sayyid Qutb published his *Social Justice in Islam*. The radicals seek social justice but, apart from expropriating the property of the ultra-rich (especially the "five-percenters," those fat cats who serve foreign economic interests), they say little in concrete terms. Almost none of them tackles the problem of demographic explosion — they prefer to deny its existence or insist that economic expectations must be lowered. The only radical Arab thinker who argues that there may be conditions in which Muslim strength lies in limited numbers, is the Lebanese leader Fadlallah, the mentor of Hizbullah.

The radicals are adept at pinpointing the socioeconomic failures of existing regimes, especially when these entail moral deficiencies as well: they show how a crowded transportation system leads to promiscuity, how housing problems disrupt growth of families, and how laissez-faire policies create a class of nouveaux riches who overconsume. But even the broad outlines of an alternative policy are missing from their present thinking.

They are thus caught in a bind. However much they may protest that they have no panacea, however much they maintain that they do not usher in any messianic age, their very critique and their mythology, where the Shar'ia figures implicitly as goal and cure-all, raise expectations. Often their proclamations explicitly encourage such an interpretation; did not the Egyptian Sheikh Hafiz Salama, a

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popular fundamentalist preacher, declare: "Islamic legislation had descended upon us from the Omniscient; through its application we are bound to solve all our problems."[6] In January 1979, just before Khomeini's return, a poem circulated widely in Tehran:

The day the Imam returns
no one will tell lies any more
no one will lock the door of his house;
people will become brothers
sharing the bread of their joys together
in justice and in sincerity.
There will no longer be any queues:
queues of bread and meat,
queues of kerosene and petrol,
queues of cinemas and buses
queues of tax-payments
queues of snake poison
shall all disappear.
And the dawn of awakening
and the spring of freedom
shall smile upon us.

The Imam must return . . .
so that Right can sit on its throne
so that evil, treachery and hatred
are eliminated from the face of time.
When the Imam returns,
Iran — this broken, wounded mother —
will for ever be liberated
from the shackles of tyranny and ignorance
and the chains of plunder, torture and prison.[7]

Such expectations may well be the revolution's undoing, or at least its gravest challenge.

The irony is that of the dozens of Sunni revolutionary groups uncovered during the last decade, only one (the Takfir wa-Hijra in 1977 in Egypt) had a messianic streak to it, and a hidden one at that. Messianism might have been expected to surface easily among Shi'ites, due to the prevalence of the doctrine of the Hidden Imam and his return as the *madi* messiah; nevertheless all Shi'ite radicals make an effort, following Khomeini, to distance themselves from these ideas: the revolution definitely does not augur the return of the Hidden Imam. Were the revolution to wait for him "tens of thousands of years may elapse," and in the meantime Islam would be obliterated by Westoxication. One should act in the here and now and establish a form of Islamic government in the absence of the imam, and with the Virtuous Jurist serving as his deputy.[8]

For many rank and file such distinctions are incomprehensible, and the expectation of a total, near-miraculous change is embodied by the title "Imam" conferred upon Khomeini (hence the first line

[6] Interview with *al-Shira'* (Beirut), July 15, 1985.
[7] A. Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 227.
[8] Fadlallah, *Ma'na al-Quwwa*, pp. 236-237.

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of the above-quoted poem). The eschatological trait is less evident in the Sunni radical clientele, although expectations of similar change are quite common.

Myths

Such expectations hinge on the underpinning of Islamic revolutionary mythology — the Shari'a, the backbone of the radicals' "founding myth": Islam's primary task is to shape human behavior through use of law, and once upon a time there was actually a near-perfect Islamic state based upon this very law (during the years A.D. 622-660). Any state (and this certainly includes all modern Middle Eastern ones) that does not apply this law courts a return to the pagan life that preceded Islam. They are illegitimate and must be toppled by revolt. Yet the Shari'a also provides the future-oriented facet of the myth: once in power (and without any need for messianic intervention), a modern and viable state will be instituted, based upon the principles of the Shari'a. This state will solve many problems of the "dispossessed," that bulk of the believers trodden-upon by the ruler, his henchmen, and his rich cronies.

Small wonder that the most vicious radical polemics are directed against intellectuals who try to debunk this myth, men like Hussein Amin, the Algerian Muhammad Arkoun, the Sudanese Muhammad Taha, and the Egyptians Muhammad Sa'id al-Ashmawi and Faraj Fuda.[9] All these critics claim that the bulk of Islamic law was elaborated from the mid-seventh to the mid-ninth century, i.e., under the Umayyads and the Abbasids, and not in the Golden Age of the Four Orthodox Caliphs. Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs, it is generally agreed, do not measure up to the Orthodox Caliphs in religiosity. And, add the critics, the crucial point is that legislation was to a large extent under the thumb of these Caliphs and, above all, served their political ends. The Muslim jurists, more often than not subservient to the powers-that-be, were only too eager to endow such politically motivated measures with a religious varnish, as most overtly religious strife at the time was actually political. Islamic law has, consequently, nothing sacred about it; it has almost nothing to say on constitutional matters and has no doctrine of governance.

Once taken off its pedestal, what is one to do with the Shari'a? Fuda (backed by such important rationalist thinkers as F. Zakariya and Z. N. Mahmud) deduced that the separation of state and religion had always been the rule in Islam, an argument made sixty years ago by 'Ali 'Abd ar-Raziq. Thus, the Shari'a is both tainted by its political

[9] M. Arkoun, *Pour une Critique de la Raison Islamique* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1984), especially in chapter v.; S. al-Ashmawi, "Confusing Shari'a and Fiqh," *al-Musawwar*, October 26, 1984; idem, "Islamic Government," *Middle East Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1986); F. Foda, *Qabla l-Suqut* (Cairo, 1985); M. M. Taha' interview with *al-Wadi* (Cairo), March 1985; S. Muntasin, *al-Ahram*, February 2, 1985.

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and secular orgins and inappropriate for modern times. Islam would better preserve itself by concentrating on its spiritual (not behavioral) dimension and on the private (not public) domain. Secularization, they insist, does not mean to profane.

Amin, Arkoun, 'Ashmawi (and Taha, until his execution for apostasy in 1985) conclude differently: the tainted nature of the Shari'a enables it to be criticized and reinterpreted far more profoundly than Islamic conservatives and radicals deem permissible. Within certain restrictions, they would adapt, the Shari'a to modern conditions, particularly in political matters, where the absence of an Islamic legal doctrine permits much leeway. A critique of the Golden Age and the Shari'a myth thus fosters historical relativism, enhanced flexibility, and a greater receptivity to modern notions of justice (e.g., that the equality of human beings before Allah requires no discrimination on the basis of gender or religion). Such a viewpoint also leads to the conclusion that while ultimately the Shari'a should be the guiding principle of all legislation, in its present state it is too deficient to be applied. It needs an overhaul which is to be conducted by free debate among all Islamic scholars — not only by the radicals. Also, the application of the Shari'a is to be achieved at a later stage, piecemeal, and through the decisions of a normal political authority, i.e., a modern parliament.[10]

The Center Does Not Hold

How wide a backing do the radicals' views enjoy? Quite widespread, it seems, for they have seized the moral high ground, and even conservatives make the application of the Shari'a their catchphrase, though they would settle for a gradual, non-violent process. The modernists are aware that their opponents' strength proceeds from the affective power of the myth they wield. Inevitably the rationalist approach of the enlightened modernists fares badly in a head-on collision with such deeply rooted emotions. The Koran, and its child the Shari'a, remarks Arkoun, "is an immediate reference endowed with extraordinary efficacity at the level of collective imagination. . . It is thence so easy to say 'the Koran gives us response to everything'; but this is the collective imagination speaking, it is not an argument predicated upon systematic knowledge, upon historical exegesis."[11]

The unleashing of these emotion-laden myths by the radicals is by no means opportunistic. They really believe them; all the more easily, in the case of the Sunni world, as they are usually self-taught laymen with minimal systematic schooling in religious matters. This

[10] For the polemics against these views see 'A. Subh, *Tahafut Qabla' l-Suqut* (Cairo, 1985); *al-I'tisam* (Cairo), August-September 1986, pp. 32-35; ibid., November-December 1985, pp. 25-30; *al-Mukhtar al-Islami* (Cairo), May 1986, pp. 25-30.

[11] Interview with *Le Monde*, December 22-23, 1985.

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respect for the Shari'a accounts for the key role that the more knowledgeable among them assume. The commander of Sadat's assassins, Khalid al-Islambuli, explained in his police interrogation that while he came up with the idea to kill the president, he would not have taken the initiative without the approval of the group's ideologist, 'Abd as-Salam Faraj "because he is more knowledgeable in the matters of Islamic law than I am."[12] Such sincerity of belief makes propagation of the myth all the more critical.

The myth has been somewhat tarnished recently by its application in the Sudan and Pakistan. Although warmly welcomed by fundamentalists from a distance, these were quickly revealed as window-dressing by tottering rulers seeking to bolster their tottering hold over the masses. The vagaries of the Iranian revolution — the economic mess, the bloody purges — do not help either. But Iran can always be explained away either as Shi'ite (and thus irrelevant for the nine-tenths of the Islamic world that is Sunni) or as the growing pains of a new order. Sudan (and to a lesser extent Pakistan) are now viewed as scams that prove nothing about how the Shari'a will fare when sincerely applied. This line of reasoning appears to have been widely accepted, for much of the attachment to the Shari'a immune to rational inquiry.

Confronted by traditionally anchored fundamentalist mythology, the enlightened modernists feel helpless. When a man like Amin depicts the future he is also expressing, much like George Orwell or the better science-fiction writers, his anxieties concerning the present. Faraj Fuda, a founding member of the Neo-Wafd party, who quit when it decided upon an electoral alliance with the fundamentalists, summed up his despair by talking of the two nightmares that haunt him: "the Iranian option or the Lebanese option." His despair grew all the stronger as many leading modernists in Egypt (including H. Hanafi, 'A. Abdel Malek, and Hussein Amin's own brother, Jalal) now sympathize with the fundamentalists. Opportunists of all persuasions (the Neo-Wafd, the Egyptian Liberal, and the Labor parties) are allying with them. Modernists and secularists, having lost so many battles and so many allies, are losing heart and falling silent.

In a recent interview with French researchers, Hussein Amin notes this silence with bitterness. He points to the fact that only two writers defended philosopher N. Z. Mahmud when he was assaulted in the press for arguing that fundamentalism had already debased the status of Egyptian women.[13] "But," he adds, "even these two articles were banned," which illustrates the predicament of the enlightened intellectual vis-à-vis the state. The latter may use him from

[12] N. Guenena, "Jihad," p. 56 (n. 19).
[13] L. Barbulesco and P. Cardinal, *L'Islam en Questions* (Paris: Grasset, 1986), p. 97.

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time to time to counter the fundamentalists, but only for short periods and subject to its terms. In 1983, in the wake of the Sadat assassination, Amin was able to publish in Egypt the first volume of his *Guide of the Sad Muslim*, and even win a literary prize. A year later, when the regime had contained the fundamentalist resurgence and was trying to co-opt it, he had to go to Beirut to publish the second volume. Given for a while a forum in the official *al-Musawwar* weekly, this was closed to him and he had to move to the leftist opposition's *al-Ahali*. Too embarrassing an ally for the government, this career diplomat and director of the Foreign Service Academy finally had to be sent abroad to what the two French researchers delicately call "an exile which is by no means golden,"[14] a consular post in Brazil far below his qualifications. He still publishes in the official press when this serves the authorities: for example, a satire against the fad of religious car stickers when the government waged a campaign against the fundamentalists in mid-1985.[15] "Proclamation No. 10" may have been published because the police had uncovered a new plot of the *Jihad* group to topple the regime just a few weeks earlier.

Amin's case, while emblematic, holds a particular poignancy; for he is the son of a noted Islamic liberal thinker, Ahmad Amin, who tried to infuse religion with rationality, openness, and tolerance, and who enjoyed in his time a far broader audience than such views attract today. In his autobiography, Hussein Amin recounts how his father's attempts to educate his own children in this spirit were contradicted (though not cancelled out) by the family's servants, who were in closer daily contact with them and imparted a version of Islam impregnated with legends, superstitions, anthropomorphism, and literalist scripturalism.[16] Nobody envisioned then, in the 1930s, that this downstairs version of Islam would one day gain hegemony among the educated.

[14] Ibid., p. 94.
[15] *Al-Musawwar*, June 7, 1985.
[16] M. H. Amin, *Fi Bayt Ahmad Amin* (Cairo: Kitab al-Hilal, 1985), passim.

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BEYOND COWBOYS AND EUROWIMPS: EUROPEAN-AMERICAN IMAGERY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

by Dirk Verheyen

In the course of the 1980s, it has been repeatedly suggested that European-American relations have reached a point of unprecedented crisis, that NATO is dying, and that European anti-Americanism has assumed irreversible proportions. "Atlanticism," whatever that term may mean, is said to be in ominous decline. There is also a persistent proclamation of "crises," whereby each crisis is presented as if it were the last straw, a terminal disease, or an apocalyptic nightmare. Such crisis-mongering neglects a few key facts. First, crises may be healthy, insofar as they undermine complacency and focus attention on unpleasant realities and the need for change. Crises are great illusion-killers. Second, the preoccupation with crises overlooks the continuing, underlying European-American congruence with respect to some vital interests. It also frequently underestimates theWest European lack of choice in the area of security policy. Third, certain long-standing aspects of American and European interaction serve to place occasional "crises" in a more realistic, less alarmist context. These long-term elements, intangible yet real, provide the proper historical perspective in a consideration of European-American relations.

"Europe" and "America"[1] are names that, throughout modern history, have come to embody powerful images, persistent ideas, and influential connotations. While each of these two regions, and what they represent in history, could conceivably be analyzed and interpreted separately, this would neglect a crucial dimension, namely the comparative perspective.

Four images are the focus here: the self-images of Americans and Europeans, and the images Americans and Europeans have of the other. Fundamentally interdependent, these images express the historical connectedness between Europe and America, often in complementary and symmetrical ways. They can provide useful insights into recurrent patterns of transatlantic relations.

[1] In this context, the term "America" basically refers to the United States, although it is occasionally meant to refer to the Western hemisphere as a whole. The term "Europe" refers to Europe as a whole (even including European Russia) in the pre-twentieth-century context, and to Western Europe in the post-World War II era.

Dirk Verheyen is a Dutch Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. This article is drawn from a larger comparative study of German and American foreign-policy culture.

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Pre-Twentieth-Century Views

The crucial, fundamental imagery in the Atlantic region is the basic contrast between the New World and the Old World.[2] Although very old — dating back to the initial European discoveries in the Western hemisphere — it still has great relevance today. The basic meaning of America for Europe has persisted with remarkable tenacity since the sixteenth century. Europe projected its hopes and its dreams, but at times also its anxieties and its fears, on America, first as a region, and later as a country. America was the object of numerous utopias, fantastic notions of an unspoiled, pure, and ideal territory that attracted the increasingly claustrophobic, post-medieval European mind.[3] Every wave of immigrants to America carried with it the baggage of European hopes and dreams regarding the New World. The fulfillment of a fair proportion of these hopes means that the magnetic attraction of America continues to the present day.

From the very beginning, the idea of a New World implied a comparison with the Old World: the New and the Old made sense only in comparative perspective. As such the New and the Old belonged together. There was a sense of difference, and tension. The New and the Old Worlds complemented each other. Europe was un-American, a quality that generated elements of anti-Europeanism in the United States. Similarly, America was un-European, which in turn prompted profoundly anti-American sentiments in Europe. European anti-Americanism and American anti-Europeanism are probably equally old and equally significant in the history of transatlantic imagery.

Yet from the start America was also a European region, an extension of Europe, a product of a European heritage. American beliefs and values (freedom, progress, equality, individualism) are products of the European Reformation and Enlightenment. This European heritage took on new meaning as a result of circumstances peculiar to the American setting, such as the frontier experience. Altogether, America became "exceptional," in the eyes of its own inhabitants, and also in the eyes of those who remained in Europe. Daniel Boorstin points to the notion of "givenness" in American history.

> The impression that the American has as he looks about him is one of the inevitability of the particular institutions, the particular kind of society in which he lives. The kind of acceptance of institutions as proper to their time and place, which tyrants have labored in vain to produce, has in the United States been the result of the accidents of history. The limitations of our history have perhaps confined our philosophical imagination; but they have at the same time confirmed our sense of the

[2] Cf. Michael Kraus, *The Atlantic Civilization: Eighteenth-Century Origins* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), especially Chapter 1; J. Martin Evans, *America: The View from Europe* (San Francisco: San Francisco Press, 1976); Wolfgang Wagner, "The Europeans' Image of America," in Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., *America and Western Europe* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 19-32; and Daniel J. Boorstin, *America and the Image of Europe* (Cleveland/New York: The World Publishing Company, 1960), Chapter 1.

[3] Kraus, *The Atlantic Civilization*, Chapter 9.

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continuity of our past and made the definitions of philosophers seem less urgent. We Americans are reared with a feeling for the unity of our history and an unprecedented belief in the normality of our kind of life to our place on earth.[4]

Indeed, America represents both to its own inhabitants and to Europeans the qualities of freedom, opportunity, progress, tolerance, social mobility, and social justice. Although the majority of West Europeans enjoy these basic values too, their importance for the American self-image and the European image of America remains decisive. America came to represent optimism, economic and technological superiority and expansion, democracy's last great hope, the world of the future. An optimistic, progress-oriented America has always been important for most Europeans, and this is still the case today, even though it may not be explicitly realized. These European dreams, often at odds with American realities, go far to explain European anti-Americanism.

During most of its history, the American self-image was essentially positive. In accordance with the nature of its origins as a country, the American image of Europe was correspondingly negative. America as a country was intended to be an experiment, representative of a "novus ordo saeclorum," a historical escape from and rejection of the old order, i.e., Europe. According to Stanley Hoffmann, "the legacy of America's past is a heritage of separation — not only a physical separation between the New World and the traditional centers of world politics, but a moral distance, a willed and self-conscious separation of a 'segment' divorced from its European background."[5] In a somewhat similar vein, Michael Parenti has suggested that "the image of America the Virtuous is rooted in the widely held myth of New World purity, and Old World corruption."[6]

Conversely, Europe represented a negation of those things the immigrants expected to find and achieve in America, having denied them individual freedom, social justice and mobility, religious tolerance, and peace. Europe hosted endless dynastic warfare at the expense of the common folk, political intrigues and immorality, social oppression, and religious persecution. Thus, American immigrants largely rejected their mother-continent.

This accounts for some of the utopian and xenophobic aspects of American culture. Louis Halle argues:

The sense of escape . . . has dominated the attitude of Americans toward Europe, toward the Old World. Europe was the dungeon from which they had fled to the wide-open American continent, where all men were equal, where all men were free, where opportunity was unlimited. Europe was the ancient prisonhouse on which they had so gladly turned their backs — forever. . . . The sense of escape from the Old World with which those who were to become Americans arrived in the

[4] Cf. Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

[5] Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 94.

[6] Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 56.

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New World was reinforced by a pervasive Utopianism in their thinking. This Utopianism is perhaps the main philosophical factor that has shaped American foreign policy from the first colonizations to our own time.... Yet one weakness of all Utopians lies in their necessarily low opinion of the external world, and in an anxious hostility toward it.[7]

The contrast between Europe and America has been crucial to the development of the historical American self-image. Daniel Boorstin suggests that the term "Europe" has come to represent "the varied cultures of a broad continent," and this simplification has

served our need and our disposition to describe our national character and tradition in elusive, vague, and shifting terms. It has required little precision, and demanded little agreement to assert that we stand for everything that Europe is not. The emptiness of the polar concept has had the further advantage of leaving us free to experiment without worrying whether we were violating our definition of our own character.[8]

At the same time, the image of America threatened conservative circles in Europe. They feared America's challenge to the old order. The striking egalitarianism, individualism, and modernity of American society caused considerable tension. From this early period also dates the characteristic European lack of real knowledge about the United States. Europeans saw America as merely an extension of Europe, a "European province," and assumed they knew it better than, in fact, they did. Blind to the unique qualities of America, Europeans tended to project their own experience on it. Manfred Henningsen observes that "America was not foreseen in the European consciousness and has not been understood as a world-historical phenomenon in its own right until well into the 20th century."[9] And Luigi Barzini agrees:

European ideas of America (as well as American ideas of Europe), on which mutual relations and the common future and the world's peace ultimately depend, are predictably superannuated (clichés having a way of lagging far behind reality), erroneous, based on insufficient and distorted information, on myths, idées reçues, rhetorical exaggerations, wishful thinking, travelers' tales, cheap novels, and the cinema.[10]

The American self-image and the American image of Europe had a noticeable impact on the foreign policy of the new republic.

America rejected the type of diplomacy practiced by European dynasts who used war as a method of advancing selfish personal or class interests at the expense of the needs and wishes of the unrepresented masses of their peoples. Europe was identified with shifting political alliances, frequent and unnecessary wars, an uneasy and immoral balance of power, and restrictive economic relations among nations. America by contrast represented unrestricted international economic intercourse,

[7] Louis Halle, *Dream and Reality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 13, 18, 26.
[8] Boorstin, *America and the Image of Europe*, pp. 20, 36.
[9] Manfred Henningsen, *Der Fall Amerika* (Munich: List Verlag, 1974), p. 10.
[10] Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 225.

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the abolition of war, abstention from alliances which produce war, and the promotion of international law to promote peace everywhere.[11]

The leitmotif of foreign policy became isolationism, a profoundly unilateralist approach to diplomatic relations. Americans saw Europe as a threat to their democratic purity, innocence, and security. Washington's Farewell Speech urged a careful, non-interventionist foreign policy. Europe's evils found their international expression in colonialism, and the Monroe Doctrine came to symbolize the American rejection of European power politics. That much of American isolationism was made possible by the power of the British navy (as well as sheer luck and coincidence) did nothing to reduce the significance of isolationist sentiments. America, it was felt, had a different historical fate than Europe. It had a "manifest destiny." America was to be a new Athens, a new Rome, a new Jerusalem. Europe was the past, America the future.

These and other elements were gradually combined in a kind of American ideology, which one might label "Americanism." Certain ideas (such as monarchy, or later Communism) were felt to be "un-American." Accordingly, "Americans long have lived in fear of being contaminated by some alien ideological disease. . . . Attacks upon 'Free Enterprise' often are equated in the public mind with un-Americanism. Capitalism is treated as a necessary condition — sometimes even a sufficient cause — for political freedom, contraposed as the sole alternative to 'communist tyranny.' "[12] This viewpoint continues to influence the American Weltanschauung and U.S. foreign policy.[13]

American ideology contains an idealist component, which feeds messianic impulses. In the words of Burns,

perhaps no theme has ever dominated the minds of the leaders of this nation to the same extent as the idea that America occupies a unique place and has a special destiny among the nations of the earth. It is an idea which characterizes not simply flamboyant orations but pervades the writings of critical philosophers and distinguished historians and social scientists. No period of our history has been free from its seductive influence. . . . As the years passed, the prophets of a glorious and expanding America placed more and more emphasis upon the duties and moral responsibilities of greatness. [14]

[11] Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy: The American Experience* (Westport/London: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 4-5. Various writers have sought to distill from the American worldview and self-image a specifically American "style" in foreign policy. See Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles*, Part II; Gordon A. Craig, "The Democratic Roots of American Diplomatic Style," in Helmut Berding et al., eds., *Vom Staat des Ancien Regime zum modernen Parteienstaat* (Munich/Vienna: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1978); and Knud Krakau, "American Foreign Relations — An American Style?" in Erich Angermann and Marie-Luise Frings, eds., *Oceans Apart?* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981).

[12] Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, pp. 59, 64.

[13] Cf. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1983.

[14] Edward M. Burns, *The American Idea of Mission* (Westport: Rutgers University Press, 1973), pp. 5-6, 8. See also Ernest L. Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

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Idealism has had two contrary effects, interventionism and abstention. On the one hand, America was to be the savior, teacher, and leader of freedom and democracy in the world. American foreign policy was to be a crusade for liberty, an enduring campaign to make the world safe for democracy. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt represent this strand. On the other hand, America would aim to be a beacon of democracy for the world, but would guard its purity by refraining from active interventionism. American example alone would generate democratic progress in other countries. This approach led to public judgments on the democratic credentials of other nations, giving American diplomacy a schoolmaster-like quality.

Two-pronged idealism is perhaps the decisive characteristic of traditional American foreign-policy culture. According to Halle,

> one constant theme runs through the history of American foreign policy, from our first experiences as an independent unit in the world to the charged and revolutionary events of the twentieth century. It dominates virtually every debate and every significant decision throughout this period. It takes the form of a question which is always being temporarily answered, with reference to transient circumstances, and which has never been finally answered until, perhaps, the 1940's. It takes the form of a tension, a polarity in our thinking, a conflict in our national desires or attitudes which at critical moments in history has divided our people, sometimes bitterly. . . . The tension is that between participation in world politics and withdrawal or aloofness or abstinence; between involvement and isolation, between alignment and neutrality.[15]

Such ambivalence in the American discussion concerning the meaning of America and its appropriate role in foreign affairs (an ambivalence, by the way, that persists today) has been a burden for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. American foreign policy had to be different; it had to be radically revisionist, aiming at the reorganization of the world (preferably in the American image), or radically escapist, aiming at the fundamental separation of the New World from the Old. During much of American history, isolationist and interventionist impulses appeared to be luckily compatible. According to Hartz, "we have been able to dream of ourselves as emancipators of the world at the very moment that we have withdrawn from it. We have been able to see ourselves as saviors at the very moment that we have been isolationists."[16] And in the view of Tucker, "the mission of regenerating the world and the isolationist impulse were seldom seen as contradictory. Instead, both arose from the central conviction of the unique character and absolute significance of our experience."[17]

Not just a historical question, this is a problem said to plague American foreign policy still. Thus, Morgenthau has argued that

[15] Halle, *Dream and Reality*, p. 1.
[16] Quoted in Robert W. Tucker, *Nation or Empire? The Debate Over American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p.44.
[17] Ibid.

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the fundamental weaknesses of American foreign policy ... have one quality in common: the inability to relate intellectually to the realities of international politics in an appropriate way. A gap exists between the objective character of that reality and our perception of it. We have tried to bridge that gap by forcing a new reality into the procrustean bed of obsolete concepts; by reducing seemingly unintelligible and unmanageable problems to personified, demonological proportions; by making reality disappear behind a veil of high-sounding yet empty words.[18]

These idealist impulses in American foreign policy culture have always competed with more "realist" perspectives focused on power, interest, and prudence. In the realist view, the question of American isolationism and interventionism in world affairs constitutes a matter of "national interest" and international opportunity/necessity, not ideological inclination. In the view of Schlesinger,

two strains have competed for the control of American foreign policy: one empirical, the other dogmatic; one viewing the world in the perspective of history, the other in the perspective of ideology; one supposing that the United States is not entirely immune to the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to all societies, the other regarding the United States as indeed the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue, commissioned to save all mankind.

He suggests that the "present Administration represents a mighty comeback of the messianic approach to foreign policy."[19]

America has, so far, been presented as an escape from and rejection of Europe. As such, the American image of Europe acquired some enduring negative features. Yet Americans could not (and probably never intended to) completely reject or escape from Europe.[20] America was, after all, decisively European. The American political and cultural intelligentsia was continuously inspired by the heritage of Old World civilizations. European concepts provided the foundation for American political and philosophical discourse. In religion and art and architecture the European impact was equally decisive. As a result, America can see itself as more than a mere escape from Europe: America becomes the fulfillment of the dream and promise of Western civilization, rooted in Europe and extended across the Atlantic. This equally important dimension in the American image of Europe (and the European image of America), a more positive dimension, has helped to mitigate some of the negative elements. It has also contributed to an ambivalence in the American image of Europe.

[18] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," *International Security*, Winter 1977, pp. 12-13.

[19] Schlesinger, "Foreign Policy and the American Character," pp. 4, 5. See also Felix Gilbert, *The Farewell Address* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Founding Fathers and Foreign Policy: Implications for the Late Twentieth Century," ORBIS, Spring 1976; and Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

[20] In this context, see the discussion by Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1942), Chapter V ("The European in Our Midst").

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The American psychology with respect to Europe, containing an ambivalent mixture of feelings of inferiority and superiority, has been well described by Heald and Kaplan:

> Toward Europe, at least until the aftermath of World War I made it clear that a new relationship was called for, Americans had long demonstrated an ambivalent posture in which deference and suspicion combined with presumptions of superiority. Over the years, the stridency of American critiques of Europe and American sensitivity to real or imagined slurs upon the New World by visitors from the Old had given unmistakable evidence of feelings of inferiority lying barely beneath the surface. Such feelings challenged the prevailing faith that the United States excelled in ways European sophisticates were too cynical or corrupt to appreciate. Uncertain though they might be in the face of Europe's age-old traditions and culture, Americans still affirmed their country's present and future superiority. It was an awkward position to maintain, but one made necessary by the fact that they or their ancestors had rejected Europe in coming to America and had staked their lives, their families' fortunes, and their convictions on the choice.[21]

Incidentally, the widespread notion that America and Americans are somehow ahistorical compared with Europeans needs correction. I would suggest that Europeans' purported historical consciousness results not only from Europe's longer history , but also from Europe's numerous "historical discontinuities." A dynamic process of disruptions, catastrophes, and general change tends to heighten a country's consciousness of the element of history in its national life. This is certainly the case with regard to Europe. Thus, any American lack of historical consciousness may be read as the result not just of a more futuristic outlook, but of a significant degree of continuity in U.S. political history. The American past relates more to the American present than the European past to the European present. European history seems to be so alive precisely because it is in many ways so clearly dead. Hoffmann captures part of this European-American contrast, focused on the heritage that history has bestowed on each, when he suggests that

> except in the relations between North and South, Americans of different regions can face each other without deep misgivings and look at their past without shame. Their very mobility has loosened the grip of sectional memories. . . . The only common heritage of the "new Europeans" is one of guilt and shame. Shame, for having produced the biggest record of atrocities in centuries; shame, for having acted in such a way that Europe has become a stake [between the superpowers]; guilt, for having so often repressed awareness and atonement; guilt, for having again and again turned the national community into an arena for civil war.[22]

The question of the relevance of the past is closely related then to the issue of the emotional legacy left by one's history.

Thus, from the beginning the American image of Europe and the European image of America have been ambivalent, mixtures of positive and negative elements. While both the New and the Old World were at times felt to share positive features as a result of a

[21] Heald and Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy*, p. 344.

[22] Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Daedalus*, Fall 1964, p. 1257.

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common heritage, there was an equal tendency for one to see itself as the representative of good and to ascribe the correspondingly negative features abroad. Equipped with this mutual historical imagery, Europe and America were to encounter one another in radically new roles in the course of the twentieth century.

Developments in the Twentieth Century

Our century has witnessed fundamental identity crises in the European and American self-images. Important facets of the American self-image militated against the assumption of an active international role by the United States. Others, though compatible with an active world-power foreign policy, contained the dangers of ill-considered overcommitment and over-extension. Thus, twentieth-century American foreign policy has oscillated between expansion/involvement and withdrawal/disengagement tendencies.[23] American involvement in World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam generated great debates on the purposes of U.S. foreign policy and attempts to achieve that elusive national consensus.[24] Much of the identity crisis was a direct result of the historically unprecedented, increasing American involvement in European affairs. This continuing American identity crisis has had a direct impact on U.S.-European relations, commencing under Theodore Roosevelt and reaching its climax after World War II.

Reinhold Niebuhr, noting the crisis in the American self-image, especially since World War II, argues that "our modern liberal culture, of which American civilization is such an unalloyed exemplar, is involved in many ironic refutations of its original pretensions of virtue, wisdom, and power." In his view,

> our age is involved in irony because so many dreams of our nation have been so cruelly refuted by history. Our dreams of a pure virtue are dissolved in a situation [i.e., the Cold War] in which it is possible to exercise the virtue of responsibility toward a community of nations only by courting the prospective guilt of the atomic

[23] In this context, see Frank L. Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, January 1952; and id., "Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods and Their Policy Implications," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan, eds., *Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's* (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1979).

[24] The Vietnam debacle led to vigorous controversy in the United States, producing considerable fragmentation in recent American foreign-policy culture. For further discussion, see Michael A. Maggiotto and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "American Public Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy,"*International Studies Quarterly*, December 1981; Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Cold War Axioms in the Post-Vietnam Era," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); William Schneider, "Conservatism, Not Interventionism: Trends in Foreign Policy Opinion, 1974-1982," in Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's* (Boston: Little,Brown, 1983); Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1974; Graham T. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1970-71; Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider, "The New Internationalisms," in Kenneth Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World* (New York: Longman, 1979).

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bomb. And the irony is increased by the frantic efforts of some of our idealists to escape this hard reality by dreaming up schemes of an ideal world order which have no relevance to either our present dangers or our urgent duties.

Thus "the perennial moral predicaments of human history have caught up with a culture which knew nothing of sin or guilt, and with a nation which seemed to be the most perfect fruit of that culture." For Niebuhr, "power cannot be wielded without guilt, since it is never transcendent over interest." Consequently, he argued that

our American nation, involved in its vast responsibilities, must slough off many illusions which were derived both from the experiences and the ideologies of its childhood. Otherwise either we will seek escape from responsibilities which involve unavoidable guilt, or we will be plunged into avoidable guilt by too great confidence in our virtue.[25]

In this same context, Brogan has pointed to the historical American "illusion of omnipotence" and described it as "the illusion that any situation which distresses or endangers the United States can only exist because some Americans have been fools or knaves."[26] Again, the traditional American self-image blocks a better understanding of and adjustment to the intractabilities of international affairs.

The European self-image has been equally affected by Europe's losses in this century; power and colonies have gone together with a good deal of Europe's self-confidence. Some observers speak of "Europessimism," others see a resurgence of older forms of European "Kulturpessimismus." Nationalism became a discredited ideology. While the need for European integration and unification has been widely recognized and accepted, the results have often been disappointing. Europe has become a mere bureaucracy rather than an embracing psychological construct. In its relations with the United States, parent Europe faces its grown-up child. Though parent and child may share an abiding affection, they differ in character and interests, facing a partially divergent world. A certain amount of alienation is to be expected. When Europe, the once-proud parent, is dependent for its ultimate security on the vital protection offered by America, bitterness and frustration are predictable.

Two observers in the late 1950s vividly expressed this trauma. Speaking of Western Europe, Weber noted that "one of the characteristics of feeling in these countries is the spite, and the envy, and the pride, of the new poor . . . of nations which cannot forget that they were great powers, and which hate to admit their new and unwilling dependence on parvenu empires, which they fear and despise."[27] Moulin wrote in a similar vein:

[25] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. viii, 2, 37, 39, 42.

[26] D.W. Brogan, *American Aspects* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1964), p. 9.

[27] Eugen Weber, "European Reactions to American Policies," *International Journal*, Spring 1956, p. 105.

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for the first time in centuries, Europe is starkly aware of the fact that she is no longer the leading power. And not only is she no longer the leading power, but her deep-seated confusion also dooms her to impotence. She broods morosely over her past splendors. Disunited Europe is nothing and Europe knows it. . . . The United States. . .is in a good position to threaten Europe's ancient mastery precisely because she is close to Europe. In fact, she has already acquired hegemony in a number of economic, military, technical, financial and even political spheres. Now such a development appears to Europe, or at least to a part of European public opinion, as a brash attempt at "usurping the inheritance." Whence a feeling of inferiority (excessive in some respects), and of decadence and disgrace. This complex is itself the composite of a veritable multitude of complexes: those of the "ungrateful beggar," the "threadbare aristocrat," and the "pensioner" who symbolize a number of class resentments, especially those of the poor against the rich. The European inferiority complex also grows out of the historical temperament (pessimism versus optimism, conservatism versus the pioneer spirit), out of demographical experience (growing populations versus declining populations), and out of contrasting visions of the world.[28]

Providing further insights into the problem of post-World War II West European identity, Stanley Hoffmann in 1964 described Europe's troubles as the product of a mixture of factors: dependence on America, continued national fragmentation, Atlanticist illusions and Europeanist mirages, international European decline, a traumatic recent historical experience, intellectual fatigue, fear of the future, irrelevance of the past, ideological drift, and political complacency. Returning to many of these themes in 1979, he pointed to the failure of postwar Europeanist idealism, Europe's disconnection from its past, the absence of vision and optimism regarding the future, a preoccupation with present needs and interests, multiple nationalisms that forestall a common European will, the victory of utilitarianism in politics, frequent historical escapism and irrealism, the consequences of revolutionary social changes, ideological disillusionment, unimaginative welfare-statism, the disappearance of inspiring sociopolitical models, and frequent anti-American snobbery. In many if not most of these areas, the American experience is quite different: more successful, less discontinuous, more optimistic, and more visionary.[29]

Europe's dependence on the United States, unprecedented in her historical experience, has fundamentally transformed transatlantic relations.[30] Even where Europe had established pre-eminence — in the area of culture — a decisive American impact has some Europeans speaking scathingly of "cultural imperialism" or "Coca-Colonialism." To the extent that American culture contains elements of "modernity" that inhere in contemporary Western civilization in

[28] Leo Moulin, "Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Psychoanalysis," ORBIS, Winter 1958, pp. 450-51.

[29] Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America" *Daedalus*, Fall 1964; and id., "Fragments Floating in the Here and Now," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979.

[30] On the issue of the American impact on Western Europe after 1945 and the European response, see Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, *Euratlantica* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969); Edward McCreary, *The Americanization of Europe* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964); and J.J. Servan-Schreiber, *Le Défi Américain* (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1967).

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general, such criticisms are misplaced. But persistent bitterness and frustration fire anti-American sentiment that, in turn, is likely to play a role in any process of European cultural and political "emancipation."

Important changes in the American image of Europe followed the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. Europe was no longer seen as the prime source of international evil, a threat to America's innocence and purity. The image began, more than ever before, to differentiate between Western and Eastern Europe. Western Europe was now seen as a vital bulwark of democracy and freedom in the increasingly global confrontation between the Free World, led by America, and the forces of Communism, led by the Soviet Union.[31] Eastern Europe came to be seen as a target for indirect liberation through containment of Soviet power, whereby it was and still is frequently forgotten that even the removal of Soviet domination of that area in Europe would not necessarily imply its democratic development, considering its decidedly un-democratic past. Parallels were frequently drawn between Nazi and Soviet communist foreign policy. The domino theory flourished, as the "lessons of Munich" came to guide the foreign-policy perspectives of a generation of postwar Western leaders. Not so much traditional European power politics, but the ideology and practices of Communism, especially as promoted by the Soviet Union, became the focus of American (but also West European) anxiety.

The importance of anti-Communism in the American foreign-policy culture becomes fully understandable only if one focuses on its ideological and philosophical rather than power-political aspects.[32] Communism as an optimistic creed concerning the future course of human history, self-confident, dogmatic, and messianic-revisionist posed (and still poses to some extent) a direct challenge to American ideology and self-image. "Believing that our nation occupies a unique and enviable position in a world of want and degradation, Americans tend to greet contemporary revolutionary ferment not with empathy but with the conviction that such political upheavals are the actual or potential thrusts of a global enemy who menaces the American Way of Life."[33] Communism thus became a profound threat to America's enduring Liberalism. Both are fundamentally liberation ideologies, sometimes similar in style and emotion, but vastly different in content and implication.[34] Along these lines, Niebuhr argued that "the two leading powers engaged in the struggle [of the Cold War] are particularly innocent according to their own official myth and

[31] Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Social Myths in the Cold War," *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume XXI: 1, 1967.

[32] For an interesting treatment, see Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse.*

[33] Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, p. 72.

[34] See Christer Joensson, *Superpower. Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy* (London: Frances Pinter, 1984), Chapter 2.

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collective memory. The Russian-Communist pretensions of innocence and the monstrous evils which are generated from them, are the fruit of a variant of the liberal dogma."[35] The crucial ideological clash between American Liberalism and Soviet Communism antedates the political and military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Communism as a threat or challenge was to acquire ideological dimensions in the United States unmatched in Western Europe. In Parenti's conclusion:

> historically intolerant of dissent, fearful of contamination, and addicted to the values and myths propagated by the propertied classes, Americans (not surprisingly) see communism — or their stereotyped image of communism — as the diabolic antithesis of everything they have been taught to esteem. The communists are despotic, we are democratic; they are collectivistic, we are individualistic; they have a controlled economy, we have free enterprise; they are "extreme," we are moderate; they are godless, we are God's children; they are alien, we are Americans; they are evil, we are virtuous.[36]

Inadequate awareness of the historical reasons for this difference of perspective has contributed to much transatlantic misunderstanding regarding the nature and meaning of Communism.

For America, Western Europe has become an important "island of democracy." But American dreams have gone even further. In the context of the Cold War, it was hoped that, guided by American federalist experience, European integration would generate a United States of Europe that would stand with the United States in "Atlantic Partnership." This idea reached its high-point in John F. Kennedy's Grand Design. Stanley Hoffmann, detecting a strong American "belief in the possibility that the United States can apply to Europe today the recipes of past American history," sees it as part of a more general American affliction.[37] He suggests that "Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from their experience are of universal application, and they are reluctant to recognize that they are tied to the special conditions that made the American success possible." He criticizes "the United States' magisterial way of looking at European history" and points to an American

> tendency to look at Europe as a whole — to see in it a basket of eels, perhaps, but one basket all the same. In the days of the Monroe Doctrine, and much later during the two world wars, there was something massive and global about the way the United States confronted Europe. To Americans, the continent from which the immigrants came looked like a single, if extraordinarily fragmented and perversely complicated, entity. . . . America's distance, geographical and historical, blurs intra-European barriers or makes them look grotesque.

An important consequence is American "impatience with, and sometimes ignorance of, the intricacy of European history."[38]

[35] Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, p. 19.
[36] Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, p. 72.
[37] Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles*, p. 106.
[38] Ibid., pp. 98, 103-04, 107, 108.

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Unrealistic expectations provoked double disappointment. First, European integration fell clearly short of American and European hopes. Second, to the extent that integration did occur, the partnership was not necessarily successful as post-World War II U.S.-European economic relations have repeatedly demonstrated. The ensuing American disappointment has had an often noticeable anti-European flavor, which in turn could connect itself with older negative elements in the American image of Europe.

Thus, despite a generally positive American postwar orientation toward Western Europe, an undertone of criticism, anxiety, and doubt persists. America is not always confident about its relations with Europe. West Europeans might drag the United States into international crisis and conflict as a result of a lack of political will, internal divisiveness, and a growing neutrality. Paralyzed by illusions of the Left, they could be threatened by communist subversion via the back-door of Eurocommunism, thereby threatening American security. And in the area of socioeconomic policy, the West European welfare state is seen as an assault on economic liberalism, and an addiction to statism and socialist collectivism. For some American conservatives, these European-American tensions have worrisome sources. Kristol, for example, traces them to "the political ethos of Western Europe [that] has been significantly influenced by socialist ideas and socialist modes of thinking, while the political ethos of the United States has been only superficially affected by them." He argues that "the foreign policy of Western Europe, to the degree that it has been responsive to the socialist mode of thought, has . . . been defensive and parochial. Having little instinctive confidence in the righteous use of national power, and assuming that the world's future will be shaped more by 'economic forces' than by purposive national action, its posture is defensive. 'Watchful waiting' would be a fair description."[39]

The European image of the United States is also characterized by a noticeable ambivalence.[40] Old and new elements mix in a setting that is radically novel for both sides and colored by mixtures of fear and trust, of hope and disappointment. A persistent dimension is the idealization of America in Europe, though the one-sided coverage of much of the American media, focused heavily on evidence of anti-Americanism at mass demonstrations in the capitals of Europe, might suggest the opposite. Many dreams and expectations continue to be

[39] Irving Kristol, "Should Europe Be Concerned About Central America?" in Andrew Pierre, ed., *Third World Instability. Central America as a European-American Issue* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985), pp. 49, 51.

[40] Cf. Luigi Barzini, "The Baffling Americans," in *The Europeans* (New York: Random House, 1983). See also Alvin Richman, "The U.S. Image Under Stress: Trends and Structure of Foreign Attitudes Toward the United States," in Kegley and McGowan, eds., *Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's*; "What the World Thinks of America," *Newsweek*, July 11, 1983 .

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projected on America. America's victory in World War II, its wealth and opportunities enhanced its image as a Promised Land. New waves of immigrants converged on the New World, in search of freedom and prosperity, fearing the return of fascist or the expansion of communist totalitarianism. In the ensuing decades, America became a mecca for European tourists, scientists, and students. Its cultural impact on Western Europe became decisive, despite a frequently attempted rejection by a historically persistent European tendency toward cultural snobbery.

Europe's cultural self-consciousness is perhaps best seen as the result of an attempt to preserve at least a sense of equality in a situation otherwise characterized by American dominance. Western Europe has coped ambivalently with its condition of dependence since 1945. It has expressed trust and gratitude toward its American benefactor and protector, but, realizing the uncertainties and disadvantages of dependence (particularly in the nuclear age), it has often expressed fear about the trustworthiness of American policies and strategies, and its bitterness and disappointment as a result of attempted emancipation and unfulfilled expectations. While benefiting from American protection and postwar economic reconstruction aid, many Europeans have frequently provided illustration of Edmund Burke's observation that "gratitude is not a political emotion."

Ambivalence colors West European evaluations of American foreign policy. There are complaints about both a lack and an excess of American leadership. Both doubt and confidence are inspired by America's nuclear reliability. There is a fear about the consequences for Western Europe if America would not come to its aid in case of war, coupled with a fear about the consequences for Europe if America does come to its aid in case of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Weber has captured the basic dilemma well when he writes: "As they see it, Europeans live on a barrel of gunpowder. The fuses are in the hands of outsiders, and the rival virtues of these outsiders are less important than the fact that they are outsiders — nations to whom the fate of Europe and of Europeans is merely one aspect of a vaster game."[41] More generally, there is a persistent concern about potential American mismanagement of international crises, based on a kind of European arrogance regarding its own purported diplomatic abilities and credentials.[42]

[41] Weber, "European Reactions to American Policies," p. 108.

[42] In *Europe Views America* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1962), Edward W. Chester has noted the frequent European fear concerning possible threats to peace posed by uncontrolled American messianic idealism in international affairs and by the gullibility and vulnerability of an inexperienced United States. He emphasizes the European ambivalence regarding both American idealism and realism, largely as a result of Europe's own decline in power and influence. Luigi Barzini, in *Americans Are Alone in the World* (New York: Random House, 1953, p. 128ff.) adds the repeated European preoccupation with the alleged unpredictability of American foreign policy.

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While some Americans see Europeans as Fausts who might sell their souls to the communist devil, some Europeans regard Americans as driven by Promethean rashness in a complex, dangerous world. As Serfaty puts it, "there has always been much fear and resentment in Europe of America's alleged inability to comprehend the tragedy of war."[43] While Americans may be regarded by some in Europe as Don Quixotes chasing the illusory windmills of global communism, Europeans are equally likely to be considered Till Eulenspiegels whose international pranks in pursuit of détente are becoming increasingly dangerous for the preservation of an adequate margin of Western strength and safety vis-à-vis the East.

Such transatlantic tensions are visible in the frequent and profound European-American differences with regard to Soviet foreign policy and the pursuit of détente. According to Kristol,

> it is often said that . . . differences in attitudes and policies toward the Soviet Union . . . flow from varying perceptions and theories as to what the Soviet system is like, whence it has come, whither it is going. I think this is a half-truth. The other half is that the differences flow from the different conceptions the United States and Western Europe have of their own roles in the world. . . . The United States is, and its people wish it to be, a world power. In fact, the people wish it to be the world power — which may not be entirely possible. . . . Western Europe, in contrast, has entered what can fairly be described as a regional-isolationist phase, with a policy toward the Soviet Union based on the assumption of permanent military inferiority, a policy that one might call, at the risk of giving offense, "therapeutic appeasement."[44]

Hoffmann is not so bleak about the future of the Alliance:

> The United States is still (or again) in the throes of "exceptionalism" — the belief in the unique mission of America. This tends to promote a peculiar kind of insecurity: the need to ask oneself at every moment if one still is number one, if one is up to the task, faithful to the mandate. It also makes it difficult for Americans to understand experiences different from their own — social revolutions for instance — and it makes them want to project abroad the experiences that have made America great — free enterprise, political democracy. A sense of mission makes sharing responsibility — not only with an evil power, but with allies — equally difficult. The politics of Western Europe are not those of exceptionalism but those of survival. When the Cold War intensifies, dangers for survival and for political autonomy increase, giving rise to the two tendencies of either wanting to opt out altogether (which often prevails among those far from power) or else of working to improve the atmosphere — pleading for summits and negotiations, thus often exposing European statesmen to the charge of being naive and of playing right into Moscow's hands, of helping Moscow's attempt to lull Europeans to sleep and to estrange them from Washington.[45]

These divergent American and European images have prompted different foreign-policy perceptions in West European and American evaluations of détente, the Siberian pipeline controversy, and reactions to the Polish crisis. The images here represent clearly differing

[43] Simon Serfaty, "Atlantic Fantasies," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1982, p. 76.

[44] Irving Kristol, "Uncertain Future — NATO After 35 Years," in Walter Laqueur and Robert Hunter, eds., *European Peace Movements and the Future of the Western Alliance* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 37.

[45] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Western Alliance: Drift or Harmony?" *International Security*, Fall 1981, pp. 116-17.

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world-views. In the area of alliance strategy, the West European dependency syndrome has been decisive in controversies over the neutron bomb, medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Subjective reflexes have frequently been as important as "objective" realities. West Europeans have criticized a reckless amateurism in the American attitude toward Libya and the complexities of terrorism, while many Americans have denounced European weakness and even cowardice. In addition, West Europeans have rejected an American tendency to "globalize" conflicts and crises in the Third World (for example, Grenada, Central America, Angola, the Iran-Iraq war), due to an exaggerated obsession with Communism.

Inevitably, of course, reality has caught up with European and American images of each other. Serfaty speaks of a "steady reappraisal in Europe of America's image as an exceptional country."[46] America has turned out to be, in many ways, an "ordinary country," capable of mistakes and injustice. Vietnam, Watergate, the racial and political upheavals of the 1960s, the recriminations during the Carter era, and the more recent "Iran-gate" revelations have, of course, played a crucial role in this process of disappointment and disillusionment, but they are merely the clearest expression, and not the causes, of something that was bound to happen sooner or later. The result has been the frequent manifestation of European anti-Americanism (and American self-hatred and self-flagellation).

On the other hand, the USSR is criticized less because Western Europe expects less from it. Weber notes that "the most peculiar expression of European anti-Americanism" is "the tendency to blame the United States for things which are actually the fault of the Communists." He concludes that "Americans are blamed presumably because they are around to be blamed and the Communists are not; because they are supposed to be on the same side and 'speak the same language'; because one expects more of a wife, say, than of a housekeeper — a meeting of minds, a unity of purpose — and expecting, one is often disappointed."[47] There is also strictly radical left-wing anti-Americanism based largely in Marxism, but such views do not even approach the majority in any West European country. Pride contributes to anti-Americanism because it is the expression of a process of attempted political emancipation and cultural assertiveness, and also of bitterness over Europe's lost power and prestige. De Gaulle was not alone. There is also a fair amount of envy with respect to unmistakable postwar evidence of American power, superiority, prosperity, dynamism, optimism, and prestige. Envy of the United States is also tied to Europe's resignation to its own fate.

[46] Serfaty, "Atlantic Fantasies," p. 74.
[47] Weber, "European Reactions to American Policies," pp. 111-12.

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Finally, there is a connection between European anti-Americanism and the disappointment of often unrealistic European hopes and expectations concerning America.

Fear, pride, envy, and disappointment play a visible role in American anti-Europeanism too. Americans fear the consequences of European weakness for American security and defense commitments. There is a certain patriotic pride about the "American Way of Life" that slips easily into chauvinism. There is also envy of Europe's well-established cultural contributions, and further there is an element of disappointment due to unfulfilled American expectations for European unity and integration. In general, then, American anti-Europeanism finds its roots in a mixture of moods, motivations, and historical experiences and perspectives.

Both European anti-Americanism and American anti-Europeanism have been a constant motif in European-American relations from the beginning. Thus, the relative absence of European anti-Americanism and American anti-Europeanism in the initial postwar period appears to be, in historical perspective, an anomaly. In this light, the phenomenon of anti-Americanism in Europe's younger generation, while partly true, is easily exaggerated.

It is fashionable in Western Europe these days to concentrate on American anti-Europeanism and worry about its possible consequences, such as American troop withdrawals. It is equally fashionable in the United States to emphasize European anti-Americanism and wonder whether Western Europe is on the road to appeasement, defeatism, and neutrality. Such worries reinforce the established tradition in commentary and scholarship about the Western Alliance: a preoccupation with crises, with impending doom, and dissolution. In fact, there is a considerable historical reservoir of pro-American sentiment in Western Europe. The same can be said of pro-Europeanism in the United States. There is, however, a tendency among U.S. news commentators to connect anti-Americanism in Western Europe with pro-Sovietism or with an immoral ideological equidistance. These journalists forget that anti-Americanism does not preclude anti-Sovietism, and that the sources and meaning of each are quite different. Their policy implications differ as well: anti-Americanism limits a full and tension-free European-American partnership, while anti-Sovietism precludes any desire or possibility for a full European-Soviet partnership in the first place.

European pro-Americanism is not born solely of necessity; its roots lie in an affective complex involving trust, pride, hope, and gratitude. Trust in America, its policies, intentions, and commitments. Pride in shared values and purposes, and in America as a historic European achievement. Hope regarding America's ability to bring solutions to international problems, based on its wealth, know-how, and good-will, and create a better world, even when realization about

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American limitations brings occasional disappointment. And appreciation for American support in difficult times. The 1948 Berlin airlift has had a significant symbolic meaning in this regard, especially in West Germany. This gratitude is probably generation-specific, due to the special impact of personal experience in the immediate postwar period.[48]

Long-standing emotional ties bind Europeans and Americans and underpin American pro-Europeanism. Asia, for example, does not yet have the same cultural and historical importance for America as does Europe. American relations with Europe are multifaceted, whereas American relations with Asia focus largely on East Asia and are predominantly concerned with matters of trade and security.

The pro-European affective complex in the American psyche seems to contain elements of trust, pride, and hope: trust in shared purpose and values, pride in a shared culture, and hope in the future of the West and in European integration compatible with a harmonious Atlantic community.

The actual substance of Atlantic relations is still a matter of trade, money, missiles, and armies, conditioned in the first place by factors of power, interest, and necessity. Yet, the Atlantic policy environment requires human interpretation in the process of policy development and formulation, and it is here that images shape expectations and anxieties. Along with the usual focus on the substantive dimensions of Atlantic relations, these subjective aspects of politics add depth to the analysis.

[48] Cf. Robert R. Bowie, "The Bases for Postwar Cooperation," in Kaiser and Schwarz, eds., *America and Western Europe*, pp. 47-62.

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"YOU COULD HAVE SAID YES": LESSONS FROM REYKJAVIK

by P. Edward Haley

The Reykjavik summit remains one of the most puzzling episodes in the sometimes bizarre record of U.S.-Soviet relations. Without warning, the negotiations on strategic nuclear arms control soared into the clouds. Great visions appeared. Total nuclear disarmament. An end to the nuclear age. Peace and hope regained. Abruptly, the visions dispersed. The talks fell to earth. The old dilemmas and anxieties returned along with a host of questions. What were Soviet objectives in the talks? Why had President Reagan told his countrymen and allies that the two sides would engage in limited preparatory discussions at Reykjavik, with full negotiations to follow at a summit meeting in Washington? Why had Soviet leaders surprised their American counterparts by launching into full negotiations? What are the prospects for further progress on nuclear arms control?

The public record, though incomplete, sheds light on these questions and offers insights into other important dimensions of the global nuclear and diplomatic competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.[1] The frantic, pressured week-end in Iceland exposed the deep reluctance of both nations to alter their nuclear arsenals in any significant way. Both continue to cherish hopes of gaining diplomatic and military advantages from their nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy.

Reykjavik also exposed the bargaining methods of the current governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. Whether or not they truly take SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) seriously, Soviet leaders mean to use it and the current arms control negotiations to divide the United States from its allies and to weaken public and legislative support for nuclear modernization in Western Europe and the United States. In its bargaining, the Reagan administration has from the outset demanded deep reductions, especially in land-based Soviet missiles with multiple warheads. Whenever the Soviet Union moves toward the American position, as it has several times since

[1] Among the most useful accounts of the summit are those by David Hoffman, "Iceland Talks: One Word Chills Hope," *Washington Post*, October 19, 1986; Bernard Weinraub, "In Iceland: How Grim Ending Followed Hard-Won Gains," *New York Times*, October 14, 1986; and "Report on the Reykjavik Process," Draft Manuscript, Defense Policy Panel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd sess., December 15, 1986. See also, Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, "Reykjavik and Beyond" *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1986/87,pp. 215-35.

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1981, the Reagan administration raises its "minimum" acceptable terms for an arms control agreement. Following its commitment to SDI in 1983, the Reagan administration incorporated SDI into this bargaining method.

Thus, at Reykjavik, when the Soviets offered a number of concessions on deep reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in order to bind the United States to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for ten years, the Reagan administration countered with a demand that the Soviet Union agree, during the same period, to eliminate all its ballistic missiles. General Secretary Gorbachev responded with a proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years, an approach with which the president agreed in principle. But at this point, as Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott suggested, the two leaders were "engaged in a bout of feverish one-upsmanship, with each trying to outdo the other in demonstrating his devotion to the dream of a nuclear-free world."[2] In such an atmosphere nothing further could be done. The summit ended with this bleak exchange:

Gorbachev: I think we can still deal.
Reagan: I don't think you really wanted a deal. I don't know when we'll see each other again.
Gorbachev: I don't know what else I could have done.
Reagan: You could have said yes.[3]

For those who hope for early progress on arms control, the glimpses Reykjavik provided into the methods and goals of the superpowers must be sobering. For those who doubt that arms control can or should affect nuclear strategy in any significant way, the outcome is less troubling. Adherents of both views[4] would perhaps agree that the meeting raised disturbing questions about the reliability of the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner and about the institutional effectiveness and individual competence that lay behind the American negotiating effort.

Why Reykjavik?

An extraordinary and, in combination, potentially bewildering series of developments marked the months leading up to the Reykjavik summit and affected the decisions made by both governments before and during the meeting. The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, was almost pathetically anxious to convey an impression that profound changes had occurred in the methods and policies if not objectives of the Soviet government. Nothing was sacred. There were

[2] Mandelbaum and Talbott, "Reykjavik and Beyond," p. 227.
[3] "Report on the Reykjavik Process, Defense Policy Panel, p. 14.
[4] Michael Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1984), offered an interesting description of the differences between "nuclear weapons strategists" and "arms control and disarmament strategists."

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campaigns against corruption in the Communist party, drunkenness, and falling productivity. *Glasnost* (openness) became the new watchword. In the arms control area there was Gorbachev's proposal of January 15, 1986, for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000.[5] This sweeping general plan in effect overlay and complicated the much more cautious and detailed Soviet position in the bilateral strategic arms control negotiations at Geneva. When President Reagan answered Gorbachev's plan with fresh proposals of his own in an address before the General Assembly on September 22, 1986, an additional overlay had been placed on the American position at Geneva. (See table 1 for the positions of the two sides at Geneva before the run-up to Reykjavik and table 2 for the public proposals of the two leaders in January and September 1986.)

The positions of the two sides had actually begun to shift much earlier, at least as early as the summit in Geneva a year before the Reykjavik meeting. From November 19-21, 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva for wide-ranging talks that included nuclear arms control. The "fireside summit," as some called it, left a widespread if nebulous impression that Reagan had somehow "won" the encounter, an outcome that must have nettled the image-conscious Gorbachev. In a joint statement on November 21, the two sides noted that there was "common ground" on "the principle of 50 percent reductions" in nuclear weapons, as well as on "the idea of an interim INF agreement."[6]

The statement was silent about the long-standing Soviet position that tied all progress on arms control, both cuts in strategic forces and the conclusion of an interim INF agreement, to a halt in the Reagan administration's pursuit of SDI. But at this stage American leaders were careful not to suggest that the Soviets had "uncoupled" the two. The strongest language Shultz used in his post-summit press conference was that "the idea of a separate INF agreement is identified."[7] In his address to a joint session of Congress on November 21, President Reagan said only that the two governments "called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, leading, I hope to the elimination of this class of missiles."[8] Even so, the Soviet's acceptance of deep cuts represented a significant move toward the position of the Reagan administration, a stance adopted early in the president's first term.

In a letter to Reagan on January 15, 1986, timed to coincide with his sweeping general disarmament proposal, Gorbachev apparently proposed the elimination of INF in Europe.[9] In his response

[5] Text in *New York Times*, February 5, 1986.
[6] Text of the joint statement is in *Department of State Bulletin*, January 1986, pp. 7-10.
[7] Ibid., p. 12.
[8] Ibid., p. 14.
[9] This Gorbachev letter is mentioned in "Report on the Reykjavik Process," p. 2.

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TABLE 1

PRE-REYKJAVIK NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AT GENEVA

Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions

*United States**	*Soviet Union†*
• 1,250–1,450 ICBM, SLBM	• 1,600 ICBM, SLBM, heavy bombers
• 350 heavy bombers	• 8,000 "nuclear charges" including gravity bombs, SRAM, cruise missiles with range greater than 600 km.
• 4,500 ballistic missile warheads	• Ban on sea-launched cruise missles on surface ships
• 3,000 sublimit on ICBM warheads	• Ban on new types of strategic delivery systems
• 1,500 ALCM	• Verification measures beyond national technical means, including restricting deployment areas for mobile missiles
• 50% cut in Soviet throw-weight	• Reductions linked to agreement on space and defensive weapons
• Ban on new heavy ICBM	
• Ban on modernization or replacement of heavy ICBM	
• Ban on mobile missiles	
• Effective verification, to include on-site inspection as necessary	

Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

• Global equality in warheads	• Interim agreement to limit warheads in Europe to 100. U.S. to eliminate Pershing II missiles
• Interim limit of 140 launchers in Europe for U.S./USSR	• Verification to include on-site inspections as necessary
• Proportional reductions of Soviet launchers in Asia	• Shorter-range systems to be dealt with in subsequent negotiations
• Collateral restraints on shorter range missiles; equal Soviet ceilings	
• Effective verification; to include on-site inspection as necessary	

Defensive and Space Weapons

• Continue research on SDI within ABM Treaty limits	• Mutual pledge not to withdraw from ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years
• Cooperative transition to strategic defenses	• Limit work on "space strike weapons" to laboratory research
• Share benefits with allies and Soviet Union	• Stop work on Krasnoyarsk radar if the United States stops work on two radars in United Kingdom and Greenland

* U.S. position as of February 21, 1986.
† Soviet position as of September 5, 1986.

SOURCE: Report on Reykjavik, Defense Policy Panel, pp. 26–28.

on February 22, the president suggested that the two nations agree to eliminate all INF worldwide within three years, thus raising the minimum. On May 27, the president, more significantly, announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the limits of the SALT II treaty on strategic delivery systems. The issue had become acute because of the growth in the numbers of U.S. Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), deployed on B-52 and B-1 bombers. In the past, as its ALCM force grew, the United States stayed within SALT II limits by taking older nuclear missile submarines out of service. With his May 27 announcement, the president indicated that his administration would not necessarily continue this practice.

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TABLE 2

PUBLIC ADDITIONS TO STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Reagan	Gorbachev
• Total elimination of LRINF; interim agreement also acceptable • Mutual agreement governing research, development, testing, and deployment of strategic defenses, provided there is agreement on "radical reductions" in strategic offensive weapons • Through 1991, research, development, testing within ABM Treaty • New treaty signed now allowing either to deploy strategic nuclear defenses provided that a plan is offered to share benefits of strategic defense; negotiate this over two years • In event no agreement after two years, either free to deploy advanced strategic defense systems after giving six months notice • Ready to "move forward" on ratification of Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, provided reach agreement on improved verification procedures • After ratification of these treaties, and together with a "program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons," implement a phased and "parallel" limit and eventual end to nuclear testing	• Total elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 in three stages • Stage one: within eight years, 50% reduction in strategic delivery systems, each side to have maximum of 6000 warheads, provided U.S. "renounces" "space strike weapons"; elimination on LRINF in Europe; no transfer of nuclear weapons by U.S. to other countries; freeze on nuclear arsenals of Britain and France; United States/Soviet Union stop nuclear testing • Stage two: other nuclear powers join process, first by freezing nuclear arsenals and agreeing not to station them abroad; all tactical nuclear weapons eliminated; ban on "space strike weapons" to become multilateral and mandatory for all major industrial powers; ban on development of all non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction • Stage three: total elimination of remaining nuclear weapons by 1999; special procedures to be worked out for destruction of weapons and verification by national technical means and on-site verification

SOURCE: Ronald Reagan, Address to 41st United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 1986 (Text in *Department of State Bulletin,* November 1986, pp. 1-7); Mikhail Gorbachev, address, January 15, 1986, text in *New York Times,* February 5, 1986.

Gorbachev declined to answer Reagan's INF proposal directly, and the Soviet government strenuously protested the May 27 announcement. But in the early summer Soviet negotiators at Geneva again moved toward the American position by loosening the restrictions on SDI ever so slightly. On June 11 Soviet negotiators offered to allow research, testing, and development of SDI "in the laboratory" if the two sides would agree to abide by the ABM treaty for fifteen to twenty years and to reduce strategic weapons by 30 percent. Then in a personal letter to Reagan on June 23, the secretary general declared his general willingness to reach agreement on INF and urged that the United States accept his package of relaxed restraints on SDI and limited strategic reductions.[10] The president replied by letter to Gorbachev on July 25. Although the press was extravagantly

[10] Ibid.

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alerted to the existence of the letter, its terms were kept confidential. The public learned the contents of the president's proposals only after Reykjavik as a result of hearings before Congressman Les Aspin's Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee. In this letter, drafted at the White House by the president himself and a close circle of advisers, Reagan made important alterations in the U.S. negotiating position, some of which were made public in the president's September address to the General Assembly.[11]

The United States, Reagan told the Soviet leader, would not insist on 50 percent reductions in nuclear weapons. It would maintain its commitment to SDI and invited the Soviet Union to join in a gradual and agreed transition to reliance on defensive rather than offensive nuclear weapons. To this end, Reagan proposed that for the next five years both sides continue to develop SDI within the limits of the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, they would sign a new treaty that would allow either to deploy strategic defenses after 1991. There were important conditions attached: while they continued to develop SDI and to move toward deployment of strategic defenses, for the five years until 1991 and for two more years thereafter, the two sides were to try to eliminate all ballistic missiles and to agree on arrangements to share the benefits of SDI. If no agreement was reached after these seven years, either could deploy strategic defenses after giving six months notice.

The president's letter was far more important than it must have appeared at the time to the Soviet government or their negotiators at Geneva, where the plan was introduced on September 18. Even the assembled delegates at the General Assembly who heard it, and the sections of the American government most directly concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), seem to have underestimated its impact. The National Security Planning Group (NSPG), a part of the National Security Council, whose membership includes representatives of the JCS and ACDA, also overlooked the importance the president placed on the elimination of all ballistic missiles and approved the idea as a long-range goal. No one in the government, including the JCS, bothered to study the implications of such a drastic step for the nation's ability to defend itself and its allies, particularly those in Western Europe who face a Soviet advantage in conventional forces. Nor, as in standard bureaucratic practice, did the initiation of such a proposal hinge on the results of a study and consultation with the allies.[12] Regardless of its strategic implications, the president's proposal again raised the

[11] The group of individuals who helped to compose the letter apparently was limited to Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security Adviser Admiral John Poindexter, and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[12] Ibid., p. 3.

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minimum for agreement on strategic arms reductions and the limitation of SDI. Now the threshold was the elimination of all ballistic missiles.

At this stage, the strategic arms negotiations became tangled in a cold war episode reminiscent of the 1950s. On August 22 the FBI arrested a Soviet spy, Gennadi Zakharov. In response to Zakharov's arrest and the unprecedented expulsions of Soviet diplomats already undertaken by the Reagan administration, the Soviet government seized American journalist Nicholas Daniloff on August 30 in Moscow on a trumped-up charge and began its own counter-expulsions.[13] As the two governments struggled with the espionage problem, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in Washington on September 19 for a round of talks scheduled before the Zakharov-Daniloff controversy erupted.

Shevardnadze carried Gorbachev's reply to Reagan's July 25 letter. At the beginning of September in Geneva the Soviets had modified their stand on INF by proposing the retention of a few missiles on each side and, more important, by excluding British and French nuclear weapons from any Soviet-U.S. agreement on nuclear weapons in Europe. Now, Gorbachev dangled the possibility that Soviet INF in Asia might also be cut. Gorbachev stuck to his proposal that both sides adhere to the ABM Treaty for fifteen years. Gorbachev also suggested that the two leaders meet for "a quick, private pre-summit meeting."[14] Despite his belief that summit meetings should be carefully prepared and promise to be successful, Reagan accepted the invitation. Reagan's announcement that he would meet Gorbachev in Reykjavik came on October 1, the day after he reported Daniloff's release.

The proximity of the summit meeting to the U.S. elections is obvious. Presumably, both sides ought painstakingly to have calculated the impact of the summit on the November elections. The comments of high-ranking Soviet officials in Reykjavik immediately after the talks ended strongly suggest that they, at least, had entered the talks with the American elections in mind. Soviet officials told Philip Taubman of the *New York Times*, for example, that Gorbachev "had proposed the weekend talks with President Reagan, surprised the American delegation with a package of new arms control proposals and forced the discussion to a point where historic accords or abrupt failure seemed to be the only alternatives."[15] The same Soviet officials also added: "If the Soviet leader can make a convincing case that Mr. Reagan blocked a chance to curtail the arms race by insisting

[13] A chronology of both sides' expulsions is in "Moscow Expels 5 and Bars U.S. Use of Russian Aides," *New York Times*, October 23, 1986.

[14] Hoffman, "Iceland Talks."

[15] Taubman, "Russians See Fertile Ground for Broad Diplomatic Gains," *New York Times*, October 14, 1986.

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on continuing development of a space-based defense system, then Mr. Gorbachev can turn the Iceland talks into a significant public relations victory for Moscow . . . help to sway the outcome of critical races for the [U.S.] Senate next month . . . and could make inroads in Western Europe, where Moscow has tried unsuccessfully to draw American allies away from their support for Washington's nuclear policies."[16]

Congressional debate on arms control also figured in the decision to go to Reykjavik in October. During the debate on the Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization bill, amendments had passed the House of Representatives to deny funding for nuclear forces in excess of SALT II limits, to extend the moratorium on testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, to impose strict limits on nuclear testing, and to allow no increase in funding for SDI. The effect of the Reykjavik announcement was to ruin chances that any of these measures, except the ban on ASAT testing, would find their way through the Senate.

While the exact reasons the administration agreed to meet on October 11-12 remain unclear, there is no question that the president and his advisers were unprepared for the kind of negotiations the Soviets initiated. Before flying to the Icelandic capital, President Reagan and his advisers told the American public, Congress, and news media that the meeting was not a "summit," not a full-scale attempt at superpower bargaining and agreement, but a "base-camp" to prepare the way for a subsequent summit visit by Gorbachev to the United States. At most, there would be discussions about INF and nuclear testing, as well as about human rights, regional issues, and bilateral differences. To the surprise of virtually everyone in the West, the Soviet leadership launched into intensive negotiations on strategic arms reductions. "They pulled a switch," a senior American official said of the Soviets, "and entered full negotiations."

If in the American view the talks at Reykjavik were not meant to cover all the issues, then Gorbachev should not have made his sweeping proposal for total nuclear disarmament by 1996. At the very least, the American side should have been adroit enough to oblige the Soviets to give advance notice that such a proposal would be made. There are only two possible explanations for the lack of preparation, and they are not contradictory: Gorbachev purposely deceived Reagan about the purpose of the meeting, hoping for a propaganda victory; and the president's advisers were outplayed and outmaneuvered by their Soviet counterparts during the preparatory bargaining to set up the conference.

[16] Ibid.

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What Happened at Reykjavik?

The president began the talks at the first meeting in Reykjavik on Saturday, October 11 by explaining the link between SDI and the elimination of ballistic missiles. Gorbachev replied with two proposals: both sides to cut all strategic forces (bombers, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles) by 50 percent, and both to agree to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty and pledge not to withdraw from the treaty for ten years.[17]

After the initial discussions, which lasted most of the day, the president proposed that negotiations be continued in working groups, and Gorbachev agreed. The U.S. arms control group was led by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, who, at seventy-nine, has held a variety of important positions in government since the late 1940s. The United States group also included Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle; Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman; and an arms control expert from the National Security Council, Colonel Robert Linhard. Their counterparts on the Soviet side were led by Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who is sixty-three, and included Viktor Karpov, the chief negotiator at Geneva. The Soviet military representative played a much more important part in the talks than the American representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lieutenant General John Moellering.[18]

The two teams worked all night. Their mission was to produce draft agreements for approval at a summit meeting in Washington that would eventually be transmitted as instructions to the arms control negotiators in Geneva. At first, the Soviets insisted on across-the-board cuts of 50 percent in all strategic forces, although they were willing to exclude dual-capable aircraft and forward-based systems in Europe and Asia from the total. The Americans balked, because such a reduction causes a double disadvantage to the United States: it leads to fewer U.S. warheads than Soviet, and it worsens the warhead-to-target ratio, which is already much to the advantage of the Soviet Union in warheads capable of attacking U.S. missile silos. The U.S. countered with an offer for 50 percent reductions leading to equal ceilings and, presumably, heaviest cuts in the Soviet missiles capable of destroying American silos. No agreement was reached on INF in Europe and Asia, and the Soviets proposed that both sides freeze their short-range nuclear missiles and negotiate their reduction.

After an hour's recess, the talks resumed at 3 a.m. Marshal Akhromeyev immediately accepted the U.S. position that 50 percent cuts

[17] Weinraub, "In Iceland."
[18] "Report on the Reykjavik Process," p. 9.

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should lead to equal ceilings. The next three hours were then devoted, as Assistant Secretary Perle recalled, to an attempt "to translate that principle into specific agreed numbers." This ended in agreement on an overall total of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (long-range missiles and bombers) for each side, compared to present totals of about 2,500 for the Soviet Union and 1,900 for the United States. The two sides agreed to a ceiling of 6,000 warheads, down from the current U.S. level of about 13,000 and the Soviet total of about 11,000.

There were two surprise concessions on the Soviet side. The Soviets agreed to an American formula for counting bombers, of which the United States has many and the Soviet Union few: in essence, a bomber with bombs and short-range missiles counts as one delivery vehicle and one warhead, while a bomber with ALCMs counts as one delivery vehicle and each ALCM counts as a warhead. The Soviets also agreed to make reductions in the number of giant SS-18 ICBMs, although they refused to accept American sub-limits on ICBMs and other missiles. Some progress was made on the nuclear testing issue, on which the Soviets have been seeking a total ban, and, in a separate working group, on an agreed statement concerning human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations.

These agreements represent astonishing progress because in a very short time the two had translated their public positions into mutually acceptable terms and potentially binding commitments. It is understandable that American officials "got caught up in the exhilarating process — the rapidly unfolding concessions from Gorbachev, the sense of making history after so many years of delay and frustration in dealing with the Soviet Union."[19] As one of the American officials in Reykjavik put it: "We made more progress in . . . 24 hours than we had made in six years." At the same time, the president and others on the American side were aware that the Soviets were going "after SDI" in the president's words. Sunday morning, while waiting for the two leaders to resume negotiations, Kenneth Adelman observed prophetically, "It's not over till it's over."

The Sunday negotiations began well. Gorbachev accepted the long-standing American "zero option" — no intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet leader also proposed to cut Soviet INF to 100 in Asia with 100 U.S. INF to be deployed in Alaska. On the basis of this understanding with Gorbachev, Reagan directed his aides to telephone the NATO governments that had supported INF deployment to inform them that the United States planned to agree to eliminate INF from Europe.[20] According to news reports, the negotiators also agreed to end nuclear testing in phases, on the under-

[19] Hoffman, "Iceland Talks."
[20] "Report on the Reykjavik Process," p. 11.

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standing that the halt would be tied to reductions in strategic nuclear forces.[21]

The negotiations then entered the final stage. During a special afternoon session called at Gorbachev's request, the president tried to persuade the general secretary to accept SDI. He offered to share SDI in ways that have not been disclosed (presumably allowing the Soviets to observe tests). Gorbachev scornfully rejected the offer, caustically, and correctly, pointing out that the United States will not even share its oil and gas production technology with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev repeated the proposal that both sides should abide by the ABM Treaty for ten years. The Soviets had previously demanded fifteen years, and the United States had countered with seven and a half. Then the Soviet leader added several difficult conditions. The ABM Treaty should be modified in such a way that testing of "all space elements of antiballistic missile defense in space [is] prohibited, except research and testing in laboratories." In addition, the deployment of defenses based on new technologies would depend on agreement about them in future negotiations. The two leaders were near a stalemate.

It was now clear that the Soviets would approve the breakthroughs on offensive limitations only if the United States gave up SDI, that is the right to test and develop defensive systems within the limits set by the ABM Treaty and, conceivably, to deploy some form of defense one day. Shultz then made an attempt to break the deadlock, using an approach he had worked out with the president. To Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Shultz proposed that during the ten-year period of observance of the ABM Treaty, the two sides should eliminate ballistic missiles. The proposal surprised the Soviets, but they did not reject it immediately.

Shortly after 4:30 p.m. Reagan met with Gorbachev and made his last proposal. The United States would abide by the ABM Treaty for five years, and the two sides would reduce all their strategic forces by 50 percent. After these reductions were made, the president suggested, the United States would continue to abide by the ABM Treaty for five more years provided both nations eliminated all remaining ballistic missiles. After a ten-year period, both sides would be free to deploy strategic defenses. The United States would willingly scale SDI down to a much lower level if all strategic forces had been cut by 50 percent and all ballistic missiles had been eliminated. Reagan described the defenses as an "insurance policy." Gorbachev countered that no defenses would be needed if there were no ballistic

[21] Weinraub, "In Iceland." The "Report on the Reykjavik Process" noted that Gorbachev has denied there was an agreement on nuclear testing, and also quoted an unnamed administration source who said that progress on testing had been exaggerated.

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missiles. Reagan asked what there was to worry about if there were no missiles.

Gorbachev then went even further than the president and proposed that both sides eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons within ten years, and agree to confine SDI research to the laboratory. Shortly after this, the discussion ended. The summit was over. After a flurry of news conferences, the two countries' delegations and the hundreds of journalists and television technicians left Iceland as suddenly as they had arrived.

For about ten days after the summit ended, the Reagan administration acted as if the president had made no response to Gorbachev's radical proposal. The administration fostered the impression that both sides had used all their bargaining chips and had failed to reach agreement. The talks had ended in deadlock, administration spokesmen maintained, because the Soviet Union insisted on killing SDI. As Reagan told an audience of U.S. servicemen at Keflavik, a NATO base in Iceland, before leaving, "The Soviet Union insisted we sign an agreement that would deny to me and future presidents for ten years the right to develop, test and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the free world. This we could not and will not do."

As will be seen, this was not the whole truth. The president had responded to Gorbachev, and that response, taken with the administration's reluctance to reveal it, soon became a part of a series of controversies over what had been agreed and not agreed at Reykjavik. The controversies left disturbing questions about the president's competence and the competence of his principal advisers. The questions were, perhaps, unfair, but they were posed agonizingly often, until driven off the front pages and evening newscasts by the even more shocking and damaging controversy over the National Security Council's covert arms shipments to Iran and the diversion to the Contras in Nicaragua of funds paid for the arms.

The Selling of Reykjavik

When the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union meet, it is difficult for even the most hardened observers of the international scene to avoid hoping that a breakthrough change will occur and that the conflict between the two nations will end permanently. Though a vain hope, even a potentially dangerous one, it is very much a part of the "chemistry" of summit meetings. For this reason, neither nation can afford to be portrayed as unjustifiably diminishing the hopes for world peace. This in turn accords enormous significance to the manner in which the Western news media present their version of what takes place at a summit meeting. Western publics rely heavily on the news media for their information and impressions of such events.

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The hope for peace was there at Reykjavik, and the expectation of dramatic achievements was fed by the presence of an extraordinary number of journalists from around the world. Gorbachev showed his appreciation of the "bully pulpit" he had gained by bringing along his attractive wife and allowing her an active social schedule. Uncharacteristically, the president chose to leave Mrs. Reagan at home.

When the talks adjourned without even an agreed statement or communiqué, the questions exploded. At first, perhaps unintentionally, the Reagan administration presented itself as "disappointed" by the outcome. Partly as a result of the natural disappointment of the American negotiators, and partly because of the inevitably disappointed hopes for peace, the impression given by most of the early newspaper and television reports resembled the headline on Bernard Weinraub's article in the *New York Times*, which read: "In Iceland: How Grim Ending Followed Hard-Won Gains"; and that on David Hoffman's story for the *Washington Post*: "Iceland Talks: One Word Chills Hope." The initial impression of failure was compounded when an exhausted Secretary Shultz used the word "disappointed" in his news conference immediately after the end of the talks.[22] In retrospect, Shultz probably should not have spoken with the correspondents before he had rested. Drawn and obviously extremely tired, he could not have been speaking and thinking at his best. The president offered no extensive commentary but said a few words to American servicemen, boarded Air Force One, and flew home.

Gorbachev was neither tired nor reticent. As his advisers spoke happily of a Soviet public relations victory, and prepared to visit West European capitals, the Soviet leader went on the offensive. At his news conference after the talks ended in Reykjavik on October 12, he repeated the Soviet proposals for 50 percent cuts in strategic weapons, for a halt to nuclear tests, for the elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, and for the removal of INF from Europe. The United States had responded, he said, by seeking military superiority through SDI and "even went so far as to bury the accords on which we already reached agreement." There had been, he said, a shortage of new thinking on the American side. Then, in an extraordinary move, he appealed over the heads of the American and West European governments: "We, the Americans, and world public opinion should now give thought to the main question, that of war and peace, the question of nuclear threat."

A day later, the Soviet leader spoke on television in Moscow and emphatically blamed the United States for the absence of agreements. "Standing within one, or two, or three steps of a decision that could become historic for the entire nuclear technological age, we were unable to take those steps.... Our partners lacked the breadth of

[22] Text in *Los Angeles Times*, October 13, 1986.

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approach, an understanding of the unique character of the moment, and, ultimately, the courage, responsibility and political determination that are so necessary for resolving vital and complicated world problems." SDI, he said, had been revealed as "a symbol of obstruction to the cause of peace, the epitome of militarist schemes and of the unwillingness to remove the nuclear menace to mankind. There can be no other interpretation of it, and this is the most important lesson to learn from the meeting in Reykjavik."

The administration moved quickly after its return from Reykjavik to try to replace the initial impression of failure and disappointment with a version of what had been achieved at the summit that conveyed hope and encouragement. Administration spokesmen did this in two ways: by stressing that much had been accomplished rather than allowing the emphasis to fall on what had not been achieved, and by hinting that there was "give" in the Soviet insistence that all the agreements were linked to SDI.

The clearest expression of the hopeful interpretation of Reykjavik came in an address by the president to executive branch employees on October 14, a few hours before he gave a nationwide television broadcast with the same message. "Believe me," the president said, "the significance of that meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn't sign agreements at the end. The significance is that we got as close as we did." In a passage that must have annoyed Soviet leaders, Reagan claimed that his strengthening of U.S. defenses and absolute insistence on arms reductions had brought Soviet concessions on "issue after issue." The president defended SDI as "long-run insurance" and said the Soviets were attempting to kill SDI. Concerning possible Soviet flexibility he said: "My guess is that the Soviets understand [the West's need for SDI] but want to see how much farther they can push us in public before they once again get down to brass tacks."

Secretary of State Shultz picked up the theme at his news conference the same day. Asked why he was now so optimistic — he called Reykjavik a "watershed" during the news conference — he said it was because he had had "a good night's sleep." As to Soviet flexibility, he went out of his way to comment favorably on the Gorbachev speech mentioned earlier, although the Soviet leader had been highly critical of the administration.

A few days later, claiming to have received new information of flexibility on SDI from the Soviet Union, administration spokesmen announced they would seek clarifications from the Soviets in meetings of the two nation's arms control delegations in Geneva. Senior adviser Paul Nitze announced on the *MacNeil-Lehrer Report* that "the Soviets have already begun to indicate that they don't really mean what they said at Reykjavik" that SDI research "must be totally inside the laboratory." By the end of October the administration was

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telling journalists that it was "buoyed by a hint of Soviet flexibility" and planned to propose deep arms cuts at the Geneva meetings.[23]

While there were statements from high Soviet officials during this period, and the Soviets clearly wanted the arms talks to continue, there is little evidence that they had reconsidered their decision to tie progress on all nuclear arms reductions to the strict limitation of SDI. That an "all or nothing" approach still defined the Soviet position became absolutely clear in Geneva on October 29 when Soviet negotiators insisted that there could be no progress on any arms cuts unless the United States accepted significant restraint of SDI.

As its next step, the administration introduced the main proposals it had offered at Reykjavik into the Geneva talks, apparently hoping to define the future arms control agenda. The Geneva proposals called for 50 percent cuts in all strategic weapons in five years, followed during the next five years by the reduction of all ballistic missiles to zero. The U.S. proposal contained the drastic cuts to 100 INF globally, together with limits on shorter-range missiles (350- to 900-mile range) in Europe. The part of the proposal dealing with SDI sought a moratorium on deployment for ten years and allowed testing and development of lasers and other new technologies. In the absence of other agreements, in ten years both nations would be free to deploy.

In briefings for reporters on November 1, 1986, the administration revealed many of the important details of its arms control proposal. The main sub-limits in the U.S. plans were:

- Within the overall ceiling of 6,000 nuclear warheads for each side;
- No more than 4,800 warheads on ballistic missiles (4,500 had been offered in Iceland);
- Off these 4,800 no more than 3,300 on ICBMs (land-based);
- Long-range mobile missiles are banned, unless the Soviet Union proposes an effective verification method.

These proposals are obviously aimed directly at the large Soviet land-based missiles, the backbone of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. To comply with the limits the Soviet Union might have to cut its SS-18 force in half and drop plans to deploy a new missile, the SS-24; both carry ten warheads.[24] In addition, the United States qualified its willingness to abide by the ABM Treaty for ten years, maintaining that it reserved the right to withdraw at any time in the event of "major breaches" of the agreement endangering the nation's "supreme interests."

[23] Los Angeles Times, October 29, 1986.
[24] Michael Gordon, "U.S. Ideas on Arms Offered in Iceland Are Being Refined," *New York Times*, November 2, 1986.

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The "Total Elimination" Controversy

Within a week of the end of the summit meeting, and perhaps sensing that the tide in the public relations contest had shifted against him, Gorbachev became caustic and insulting. Accusing the administration of "word juggling" and "downright deception," Gorbachev attacked what he said were "quarters linked to militarism" and directly challenged Reagan: "Either the President is unable to cope with his entourage," he said, "that literally breathes hatred for the Soviet Union and everything that may lead international affairs into a calm channel, or he himself wants this. At all events, there is no keeping the 'hawks' in the White House in check. And this is very dangerous."[25] In the same speech, Gorbachev revealed an important exchange with Reagan at Reykjavik. The effect of the revelation was to trigger a major controversy that damaged the reputation of the Reagan administration, as the Soviets surely intended.

At issue was whether President Reagan had agreed to a Soviet proposal for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years. The Soviets insisted he had. In his October 22 speech, Gorbachev indicated that he had been given a definite commitment: "The President did," the Soviet leader said, "albeit without special enthusiasm consent to the elimination of all — I emphasize — all, not only certain individual, strategic offensive arms, to be destroyed precisely over ten years in two stages." A week earlier, Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia and incoming chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had reported a similar conclusion after a briefing from the president. Nunn was disturbed by the implications of such a ban for the capability of the United States to defend Western Europe, given Soviet conventional preponderance there. Immediately after Gorbachev's speech the administration attempted to explain away the problem. The president had discussed total elimination, White House spokesman Larry Speakes told reporters, but only in the sense that total elimination "had always been his goal." "The President discussed it," Speakes added, "but it was not formally tabled."[26] But the explanations were not widely accepted inside the United States, and the Soviets quickly added fuel to the controversy with further revelations.

To grasp the impact of the controversy, one must keep in mind a number of circumstances that were coming together to weaken the prestige of the administration. In August there had been the damaging flap over "disinformation" regarding Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi. The administration had shown itself to be disingenuous, willing to sow false news stories abroad about internal

[25] Ibid, October 22, 1986.

[26] On October 23, 1986, the administration released "talking points" (guidance for press spokesmen) on the controversy. These were published in the *New York Times*, October 24, 1986.

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opposition to Qaddafi and promote false rumors about the likelihood of a U.S. strike against Libya, when its own internal intelligence denied there was significant resistance and the United States had no plans for another attack. Next came the initial impression of failure at Reykjavik, with all this meant for the hopes of everyone for world peace. There followed the loss of Republican control of the Senate, a development that threatened the administration's ability to lead the nation and the Western alliance in a coherent way as the presidential election of 1988 approached.

In this context, the Soviet revelations and the confusion and concealment marking the White House response erupted into a public relations crisis. Overnight, after Gorbachev's speech and the public doubts expressed by Senator Nunn and others, American journalists began to say and write extraordinary things. Among them, Leslie Gelb, one of the most relentless investigative reporters on the staff of the *New York Times*, chose to present the controversy as one that would reveal nothing less than the unsuitability of the Reagan administration to govern the United States. "If Mr. Reagan continues to deny that he agreed to the concept of eliminating all long-range nuclear weapons," Gelb wrote on October 24, "then he risks undercutting his credibility in future arms talks with Moscow. But if he admits it, he runs afoul of most of his own Administration's military advice and faces charges of vacillation and incompetence. These are precisely the accusations he used to make, and made again today, about President Carter's handling of Soviet-American relations."[27]

Gelb then raised additional questions about Reykjavik. Were the president and his advisers prepared for the kinds of talks the Russians imposed on them? Plausibly answering no, Gelb then asked why they continued to maintain that they were prepared. Leaving no doubt about how gravely he wished the controversy to be seen, Gelb then wrote: "The question of what was agreed about eliminating nuclear weapons is seen here as fundamental to national security and to perceptions of Mr. Reagan's competence in dealing with Moscow." Reagan and his men, Gelb concluded, had engaged in free-wheeling talks with the Soviets, at which the total elimination of nuclear weapons may have been proposed and agreed, without the help of qualified military experts, and without an opinion on the proposal from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[28]

Recognizing a good thing when they saw it, the Soviet government turned up the heat by releasing what they said were the president's exact words. According to Aleksandr Bessmertynkh, a deputy foreign minister, and Viktor Karpov in a briefing for journalists in Moscow on October 25, Reagan had told Gorbachev: "If we agree

[27] Leslie Gelb, "The Summit: New Issues," *New York Times*, October 25, 1986.
[28] Ibid.

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that by the end of the 10-year period, all nuclear arms are to be eliminated, we can refer this to our delegations in Geneva to prepare an agreement that you could sign during your visit to the United States." The reason they had released the exact words, Bessmertnykh and Karpov said, is that the United States had been speaking and acting as if such an agreement had not been reached. A White House official responded on the same day by suggesting that while the two leaders had discussed total elimination, they had not agreed to it. Privately, some administration officials told reporters that the president might have agreed to total elimination. The Soviets kept the heat on. On October 26, the Soviet government allowed Georgi Arbatov, head of a research institute on the United States, to say that the Soviet government might have to release the minutes of the Reykjavik discussions to counter a "massive disinformation campaign" by the American government.

Finally, a senior White House official, presumably Chief of Staff Donald Regan or National Security Adviser John Poindexter, admitted to reporters that the administration "would not quarrel" with the Soviet claim that the president had agreed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, the official insisted that the discussion of total elimination had ended without "formal agreement." The wonder is that it had taken the White House so long to admit it. In his initial press conference on October 12, Secretary Shultz had spoken of both nations' agreement to eliminate all strategic weapons. The president had repeated this claim in the briefing for members of Congress on October 14, to which Senator Nunn had reacted so strongly. And Regan had told reporters from the *Los Angeles Times* at a breakfast meeting on the same day: "We were going down to zero on all nuclear weapons. All . . . our reasoning was we have ten years in which to match them on conventional weapons. . . . Zero would have been zero. Everything. 'Strategic offensive arms and ballistic missiles' is the actual phrase used . . . [down to] shells, artillery shells."[29]

Concluding Observations

Both Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had earlier agreed to travel to Vienna in November to address the opening session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although they used the occasion to discuss arms control, they made no progress and parted with expressions of bitterness on both sides.

The inconclusive meetings at the ministerial level in Vienna mirrored the stalemate at Reykjavik. Indeed, in the days immediately

[29] Robert Toth, "Reagan Talked of Total A-Ban, U.S. Concedes," *Los Angeles Times*, October 29, 1986.

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after Shultz's return from Vienna, the Western position hardened, partly as a result of the opposition of the European allies of the United States and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the elimination of U.S. ballistic missiles.

On November 20, 1986, the president issued National Security Decision Directive 250, which ordered a number of agencies, including the State Department, CIA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, to study the effects of the elimination of ballistic missiles. NATO has also begun a study of the idea with the results expected in May 1987. Ostensibly, the studies would determine whether the administration would keep or abandon the plan to do away with ballistic missiles. But a number of signs indicated that the decision had already been made to abandon it. Britain and France, the European allies of the United States that possess nuclear weapons, have mostly ballistic missiles in their nuclear arsenals. In addition, they and other governments in Western Europe see little reason to strip away the American deterrent against Soviet conventional superiority.

A good indicator of European opinion came in the communiqué issued on November 16 after Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to Washington. "The priorities for arms reduction talks," it said, begin with the 50 percent cut in strategic weapons. No mention was made of the elimination of ballistic missiles. The president failed to mention the idea in a speech on arms control two days later, and on November 19, Kenneth Adelman said that the offer was "not operational" and that the goal of eliminating ballistic missiles should be de-emphasized while working toward the 50 percent reduction.

Two weeks earlier, President François Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany sought to link the removal of U.S. INF from Europe to cuts in Soviet conventional forces. Kohl clarified their reasons: "The underlying thought is that European security must not be decoupled from the security of the United States and, second, that it must not be possible in the future to conduct wars in Europe. If one were to aim for a solution that would remove missiles without at the same time including the Soviet Union's enormous advantage in conventional forces . . . the thesis that wars should not be possible would be restricted." Finally, on November 28 the United States announced that it had surpassed the limits set in the unratified SALT II agreement on the total number of bombers with cruise missiles and missiles with multiple warheads.[30]

[30] The limit is 1,320. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the United States has 1,190 missiles with multiple warheads and was taken above the ceiling when it deployed the 131st bomber with ALCMs. The Soviet Union has 1,154 missiles with multiple warheads and fifty bombers with ALCMs. The U.S. Defense Department gives slightly different figures for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, in part because it deducts Minuteman III missiles whose silos will be used for the deployment of the first MX. According to the Defense Department, ten MX were operational on December 23, 1986.

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It is easier at this stage to comment on the apparent bargaining strategies of the Soviet Union and the United States than to assess the probable consequences of either their failure to agree at Reykjavik or their continued adherence to the positions they displayed at the summit and gradual hardening of the two sides' positions.

In the short term the Soviet Union badly miscalculated the attractiveness of its bargaining position. Soviet leaders clearly hoped to foster worldwide opposition to SDI and, in this way, to deprive the Reagan administration of a bargaining instrument and a strategic program. For whatever reason, SDI does not mobilize the anti-nuclear movement, perhaps because it is still only a research program, perhaps because it is defensive. Even if the U.S. Congress were again to inflict cuts of as much as 40 percent below administration requests, as it has in the past, a strong SDI research and development program would still remain. Even worse from the Soviet viewpoint, Britain, France, and West Germany have treated the elimination of ballistic missiles and the "breakthrough" on INF — going to zero in Europe and 100 in Asia — with skepticism and indifference.

On the other hand, the Soviets clearly weakened the prestige of the president and his advisers with their manipulation of the controversy over total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Taken together with the president's plan to do away with all ballistic missiles — which had not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the allies in Europe — the total elimination bungle made the president in particular and the administration in general look shallow and foolish.

The image of incompetence was not helped by the attitude of some of the president's most important advisers who relied on public relations campaigns to "fix" difficult problems after the damage had been done rather than on planning and foresight before the mistakes had been made. "Some of us," Chief of Staff Donald Regan told the *New York Times* on November 15, "are like a shovel brigade that follows a parade down Main Street cleaning up. We took Reykjavik and turned what was really a sour situation into something that turned out pretty well. Who was it that took this disinformation thing and managed to turn it? Who was it took on this loss in the Senate and pointed out a few facts and managed to pull that?" The shallowness of this approach is apparent first in the analogy — why should there be so much to clean up? — and second in the idea that a few favorable headlines and television commentaries could overcome something as grave as a loss of confidence in the administration's judgment or the loss of the Senate to the Democratic party, a loss whose importance became painfully clear as the administration struggled to cope with the Iranian arms controversy.

Reykjavik clarified the negotiating method of the Reagan administration. It is to keep raising the "minimum acceptable" reduc-

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tions necessary for an arms control agreement. SDI has been incorporated into the approach, which appears in outline as follows:

(1) From a position skeptical of the very idea of nuclear arms control, the administration proposes reductions deeper than any ever proposed except in rhetorical calls for total disarmament;

(2) United States introduces SDI;

(3) After Gorbachev comes to power, the Soviets move toward the U.S. position but insist that their moves be rewarded by U.S. limits on SDI;

(4) United States refuses to limit SDI and pockets Soviet concessions, saying "You're getting warm but aren't quite there yet. Keep on trying."

In order to maintain this approach the Reagan administration has to keep raising its "minimum" demands. It has done this in two ways. It began by asserting that it would have no arms control agreements that did not cause deep reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of both sides. Second, it developed sub-limits within these deep reductions aimed at forcing cuts in the Soviet Union's most important nuclear weapons, the heavy land-based ICBM. Thus, when the Soviet Union finally embraced deep reductions, as Gorbachev did in January 1986, shortly after taking power, the United States could rely on the sub-limits to set a very high "minimum." The "problem" was that the Soviets kept moving toward U.S. positions. The Reagan administration's "solution," apparently, was to keep raising the minimum.

Thus, the president's offer to eliminate ballistic missiles was put forward as a way of allowing the United States to pocket the Soviet steps toward the U.S. position, avoid having to compromise on the Soviet proposals, and cloud the question of responsibility for any subsequent failure to agree. If this interpretation is correct, the failure of the president and his top advisers to consult the allies and to examine the strategic implications of eliminating ballistic missiles becomes understandable, if not wise. It was not really necessary to consult, they would have thought, because the proposal was for bargaining and not an agreement. Their error lay not in bargaining technique but in political anticipation, in not asking the vital "What if?" questions: "What if the allies and U.S. political leaders publicly question the strategic merits of doing away with ballistic missiles?" and "What if the Soviets violate the confidentiality of summit negotiations and expose the administration's bargaining maneuvers to public scrutiny, especially its attempt to conduct the talks differently in its public diplomacy than in the private bilateral discussions?"

Measured by the amount of Soviet movement toward American positions since 1981, the Reagan approach deserves praise rather than criticism. The Soviet government has made greater concessions to the Reagan White House on arms control than to any other administration. Moreover, through its insistence on SDI, the Reagan

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administration has maneuvered the Soviet government into the position of demandeur, an unenviable role the United States had foisted on itself by its public preoccupation with Soviet heavy missiles. These are impressive achievements. To realize how far the Soviet government has moved, one need only recall that the Carter administration's "comprehensive" proposal was laughed out of Moscow, although it called for much smaller reductions.[31] It does not detract from the Reagan approach to observe that a succession crisis and severe economic problems have weakened the Soviet bargaining position. The U.S. side still must make the correct bargaining moves to derive the greatest advantage from Soviet weakness and must avoid offering gratuitous compromises.

There are two apt questions concerning the Reagan administration's handling of arms control, although the answers lie outside the scope of this analysis. Is there an arms control deal the administration will accept? The "walk in the woods" arrangement raised this question, as did the Reykjavik talks. On both occasions the answer was negative. Gorbachev's acceptance of the "zero" option on February 28, 1987, again posed the question. If there is no acceptable agreement then a second question must be taken seriously: What long-term effects will the absence of an arms control agreement have on the support of the people, legislators, and allies of the United States for nuclear modernization and the maintenance of offensive nuclear deterrence?

It is fair to assume that as good negotiators, Soviet leaders follow a similar method in their dealings with the United States. If true, this would explain the Soviet counter-offer of the total elimination first of all strategic weapons and then of all nuclear weapons in response to the president's bid to do away with all ballistic missiles. The Soviets' other method of raising their "minimum," presumably, is to force the sub-limits upward. Lately, the Soviets have also appeared to be retreating from their Reykjavik offers, in regard to submarine-launched cruise missiles and their "permission" for the stationing of Pershing II missiles in Alaska.[32]

The Soviets obviously could not surrender their ICBMs while the United States kept its far more numerous bombers and ALCMs. The solution, therefore, was to escape what they must have seen as an unrealistic offer by making an even less realistic one, which, they probably hoped, could be turned to propaganda advantage when the president rejected it, as surely he would. Gorbachev could make wonderful headlines by saying, "I asked the American President to do away with all nuclear weapons and he refused." Instead, they had to say "He accepted," and then try to use the acceptance to advan-

[31] See Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 52ff.

[32] Jim Hoagland, *International Herald Tribune*, November 24, 1986.

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tage. By publicizing Reagan's acceptance the Soviets hurt the president's prestige; by revealing confidential exchanges without mutual consent, they damaged the chances for an arms control agreement for the rest of the Reagan administration's term.

Overall, Reykjavik suggests that neither side is interested in major changes in their nuclear arsenals. Both seek to preserve their present advantages, large ICBMs for the Soviets, ALCMs for the Americans, and to safeguard new developments, MX and SDI for the United States and a mobile ICBM and a Soviet version of SDI for the Soviet Union. The encounter at Reykjavik was an elaborate minuet, part propaganda, part negotiating maneuver. Both nations approached the meeting in an attempt to put the other on the wrong foot in the eyes of the most important target audiences, the people, legislators, and news media of Western Europe and North America. Both suffered losses: the Reagan administration to its reputation for competence, and the Gorbachev Kremlin to its credibility as a frank and fair partner in negotiations, one that does not ambush its counterpart and divulge privileged information.

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BEYOND MBFR: THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS GAMBIT*

by David S. Yost

In December 1986, NATO governments declared themselves ready to open discussions with the Warsaw Pact about "a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."[1] At the same time, the NATO countries participating in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) reaffirmed their "determination to reach early, substantial and verifiable agreement" and called upon the Warsaw Pact "to respond constructively to the Western initiative of 5th December 1985." This would, they added, "significantly contribute to the launching of other negotiations, this time extended to Europe as a whole."[2]

The relationship between MBFR and the NATO initiative for a new conventional arms control forum is complex. Despite their professed interest in concluding an MBFR agreement, the NATO participants apparently regard it as an increasingly unlikely prospect, owing to the Soviet Union's long-standing refusal to accept the verification measures proposed by the West. Various Warsaw Pact pronouncements have signaled declining Eastern interest in MBFR and a preference for an Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone.[3]

Moreover, many in the West have concluded — reluctantly, in some cases — that the French were right from the outset in warning of the dangers of the MBFR enterprise and in refusing to participate. The Western initiative for a new conventional arms control forum derives in part from a recognition of MBFR's shortcomings. Although some Western officials believe an MBFR agreement along the lines of the West's proposal of December 1985 could be a useful bridge to further MBFR negotiations and/or to negotiations in a new Atlantic-to-the-Urals forum, others are considering how to bring MBFR

* The views expressed are those of the author alone. This article is published simultaneously in *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn) and in *Défense Nationale* (Paris).

[1] Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, December 11, 1986, NATO Press Communiqué M-2 (86) 41, paragraph 4.

[2] North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 11-12, 1986, paragraph 8. France recalled its position on MBFR and made a reservation regarding this sentence.

[3] See especially the Warsaw Pact's Budapest Appeal of June 11, 1986, published in *Pravda*, June 12, 1986, and available in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union*, Daily Report (hereafter, *FBIS-SU*, June 13, 1986, pp. BB8-12. Mikhail Gorbachev's address in East Berlin on April 18, 1986 foreshadowed several of the themes in the Budapest Appeal.

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to a close if a mandate for a new forum is approved and — more substantively — what lessons and principles from MBFR could be usefully applied in a new forum.

The West's December 1985 Proposal in MBFR

When the MBFR negotiations began in 1973, the participants agreed on a basic objective: to establish East-West parity through reductions in military manpower in the guidelines area (the Benelux countries, West Germany, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).[4] Since 1978, they have concurred that ground and air forces could be reduced to a common collective ceiling of around 900,000 on each side with a 700,000 sub-ceiling on ground force personnel.[5]

Until December 1985, however, East and West were far apart on how this goal might be achieved. The West had insisted that the two sides agree before treaty signature on the number of forces each then had in the guidelines area and use these data to specify the reductions each would have to take to reach parity. The East had refused to agree on current force levels or to specify an explicit number of reductions beyond initial withdrawals of U.S. and Soviet troops. Moreover, the East rejected a number of the associated measures proposed by the West — e.g., exchange of information on all forces in the guidelines area, permanent entry-exit points for force movements, and mandatory on-site inspections to assess treaty compliance. The result had been virtual stalemate.

In December 1985 the West fundamentally modified its proposals. The changes in the Western position included an adoption of elements of the Eastern framework for an agreement and an abandonment of the previous insistence on clarification of the data base prior to undertaking any reductions. As a result, differences of principle dividing the Eastern and Western proposals have been significantly narrowed.

Indeed, two of the main elements of the December 1985 Western proposal were based on the February 1985 Eastern proposal. First, the West proposed that 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground troops be withdrawn from the guidelines area within a year or less. (The February 1985 Eastern proposal had suggested 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet troops). Second, the West suggested that these initial U.S. and Soviet withdrawals be followed by a collective no-increase commitment for all troops of participating countries in the guidelines area for three years. The agreement would be "time-limited" and intended to expire at the end of the three-year no-increase period

[4] MBFR is, of course, a Western acronym. Owing in part to the Warsaw Pact's rejection of the term "balanced," the agreed official designation of the negotiations is Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MURFAAMCE).

[5] John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 73.

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"in order to afford the sides an opportunity to assess the results of the agreement."[6] It might then be followed by negotiations on more comprehensive reductions.

The West had consistently maintained since the beginning of the negotiations in 1973 that a common understanding on the starting point — that is, the numbers of forces currently in the guidelines area — would be an essential prerequisite for any reductions. The lack of agreement on data has stemmed from Western intelligence estimates that attribute over 200,000 more air and ground troops to the Warsaw Pact than are acknowledged by Eastern negotiators in Vienna.

During the three-year no-increase period proposed by the West, both sides would undertake associated measures for verification of compliance with the new ceilings on U.S. and Soviet forces and the collective no-increase commitment. The associated measures are, moreover, intended to enable each side to verify the accuracy of the data exchanged at the start of the three-year no-increase period. The data exchanges would provide information on unit strength down to the battalion level. The associated measures would include permanent entry-exit points, pre-notification of out-of-garrison activities, in the exchange of maneuver observers, and up to thirty mandatory inspections per year.

In February 1986 the East accepted the West's adoption of the February 1985 Eastern framework for an agreement and the West's decision to forego clarification of data before undertaking any reductions. The East also agreed that the initial Soviet withdrawals from the guidelines area should consist of 11,500 troops. The East proposed, however, that 6,500 U.S. troops be withdrawn (instead of the 5,000 proposed by the West) and that both the U.S. and Soviet troops leave with their armaments and equipment (NATO had left this to the discretion of each side). Similarly, the East proposed that the subsequent three-year no-increase commitment apply to both manpower and armaments (the Western proposal would limit manpower alone).

The February 1986 Eastern response further differed from the Western proposal in specifying (as in February 1985) that the withdrawn U.S. and Soviet troops should consist of combat and combat support units. Although this concept once figured in a Western proposal (that of April 1984), in December 1985 the West offered each side greater flexibility in selecting which units to withdraw. The Soviets may be attracted to the combat-combat support concept as a means to set a precedent applicable to the forces of other MBFR participants, notably West Germany. Finally, the West detected a

[6] Statement by the Dutch ambassador, Jan Hein van de Mortel, *Atlantic News*, February 5, 1986, p. 2.

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"clear implication that the East would not accept sublimits on U.S. and Soviet forces" — a position unacceptable to the West and in contradiction to the East's own 1982 proposal for U.S. and Soviet force limitations.[7]

The East has also declined to approve the West's package of associated measures. The East has, for example, "categorically" rejected the Western proposal that associated measures for pre-notification of out-of-garrison troop movements and the invitation of observers extend beyond the guidelines area into Soviet territory.[8]

The Eastern view on entry-exit points has been somewhat more surprising. Although the Eastern proposal of February 1985 had referred to temporary observation points to monitor U.S. and Soviet force withdrawals, recent Soviet statements implied a return to the East's June 1983 proposal for permanent entry-exit points. In January 1986, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev said, "permanent verification posts could be established to monitor any military contingents entering the reduction zone."[9] At the negotiations in Vienna, however, the East has intimated that soldiers replacing forces already based in the guidelines area would not be obliged to go through the entry-exit points. The East's "language on exceptions to exit/entry point provisions strongly suggests that hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops on rotations and reservists called to active service would not be required to pass through these observation points."[10]

Similarly, although high-level Soviet officials have referred in recent years to the possibility of supplementing national technical means with mutually agreed cooperative verification procedures, the East has not been willing to endorse on-site inspections that would meet Western standards of adequacy. The East has declined to accept the disaggregation of data that would be necessary for verification through inspections, and has added that proposed inspections should be justified on a case-by-case basis, and in any event be subject to veto by the inspected side. The East holds that refusal of an inspection "should not give rise to doubts about the compliance with the agreement."[11]

From a long-term historical perspective, East and West appear to have reached an unprecedented degree of broad consensus on the main features of a possible initial MBFR treaty. The remaining differences on numbers of U.S. troops to be withdrawn in the first phase

[7] Statement by the Luxembourg ambassador, Edouard Molitor, *Atlantic News*, March 12, 1986, p. 2.

[8] Statement by the Soviet ambassador, Valerian Mikhailov, *Atlantic News*, March 5, 1986, p. 3.

[9] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Nuclear Disarmament by the Year 2000," statement of January 15, 1986, in *New York Times*, February 5, 1986.

[10] Molitor, *Atlantic News*, n. 7, p. 3.

[11] Eastern draft treaty language quoted by Molitor, ibid.

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and on the inclusion of armaments may be more amenable to compromise than the contrasting approaches to associated measures.

Compromises by the West on associated measures appear to be ruled out for the present by the logic of its abandonment of its previous position on clarification of data prior to undertaking any reductions. The initial U.S.-Soviet reductions are conditioned on Eastern acceptance of associated measures intended to establish a data base that might justify confidence regarding Soviet compliance with a treaty regime providing for more extensive reductions. Although some observers consider that the West would be making a no-increase commitment in the face of an unquantified East-West disparity in troop levels, others contend that the detailed figures on unit strengths filed by the East in the information exchange at the beginning of the three-year no-increase period would be verifiable with the associated measures proposed by the West.

The North Atlantic Council in December 1985 described the West's proposed associated measures as "essential to verify compliance with the Agreement's provisions."[12] Some Western policy makers may, however, come to regard the current policy as one subject to further modification for negotiating purposes. If the East offered compromises (and possibly even in the absence of Eastern concessions), some Western officials might argue for yielding on "technical" and "secondary" points to improve prospects for an agreement and for follow-on negotiations while retaining associated measures judged to be sufficient for verification purposes. The possibility of an agreement along the broad lines currently approved by East and West is, in any case, serious enough to justify an assessment of the benefits and risks it might entail. Such an assessment may illustrate the shortcomings of the MBFR terms of reference, and help to explain the West's initiative for a new conventional arms control forum.

MBFR's Shortcomings

Proponents of an MBFR agreement have contended that the large concentrations of forces along the inter-German border pose intrinsic risks to peace, since miscalculations might readily lead to large-scale war. The hope is that concluding an agreement to reduce force levels and verify compliance would have a positive impact on the political climate of East-West relations and reduce the risks of war. By this logic, even the currently envisaged agreement — relatively small U.S. and Soviet reductions and a three-year no-increase arrangement — could diminish the chances of war. This agreement for an MBFR accord is among the most elusive and most difficult to evaluate objectively. It amounts to a vague judgment about a poten-

[12] North Atlantic Council communiqué of December 12-13, 1985, paragraph 6.

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tial political outcome ("lowering confrontation" and "relaxing tension"), and it is open to debate.

An assessment of the military implications of an MBFR agreement must consider five principal issues: (1) whether the personnel ceilings could in fact be verified; (2) what military options — with or without substantial warning — might nonetheless be available to the Warsaw Pact; (3) what capacities for subsequent reinforcement would remain, give the geographical setting and other factors; (4) whether the force ceilings and associated measures could have asymmetrical political effects on Eastern and Western decision making in a crisis; and (5) whether manpower is a relevant unit of account for modern conventional warfare.

VERIFICATION. To benefit from parity in the negotiations area, NATO would have to be sure that the Warsaw Pact had reduced to (and remained at) parity levels. The East so far declined to cooperate in any joint examination of how its figures were derived or to accept a number of the associated measures proposed by the West to facilitate verification and confidence-building. Instead, the Warsaw Pact has suggested that non-mandatory associated measures of limited scope and duration would be sufficient to verify its contentions that approximate parity already exists and that agreed ceilings would be honored.

Years of analysis have, however, confirmed what was suspected when the negotiations began: manpower is perhaps the most difficult unit of account for verification purposes ever used in arms control negotiations. The high aggregate ceilings for forces simply cannot be verified with confidence or, in the case of a crisis, expeditiously. This makes the information exchanges on units foreseen in the December 1985 Western proposal a critically important point of compliance. Mandatory on-site inspections are essential, because no photograph can indicate whether a unit is over-manned, and methodologies for constructing estimates on the basis of extrapolations from unit structure and other sources are indirect, inexact, and extremely time-consuming.

The limitations of even the West's proposed associated measures should be recognized. Owing to the desire to make the package "negotiable" and to limit corresponding Eastern rights to conduct intrusive inspections and other activities on the Western side, the West has refrained from proposing the draconian associated measures that would be objectively necessary for reliable and timely verification of manpower ceilings. Thirty inspections a year would hardly be sufficient to cover forces at over two thousand sites of varying sizes and purposes in the Eastern side of the guidelines area. As a result, only a sampling would be feasible.[13]

[13] Sampling may be statistically sound when dealing with random but otherwise con-

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Even if the Soviets did not attempt to evade the limitations during the reductions or for years to come, the obstacles to verifying manpower levels by national intelligence means would constitute a standing invitation to do so. If weapons and equipment were stockpiled forward in the guidelines area or kept in active unit inventories, it would be easy for the Soviets, gradually and surreptitiously, to reintroduce troops for under-strength units. They have already established behavior patterns that could mask large-scale clandestine reinforcements (for example, the semi-annual rotation by air within a few days of over 100,000 Soviet troops in East Germany); and, as noted above, the East intends to exclude troop rotations from use of entry-exit points.

Western intelligence would probably be able to detect promptly any major Soviet move into the area (e.g., divisions with equipment), but this would be true in the absence of an MBFR agreement. An agreement for manpower parity and associated measures would be intended to supply added protection against so-called standing-start or shirt-warning attacks. But intelligence on manpower levels, intrinsically problematic and unpunctual, would be especially unreliable with respect to the prompt violations that could support a short-warning attack with in-place forces.

RESIDUAL EASTERN ATTACK OPTIONS. Even if the Warsaw Pact complied fully with the terms of an MBFR treaty, its military options would be diminished only slightly because no actual demobilization of Soviet forces would be required. The "reductions" in Soviet forces could therefore simply be re-deployments out of Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia into the Western Military Districts of the USSR, a maximum distance of 500 miles from the negotiations zone.[14]

In other words, even if an MBFR agreement were broadly verifiable, substantial Warsaw Pact surprise and short-warning (nominally, seven to ten days) attack options would remain.[15] Any

sistent phenomena; but sampling of information that is already manipulated as a matter of course for purposes of strategic deception would be of questionable validity.

[14] It should be noted that the West has insisted that the question of whether Hungary should form part of the guidelines area be left open until an MBFR agreement is concluded. The Soviet Union has hinted that Hungary's inclusion would not be acceptable unless France or Italy were also added. Western draft treaties for comprehensive reductions reportedly provide that the forces withdrawn by non-indigenous direct participants return to their homelands. This would rule out the Soviet Union re-deploying forces directly from the negotiations area to Hungary, but would prevent the Soviets from deploying *other* units from the USSR to supplement Soviet forces already in Hungary. It could nonetheless be argued that the Soviets would not deploy additional forces in Hungary in order to avoid being accused by the East of circumventing "flank security" provisions of draft MBFR agreements.

[15] James R. Blaker has suggested that the West might use on-site inspections to disrupt Warsaw Pact short-warning attack preparations. This might function as a deterrent to such preparations. As Blaker acknowledges, however, on-site inspections could be at least partially vulnerable to deception by the East. Moreover, the long-standing Eastern refusal to accept the principle of mandatory inspections and other closely related Western associated measures — e.g., detailed information exchanges — makes the utility of on-site inspections for this purpose hypothetical. See Blaker, "On-Site Inspections: The Military Significance of an Arms-control Proposal," *Survival*, May/June 1984.

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deleterious effects of an MBFR treaty on Eastern military options could be mitigated by (a) gradually re-inserting forces in small numbers attached to existing force structures (incapable of being readily detected by Western intelligence means, even with the help of associated measures); and (b) building up forces under the guise of notified exercises, "routine" troop rotations, and/or dealing with a political crisis internal to the Warsaw Pact.[16] In combination, these steps could supplement in-place forces in the guidelines area and alerted forces in Hungary and the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union. While these increments of capability might fall short of the degree of superiority and readiness the USSR would prefer to achieve before launching a full-scale offensive against NATO, it should be recognized that important short-warning attack options for limited objectives would still remain.[17]

Such limited-objective attack options could be even more attractive for the Warsaw Pact after the conclusion of an MBFR agreement, depending on its terms, because NATO could well be less capable of coping with them. The time-limited agreement currently under consideration would not require extensive force reductions in the West. However, if this agreement were followed by one providing for the 900,000 ceiling on air and ground forces approved by East and West as a long-term goal of MBFR, NATO would have about 100,000 fewer active forces to defend against surprise attack. The remaining forces would be spread more thinly, and forward defense would thus be even more difficult.

REINFORCEMENT ASYMMETRIES. Differences in the geographical situations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact constitute one of the main reasons why the latter's standing-start attack options would remain significant under an MBFR agreement. The guidelines area is simply too narrow to delay significantly the movement of Soviet forces to the front: only 500 miles separate the inter-German border from the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the

[16] According to one analysis, "If . . . the Soviets were to build up their forces over a period of some weeks without actually firing a shot, Western leaders might find it difficult politically to mobilize their own forces because of the social and economic costs of mobilization and the pressures to resolve the crisis diplomatically rather than matching the Soviet force buildup. Moreover, collective NATO leadership might well be paralyzed by different interpretations of the crisis or Soviet deception about the nature of the mobilization, particularly if there were unrest in Eastern Europe." (Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, *Challenges for U.S. National Security, Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Force, A Preliminary Report, Part II* [Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981], p. 80). The likelihood that the Soviet Union could use the latter stratagem successfully — deceiving the West as to the nature of a crisis internal to the Warsaw Pact — has been disputed. It can also be argued that cheating within the guidelines area would be less likely than a force buildup on adjacent Soviet territory. If detected, cheating might deprive the Soviets of militarily useful surprise effects.

[17] See the statement by West German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner in the *New York Times*, July 14, 1984; and the article by Colonel Dieter Farwick, a member of the Planning Staff of the West German Ministry of Defense, "Überraschender Angriff mit begrenztern Ziel," *Europäische Wehrkunde*, December 1985, pp. 642-46.

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United States, the USSR can deploy any troops withdrawn from Central Europe to immediately adjacent regions and can quickly reintroduce these troops into the forward area.

In other words, the force ratios in usable capabilities would probably not be improved for NATO by an MBFR agreement, owing in large part to the geographical asymmetries. Indigenous active forces would be limited in their entirety; for them, reductions would mean demobilization and, in some cases, disbanding units. U.S. and Canadian forces would be withdrawn to North America, and British forces would be withdrawn to the United Kingdom. But Soviet forces would be numerically restricted only in the guidelines area, and withdrawn forces would be relocated only a relatively short distance away from their current garrisons. The geographical benefits for the East of short, interior lines of communication versus long, exterior lines of communication for the West (particularly the United States and Canada) are so obvious that even proponents of an MBFR agreement usually do not dispute their significance.

CRISIS DECISION MAKING. Proponents of an agreement have suggested that Warsaw Pact violations of MBFR treaty commitments would help Western governments make timely decisions in crises by providing additional indicators and warnings of hostile intent and enhanced capabilities. It is, however, doubtful if any verification regime could resolve the problem of political leaders possibly delaying action on the basis of ambiguous (or unwelcome) evidence of treaty violations.

Even if information from national intelligence means and intrusive associated measures (or Eastern refusals to comply with them) were available for "going public" with findings of Soviet violations, it would be politically unrealistic to presume that all Western governments would reach decisions to do so — much less order countervailing actions inconsistent with an MBFR agreement. The genuineness or significance of the violations would in all likelihood be questioned, even in the context of a protracted crisis, given the implications for domestic and alliance politics and for the future of arms control and East-West relations. Even if the Alliance were able to agree that specific violations had occurred (an improbable circumstance), the fear of raising tensions and being "provocative" could prevent or fatally delay action vital for managing the crisis and preventing war. These constraints could delay timely reinforcements from Britain and North America that would be all the more necessary in view of the geographical distances and greater logistical difficulties (more dependence on sealift and airlift) facing the West.

The USSR might even be able to mobilize forces on Soviet territory without violating MBFR commitments. That the Soviet authorities intend to retain this option is apparent in the East's recently reaffirmed rejection of associated measures extending beyond the

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guidelines area into the Soviet Union. A Soviet mobilization would give the Warsaw Pact a significant time advantage unless the West made decisions — e.g., mobilization of NATO's main reserves in Europe, those of West Germany — that would violate MBFR limitations. Moreover, West Germany and the Benelux countries constitute NATO's primary reception area for reinforcements from Britain and North America; but these forces could not be rapidly introduced into the guidelines area without violating MBFR ceilings. It is difficult to identify militarily meaningful constraints on the Warsaw Pact's strategic options under an MBFR regime of a magnitude comparable to the practical and political inhibitions that such a regime would impose on Western freedom of action.

MILITARY RELEVANCE OF MANPOWER. A basic problem with manpower as a unit of account (aside from the verification difficulties noted earlier) is that manpower parity in the guidelines area, even if achievable through an arms control treaty, would become less significant than the quality of the firepower, mobility, readiness, organization, and general equipment and training of forces. In the words of Senator Nunn,

> In the Guidelines Area toady, NATO's 792,000 ground troops are confronted across the inter-German border not so much by 935,000 Pact troops. They face 57 Pact divisions that are organized, deployed, trained and equipped for a surprise blitzkrieg geared for a rate of advance of up to 100 kilometers per day. *It is mobility, firepower, organization and tactics — not numbers of men — that govern the course of combat on the modern battlefield.* By continuing and even sharpening its forces on aggregate troop levels, *NATO is pursuing an agreement in Vienna that may be irrelevant to the realities of the military balance in Europe.*[18]

Since the mid-1960s, the equipment of Warsaw Pact forces in the guidelines area has generally been increased and upgraded far more than that of NATO forces in armor, artillery, anti-tank weapons, tactical air defense, and logistics; the quality of Soviet-made equipment has also improved markedly.[19] Some proponents of an MBFR agreement imposing manpower ceilings in isolation from equipment and armaments have argued that manpower is an appropriate unit of account precisely because Warsaw Pact superiority in armaments makes East-West equality virtually non-negotiable. Jonathan Dean, for example, has stated that,

> It is logical and necessary to seek to reduce the huge accumulation of weapons in Central Europe at some point. But the Pact's numerical superiority in most major armaments and the drawbacks of accepting in an agreement an Eastern numerical

[18] Address by the Honorable Sam Nunn in *Third German-American Roundtable on NATO: The MBFR Negotiations: A Conference Report*, Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980, p. 23; emphasis added.

[19] See the table of improvements in Soviet weapons in the guidelines area in Lothar Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems*, Adelphi Paper no. 176, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, p. 5; and Phillip A. Karber, "To Lose an Arms Race: The Competition in Conventional Forces Deployed in Central Europe 1965-1980," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., *The Soviet Asset: Military Power in the Competition over Europe*, vol. I of *Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983).

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superiority make it difficult to design a concept for reducing armaments in Central Europe which is both effective in the arms control sense *and relatively negotiable.* For example, reduction of tanks on both sides to parity at a lower level as with military manpower, a possible approach, would require larger Pact than Western reductions.[20]

This approach would seem to reward the Soviets for their force buildup by making equipment not subject to negotiation, and could help to perpetuate Soviet armaments superiority on a de facto basis — even if not codified and endorsed in a treaty. Indeed, an agreement on manpower parity might mislead public opinion in Western countries by implying that critical limitations had been placed on Warsaw Pact capabilities when, in fact, Soviet theater war-fighting superiority would remain largely intact, owing to Soviet reinforcement advantages and differences in force characteristics. These differences include the increasing importance in Soviet theater offensive doctrine of airborne and special operations units and operational maneuver groups (highly mobile formations up to corps size dedicated to the rapid seizure of targets in rear areas), all of which could support short-warning attacks, even if manpower parity were established in MBFR.

The significance of such Soviet manpower redeployments should also be considered from the viewpoint of "tooth to tail" ratios. Indigenous armies — those of countries constituting the guidelines area — must naturally devote a large proportion of their manpower to command, training, and support functions. Support functions and overhead services also take up a great fraction of the manpower of units coming from Britain and North America, because they are organized as expeditionary forces. In contrast, the USSR can arrange for many of these functions and services to be performed on Soviet soil, because its units in the guidelines area are deployed from immediately adjacent territory. As a result, Soviet manpower in the guidelines area has a generally higher "tooth to tail" ratio — more combat potential — than NATO manpower. Manpower parity could therefore equal Soviet combat superiority not only because of armaments advantages, but also because of higher "tooth to tail" ratios.[21]

Maintenance of Western Force Levels

Judgments differ with respect to the political and financial implications of an MBFR agreement for the maintenance of adequate Western force levels in Europe. Proponents of an agreement have

[20] Jonathan Dean, "MBFR: From Apathy to Accord," *International Security*, Spring 1983, p. 132; emphasis added.

[21] For a more detailed analysis of this point, see Phillip A. Karber, "Calibrating Armament Responses: Agreed Constraints in the Stabilization of Arms Competitions," in Uwe Nerlich, ed., *The Western Panacea: Constraining Soviet Power through Negotiation*, vol. II of *Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 353-54.

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speculated that it might lead to a moderation of Soviet conventional force modernization efforts that would allow Western governments to follow suit. It has also been conjectured that an accord could have three additional benefits for Western force levels: it might enable the United States to reduce the costs of maintaining its security interests in Europe by shifting part of that defense burden to allies; it might protect the treaty-approved force levels from budgetary and parliamentary pressures for unilateral troop reductions; and it might even stimulate public support for improving conventional forces by making conventional defense seem more feasible.

On the other hand, it might be more realistic to recognize that an MBFR agreement would concern force *ceilings*, as the phrase "no-increase" implies. Unilateral force reductions would obviously not violate ceilings. Some politicians in NATO countries could argue in favor of such reductions on the ground that the East-West force disparities prior to the conclusion of an MBFR treaty were found tolerable and that a similar ratio of forces could therefore be maintained at a lower level under an MBFR treaty. Even the small U.S.-Soviet initial reductions foreseen in the current Eastern and Western proposals could help to promote unilateral troop reductions in Western Europe and North America.

Western reductions below the parity ceiling could even be portrayed as confidence-building measures that the East might imitate. While the "euphoria effect" of an actual agreement should not be exaggerated, it should be recognized that conclusions of an MBFR accord could be interpreted by some as a signal that the Warsaw Pact threat had been brought under control by political means. The accord could then be used as an argument for reduced defense spending and (in countries such as West Germany) for the abandonment of measures to extend conscription obligations in order to maintain conventional force levels.

An MBFR agreement could also result in added costs for dual-based U.S. forces to carry out commitments to European security. If troop levels in the guidelines area were to be reduced, and NATO became even more dependent on the U.S. ability to rapidly reinforce Central Europe, U.S. airlift requirements would be increased even beyond the demanding levels currently necessary to move designated forces to their pre-positioned supplies in Europe. Such risks underline the extent to which the MBFR enterprise subtly contradicts the main strategic prescription supported by a consensus within the Atlantic Alliance: improving NATO's conventional combat strength.

An MBFR accord would send the contrary signal to public opinion by implying that conventional force improvements are unnecessary, since existing Western forces would be cut back and Eastern forces would be limited by treaty. Such an accord could help to frustrate Congressional efforts to establish better burden-sharing ar-

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rangements within the Alliance. Rather than increasing defense spending and paying particular attention to the key prescriptions of Senator Nunn and other defense reformers (e.g., munitions stockpiles and aircraft shelters), some West European politicians could view an MBFR accord as an excellent substitute for such costly prescriptions. An MBFR accord could thus exacerbate European-American burden-sharing disagreements.

A related risk of NATO's conventional force improvement efforts resides in a potential politicization of conventional force modernization in Western Europe. At present the main obstacles to further conventional force improvements in NATO reside in domestic political and economic priorities. If an MBFR accord were to be concluded, the agreement would take on greater significance for East-West political relations than the negotiations have ever had. The Soviets would probably use the agreement — and the likely follow-on negotiations — to question any NATO conventional force improvement programs as inconsistent with the agreement. In other words, the agreement would give the Soviet "military détente" propaganda line greater plausibility and thus undercut NATO's conventional force plans vis-à-vis public opinion.

Any MBFR agreement — either the "time-limited" accord currently under consideration or a more comprehensive treaty — could also encourage public belief in an East-West "essential equivalence" in conventional forces in Europe, on the grounds that NATO would not have approved the conventional force "freeze" if the situation were otherwise. This belief could make it harder for the Alliance to oppose calls for a "no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons" pledge and a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in Central Europe. In the context of an MBFR agreement, it could be less clear that NATO needs U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to compensate for Soviet superiority in conventional forces.

Finally, it may be argued that an MBFR agreement would establish a permanent de facto ceiling on U.S. forces in Europe that budgetary and domestic political pressures would maintain, even if the MBFR regime eventually broke down and the Soviets gradually re-introduced their forces. Treaty commitments are hard for democracies to abandon, even in changed circumstances. Unilaterally determined force levels could, in contrast, be raised with greater ease, if necessary.

Long-Term Diplomatic Effects

Five potential diplomatic and political implications of an MBFR accord must be considered as well. The first concerns what an MBFR agreement would signify regarding Soviet objectives for the long-term future of Western Europe. Some West European MBFR proponents have interpreted Soviet willingness to negotiate in this forum

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as evidence that the USSR became a status quo power during the era of détente. In this view, the Soviets have signaled their acceptance of NATO and the U.S. military presence in Western Europe via MBFR partly because Moscow finds the U.S. presence stabilizing and a useful lever to help control the Federal Republic of Germany. Skeptics disagree. In their view, the long-term aim of the Soviet Union in Europe is to neutralize and ultimately expel the U.S. military presence that stands in the way of Soviet dominance. Soviet participation in MBFR has been an instrument toward this end, not an indication of Soviet acquiescence in a permanent U.S. presence in Western Europe.[22]

A second area of long-term diplomatic speculation involves the possible effects of an MBFR agreement on the future of the Soviet control structure in Eastern Europe. Some MBFR advocates have suggested that an MBFR agreement would supply a framework for positive evolutionary change in Eastern Europe, because the Soviets would be reassured by the Western force reductions and the manpower parity ceilings. With less to fear from the West, the argument goes, the USSR would relax its grip over Eastern Europe. The counterargument is that an MBFR agreement would ratify and help to perpetuate Soviet military control over Eastern Europe by legitimizing the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet military presence in the guidelines area.

A third issue concerns the future status of the Federal Republic of Germany. MBFR proponents typically contend that any risks for West Germany's future defense options owing to her participation in the MBFR guidelines area are outweighed by the security benefits they expect from an accord. The Federal Republic is, however, the only major country that would have all of its ground and air forces subject to MBFR limitations and associated measures. In contrast to the 1954 Western European Union limitations on West German military strength, MBFR constraints would involve the USSR and East European countries as verification agents. The collectivity principle would allow the Western governments some flexibility; but in practice ceilings would directly affect the Bundeswehr, and no ceilings would limit the total number of Soviet forces in Europe. The Soviet Union would gain a right of supervision over the greatest concentration of Western forces in Europe; but, because of the peculiarities of the MBFR terms of reference, Soviet theater war-fighting supe-

[22] Hannes Adomeit has convincingly argued that the Soviet agreement to participate in MBFR should be interpreted as a consequence of a decision in favor of "a *comprehensive* management of East-West relations and a *negotiated* withdrawal of U.S. forces . . . the Soviet leadership in this phase of policy allocated to the United States the noble task of presiding over a *voluntary* curtailment of its influence in Europe." (Adomeit, "Soviet Policy Toward the West: Costs and Benefits of Using 'Imperialist Contradictions,'" in Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson, eds., *The Soviet Problem in American-German Relations* [New York: Crane, Russak, 1985], p. 205; emphasis in original.)

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riority would be preserved. Moreover, MBFR could constitute a new Soviet diplomatic instrument in security relations with the Federal Republic — on top of the Four Power reservations regarding the German question, the "enemy states" clauses in the United Nations Charter, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty — to say nothing of Berlin and inter-German relations.

The fourth issue relates to the future of West European defense cooperation. The French government has been particularly outspoken among the Western allies in expressing concern that an MBFR treaty could lead to the creation of a special security zone that could mortgage future West European defense unit options by establishing a Soviet *droit de regard* over the Western side of the guidelines area.[23] Although a number of West Europeans see merit in this argument (would not a unique status for West Germany and the Benelux countries hinder security cooperation with other countries in a West European defense unity effort?), others consider it hypothetical and unlikely to have practical significance, especially in view of reservations about sovereign rights already articulated by some Western governments.

The fifth long-term diplomatic implication derives from France's refusal to participate in MBFR. Critics of French MBFR policy emphasize that no Warsaw Pact ally with forces in the guidelines area refuses to participate in the negotiation or to be bound by an eventual MBFR agreement; that France's non-integrated status in NATO and her approach to MBFR rule out the withdrawal of U.S., British, and Canadian forces to France — the territory adjacent to the guidelines area most suitable for the reinforcement of NATO forces — while Soviet forces can be withdrawn to adjoining territory; and that France's refusal to be bound by an MBFR agreement could oblige her allies to reduce their forces in the guidelines area to compensate for the French military presence.

It should be recognized, however, that France's refusal to join the MBFR enterprise is grounded in an array of trenchant and perceptive criticisms of the forum's terms of reference and long-term implications. France's non-participation may be seen as constructive, in that it has deprived the negotiation of some legitimacy, helped to prevent the conclusion of an agreement where prospects for an agreement in Western interests appear doubtful, and reminded her allies of the operational as well as political implications of the negotiations. A case in point is France's reported stipulation that French forces in West Germany would not be subject to any associated measures for verification and confidence-building that might be included in an MBFR agreement. This is logical on deterrence as well as legal

[23] For background on French MBFR policy, see David S. Yost, *France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part II: Strategic and Arms Control Implications*, Adelphi Paper no. 195 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1984/85), pp. 42-46.

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grounds: neither France nor her allies should see any advantage to her possible intervention in a European crisis being inhibited, however marginally, by a Soviet-manned entry-exit point on the Franco-German border and other MBFR associated measures.

The Soviet Union might nonetheless attempt to use France's MBFR policy as a vehicle to promote disunity in the West. If an agreement seemed imminent, the Soviets would probably insist that French forces in West Germany and France's borders with Belgium and the Federal Republic be covered by the force ceilings and the associated measures.[24] French opposition to this could make France appear to be an obstacle to arms control progress, at least in the eyes of some Western proponents of an MBFR agreement. Allied pressures on France to conform to the provisions of an MBFR agreement could cause a political backlash in France, reversing positive trends in Franco-NATO and Franco-West German defense cooperation over the past decade.

Implications for the Future MBFR

The implications of an agreement along the lines currently under discussion are not entirely clear-cut, partly because the specific terms are still subject to negotiation. An agreement based mainly on Eastern terms would result if the compromises involved in concluding an accord came mainly from the West.[25] The West appears more likely than the East to make further concessions, not only because of the historical behavior patterns of Western arms negotiators and the domestic political incentives to conclude arms control agreements in Western polities, but also because the East has few incentives to compromise.

Indeed, the East has at least three fundamental reasons not to compromise its position in Vienna. First, as General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has repeatedly pointed out, "the gap between the conventional force capabilities of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact gets wider each year."[26] Since the conventional balance increasingly favors the Warsaw Pact in the absence of an agreement, what is the Soviet incentive to compromise on MBFR? Second, the Soviets may expect this trend to continue, despite the Warsaw Pact's own economic and demographic problems, owing to economic constraints and demographic shortfalls in key

[24] According to Lothar Ruehl, "The Soviet Union had hinted as early as 1972-3 that, since France refused to take part in MBFR, Italy at least must be included if Hungary were to be considered." (Ruehl, *MBFR: Lessons and Problems* in n. 19, p. 10.) The Soviet Union has not, however, advertised any willingness to exempt French forces in the guidelines area or French frontiers from the provisions of an MBFR agreement.

[25] The origins of the West's December 1985 concessions should be considered in this regard. For an informative discussion, see Adam M. Garfinkle, "Troubling Questions over Forgotten Negotiations," *The World and I*, November 1986, pp. 108ff.

[26] General Bernard Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 1151.

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West European countries, particularly West Germany; why should the Soviet Union facilitate the Federal Republic's management of its military finance and personnel problems when it can expect advantageous force balance trends in the absence of an accord? Third, no more than token reductions are likely to be acceptable to the Soviets so long as their forces in Eastern Europe also function as their main guarantee of continued control over the region.

The February 1986 Eastern response to the recent Western proposal indicates that the East has retained the same basic approach outlined in February 1985. The East proposes, in effect, that Western personnel and armaments in the guidelines area be frozen at slightly below current levels, in return for an unverifiable promise by the East to do likewise. Given the absence of effective associated measures, Warsaw Pact personnel superiority of over 200,000 could be maintained, in addition to an even greater superiority in armaments. The freeze on NATO armaments might hobble the Alliance's conventional force improvement efforts, for all such programs (even modernization within existing numbers) would be opposed by the Soviets as contrary to the letter and spirit of the agreement. The Soviet incentive to come down to parity in a comprehensive accord would be nonexistent, but the Soviets would no doubt strongly support extending the "freeze" beyond the three-year "time-limited" period indefinitely.

The contrary hypothesis, an agreement based largely on Western terms, is a subject of greater controversy in the West. Proponents of such an accord have suggested that it would offer the West modest but genuine advantages: some marginal progress toward manpower parity in the guidelines area, at least some fairly intrusive associated measures to try to assure compliance, and a foundation for negotiations on a comprehensive and permanent agreement either within the MBFR guidelines area or in a new Atlantic-to-the-Urals forum.

Above all, it has been argued, the risks are limited by the "time-limited" nature of the three-year no-increase commitment and by the West's package of associated measures. The associated measures would be, it is suggested, so intrusive that the East would not make any serious attempts to circumvent their effects, for fear of detection. Detection would lead to the collapse of the treaty regime, and the East would then lose the benefits of the MBFR limitations on Western forces. Therefore, it is suggested, the Soviets would choose to reduce their troops in the guidelines area by over 200,000 in order to prolong the conventional arms control negotiations process and seek a more comprehensive long-term accord, either in MBFR or a new forum. Some have added that this resolution of the data question could help to place new Atlantic-to-the-Urals negotiations on a solid foundation.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets refused to cooperate satisfactorily with the Western associated measures during the period of the

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three-year no-increase commitment, the West would be unlikely to agree to renew negotiations on force reductions. The "time-limited" no-increase commitment would therefore lapse, because no case could be made for its continuation. Inadequate Soviet compliance would, it is argued, be so apparent that no consensus for continuing the conventional arms negotiations process could be found in NATO. If the Soviets failed to ensure the feasibility of reaching East-West agreement on data, it is suggested, they would destroy the basis for negotiations on a more comprehensive agreement.

This case for a time-limited agreement along the lines proposed by the West is controversial, partly because some observers consider it naive. First, it is hard to imagine the USSR approving an accord that would oblige it to reduce its force presence in the guidelines area by over 200,000 troops, in return for the withdrawal of 5,000 (or 6,500) U.S. troops, a three-year no-increase commitment by the West, and the prospect of a more comprehensive treaty. Second, it is possible that the West could spend three years proving the Eastern data inaccurate and still be politically incapable of putting an end to a no-increase "freeze" established at unequal levels.

The argument that the no-increase commitment could not be continued without consensus in NATO is flawed in that it assumes that one or more Western governments would be willing to play the "spoiler" role, the party opposed to continuing an arms control process. Even if the agreement technically expired after three years, it might be observed in practice in order to improve the political climate for follow-on negotiations. Western democracies have historically found it difficult to stop observing even expired agreements that the Soviets have violated, owing in part to intra-alliance pressures in favor of continuing the arms control process. If the East offered to continue negotiations and overlook the "provocations" of Western allegations of Eastern non-compliance, some would demand that the West make a constructive response to the East's forbearance and will to pursue arms control. As a result, conventional arms control negotiations could well continue after the expiration of the nominally "time-limited" MBFR accord.

The shortcomings of the MBFR terms of reference would, by this logic, remain as relevant with the three-year no-increase commitment as with the more comprehensive accord that might follow. These terms of reference might hut Western security interests more than they would advance them: the proposed benefits of MBFR are currently based on a unit of account (manpower) that is (a) of secondary military importance, (b) easy to alter in a crisis, and (c) more difficult to verify than equipment or force structures. Indeed, the military effects of such an MBFR treaty regime would probably favor the Warsaw Pact, given the residual attack options, the reinforcement and mobilization asymmetries, and likely crisis decision-making pat-

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terns. The West could not expect any real lowering of the risks in war because its ability to conduct military operations would be more adversely affected than the East's. Judgments about the probable impact in other areas, including long-term effects on Western force levels and security arrangements, are more subjective; but an MBFR accord based on the current terms of reference seems to balance to offer little or nothing of benefit for the West in these areas either.

Such an accord could, moreover, set precedents that might prejudice the prospects of the new Atlantic-to-the-Urals forum proposed by NATO. Although some would favor an accord in order to show some results from the years of MBFR negotiations (and to give impetus to new negotiations), in practical terms an MBFR agreement may well be excluded by three factors.

First, some of the Western participants are currently opposed to any further dilution of Western verification requirements and regard the December 1985 package as the minimum necessary for confidence in Soviet compliance with the treaty regime. The East has refused to accept this package, apparently because the measures proposed by the West are unacceptably intrusive, by Warsaw Pact standards. This refusal has convinced many in the West that the time has come to look beyond MBFR to a new forum.

Second, while the East would be pleased to accept a first-phase MBFR agreement on Eastern terms,[27] the Soviets have been shown increasing interest in what the USSR has sought since the mid-1950s and would evidently prefer in lieu of MBFR — an all-European conference dealing with military dispositions throughout Europe.

Third, the French have remained steadfast in their refusal to be bound by any MBFR accord. In the French view, a new Atlantic-to-the-Urals forum would have nothing to do with MBFR. French spokesmen have consistently maintained that the MBFR concept — creating a zone of special security status in Central Europe — should not be legitimized, because of its dangerous political and military implications.[28] The French hold that MBFR should be definitively terminated, with no precedents that might mortgage a new forum.

As a result, MBFR at present seems more likely to be brought to an end without an agreement that with the "time-limited" initial agreement proposed by the West in December 1985. East-West discussions about a mandate for a new Atlantic-to-the-Urals forum began on February 17, 1987, with an informal meeting at the French Embassy in Vienna. MBFR might be adjourned *sine die* if the East and West agree on such a mandate. The Western and Eastern delegations

[27] According to a Soviet spokesman at the MBFR negotiations, Stanislav Barbaevsky, the East would prefer an early agreement on MBFR prior to moving on to a "European scale" negotiation. *Financial Times*, October 24, 1986.

[28] See the transcript of transcript of the interview with Jean-Bernard Raimond, the French foreign minister, on December 12, 1986, in the Quai d'Orsay's *Bulletin d'Information*, December 17, 1986, p. 2.

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might at that point make final statements in Vienna about the achievements, or *acquis*, of MBFR that each side considers relevant to the new negotiations.

The Procedures and Attractions of an Atlantic-to-the Urals Forum

According to NATO's December 1986 Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, the Western allies envisage two "distinct negotiations":

> — to build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security building measures; [and] — to eliminate existing disparities, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and establish conventional stability at lower levels, between the countries whose forces bear most immediately upon the essential security relationship in Europe, namely those belonging to the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

The latter form would probably supplement MBFR and would have twenty-three participants (the sixteen members of the Western Alliance and the seven Warsaw Pact states). The former negotiation would be a continuation of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which met in Stockholm from January 1984 to September 1986, under a mandate approved in 1983 by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE review conference that began in Vienna in November 1986 is expected to charter further negotiations in the CDE about confidence-building measures.

The relationship between the CSCE and the possible new twenty-three participant forum has yet to be determined. The Brussels Declaration says nothing about it. France would prefer that both the new forum and the continuation of the CDE be chartered by the CSCE.[29] The United States reportedly favors a less formal link to the CSCE for the new forum — e.g., informing the other CSCE participants of noteworthy developments in the new forum.[30]

The French have given two key reasons for opposing a bloc-to-bloc forum, or any forum on force limitations or reductions autonomous from the CSCE. First, they insist on their independence and freedom of maneuver, and maintain that all CSCE participants should be free to speak on an individual basis in the deliberations. Second, the French are concerned about the risk that security matters might be amputated from the other dimensions of the CSCE — above all, human rights and the need to promote the free circulation of people and ideas. In the French view, therefore, the neutral and non-aligned participants should remain associated in the overall process, and no

[29] Raimond, ibid.

[30] For background on the procedural disagreements, see the article by José Alain Fralon in *Le Monde*, December 13, 1986.

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"enlarged MBFR" should be established.[31] The French conception, tacitly or openly supported by a number of European governments, has been described as one of a two-story house — or of two rooms under a single roof, the CSCE. The Americans hold that the Western allies should jointly determine common positions if they are to negotiate effectively and would prefer to pursue an alliance-to-alliance framework.

The French and the Americans agree that the new forum's deliberations should not be tied to the deadlines determined by the CSCE review conference schedule. (The degree of danger inherent in CSCE deadlines may, in any case, be somewhat exaggerated. There were no agreements at the Belgrade and Berne meetings, and the Madrid review conference lasted over two years longer than had been planned.) The allies also generally agree that it would not be in Western interests to limit the forces of the neutral and non-aligned states, and that these states should not be involved in negotiating the obligations of others, unless they are prepared to accept equivalent obligations.

Even though the Western participants have not yet fully agreed on the foundations and elements of a mandate, informal mandate discussions with the Warsaw Pact began in February 1987. While French officials have stated that East-West mandate negotiations could be concluded as soon as July 1987,[32] they could take longer, depending on the degree of precision in the mandate and political will on each side. Some Warsaw Pact governments have professed a willingness to include the neutral and non-aligned states in the new forum on force limitations; but the East may well accept twenty-three participant deliberations if the West insists on such a framework.

Western governments appear to favor the establishment of a new forum with a mixture of reactive and enterprising motives. On the reactive side, many consider it essential to respond to the series of Soviet and Warsaw Pact initiatives for a new forum. Although public interest in conventional arms control remains limited, the consensus in the Alliance is that the public wishes to see Western governments attempting to reach arms control agreements, however difficult Soviet intransigence makes the effort. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact offers must, therefore, be given a response to show Western publics that their governments are truly interested in arms control and fully prepared to negotiate. Public awareness of the sincerity of the West's efforts to achieve useful arms control results appears necessary to keep public consensus behind Western defense policy.

[31] Pierre-Henri Renard, the head of the French delegation to the CSCE review conference in Vienna, made a detailed statement of the French position on January 30, 1987. Excerpts were published in *Le Monde*, February 1-2, 1987, p.4.

[32] Raimond, *Bulletin d'Information* in n. 28, p. 2.

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On the enterprising side, a new forum offers three main attractions. First, by involving the forces and territory of all the allies in Europe (instead of simply the MBFR guidelines area and the forces there), it may promote greater seriousness and deliberateness regarding arms control in the Western Alliance as a whole.

Second, it is hoped that a new forum would be a superior vehicle for educating Western public opinion about East-West disparities. Although the Warsaw Pact will no doubt continue to refuse to acknowledge its superiority in various categories of conventional capability, the process of testing the sincerity of Eastern proposals could increase public awareness of the basic asymmetries and build support for defense investments to improve the West's military posture and its negotiating position.

Third, it is believed that a more comprehensive and ambitious forum could present an opportunity to remedy MBFR's shortcomings. With the new terms of reference — a larger geographical zone, and the possibility of limiting armaments and force structures in addition to manpower — it might be more feasible to devise proposals that would be in Western as well as Eastern interests. Such proposals could be devised in various ways — for example, by focusing on East-West imbalances in major items of equipment (including main battle tanks) and on asymmetries in force deployments. The large forward deployment of Soviet forces in East Germany could be targeted by suggesting that foreign troop numbers not exceed those of indigenous forces in any participating country near the East-West divide. More balanced proposals would probably be less negotiable than ones biased in Eastern interests, but they should be publicly credible if carefully framed and fully explained to Western publics.

Whether the West will be capable of realizing such benefits in a new forum is not clear. As noted above, the East-West mandate negotiations have yet to take place, and the risk of a repetition of NATO's basic error in MBFR remains. That is, the Western Alliance may fail to assess the fundamental issues with sufficient discernment prior to committing itself to terms of reference with serious shortcomings.[33] The Western pursuit of balanced conventional arms control measures seems at any rate certain to be complicated by the Eastern approach to the new negotiations, by the legacy of MBFR, and by the challenges of defining constructive goals and terms of reference.

[33] Henry Kissinger has argued that, even though "we really had not thought through what would be desirable" in MBFR, basic flaws in the likely terms of reference, the West's lack of negotiating leverage, and the Warsaw Pact's advantages in deployed forces and in mobilization and reinforcement potential were all recognized before the forum was established. But Western governments pursued MBFR for tactical purposes — above all, to block the unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals that Congress was then threatening to legislate. (See Kissinger, *White House Years* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979], pp. 400-02, 938-49).

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The Eastern Calculus of Interests

Soviet assessments may be expected to drive the decision making of the Warsaw Pact. The apparent Soviet decision to downgrade the importance of MBFR probably stems from several considerations. Soviet arms control initiatives under Gorbachev appear to be partly inspired by over-arching motives — above all, a desire to manage the military, economic and technological competition with the West by political means. The Soviets have in recent years made it clear that they expect that a new phase of détente in East-West relations would result in a general slowdown in Western defense efforts and an increase in Western loans and technology transfers to the Warsaw Pact. Soviet decisions are no doubt also partly determined by the specific constraints and opportunities that stem from Western policies. In MBFR, the West has accepted so much of the Eastern framework for an initial agreement that verification — and the Soviet refusal to accept reciprocal transparency as a matter of principle — is almost the only substantive obstacle to agreement.

The overriding factor may well be the judgment that MBFR offers too narrow a stage to provide the political benefits the Soviet Union would like to obtain. In order to degrade the West's defense posture fundamentally, it appears, the Soviets, have judged that the time is ripe to pursue what they originally preferred instead of MBFR — an all-European disarmament conference. From a long-term Soviet perspective, such a conference could be even more desirable than MBFR as a means to promote a negotiated withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Europe while pursuing a *droit de regard* over West European defense arrangements.

The USSR would enter a new negotiation about conventional forces in Europe with three key advantages, as in MBFR. First, owing in part to what the Soviets themselves proclaim to be one of the advantages of "socialist organization," the ability of the Soviet regime to impose burdens with "discipline and strict responsibility,"[34] the Soviet Union would have significant superiority in several major categories of armaments, in forward-deployed active forces, and in mobilization capacity.[35] Second, Soviet geographic advantages would remain, notably because the West would still be dependent on lengthy and vulnerable reinforcement lines from North America.[36]

[34] Mikhail Gorbachev, televised speech of May 8, 1985, in *FBIS-SU*, May 9, 1985, p. R6.

[35] The most authoritative alliance document on these asymmetries that has been made public is that published by the NATO Information Service in 1984: *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons*. Reimar Scherz, *Land- und Luftstreitkräste* in *Europa: Ein Militärischer Kräfteiergleich*, SWP S-318 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschuft und Politik) August 1985 is the most comprehensive study.

[36] The Soviets have, of course, refrained from acknowledging that they enjoy geographic advantages in Europe; they have even expressed scorn regarding the so-called "geographic factor: during the MBFR negotiations. For a useful discussion of this point, based on Soviet sources, see Peter H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of Disarmament* (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 124.

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Third, the Soviets would be well aware of the political, financial, and demographic constraints on improving Western conventional forces.[37]

The Soviets would not be likely to see any incentives to assist the Western Alliance through asymmetrical concessions in conventional arms negotiations. The thrust of Soviet policy for severally years has been to the contrary. The Soviet Union is interested in creating conditions in which the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority could have valuable political effects. The Soviets have long recognized the West's dependence on U.S. nuclear forces, and have advocated arms control measures that would degrade the political credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees — e.g., "no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons" pledges and the creation of nuclear-weapons-free-zones in Europe.

The priority that the Soviets attach to nuclear disarmament measures is, in other words, partly explained by their desire to make the Warsaw Pact's conventional advantages more politically useful. Soviet initiatives for conventional arms control in an Atlantic-to-the-Urals framework appear to be intended to advance the USSR's denuclearization aims in Europe by neutralizing Western recognition of the Warsaw Pact's conventional force superiority. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe has historically been justified by the Soviet conventional preponderance. If the Soviets could use a new forum to persuade Western publics that the existing conventional force relationship in Europe is one overall parity, they could deprive the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe of its main political-military rationale in public perceptions. The recent Soviet conventional arms control initiatives therefore complement the Soviet interest in zero-option arrangements for intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe since the October 1986 Reykjavik summit.

Soviet assertions that there is no East-West imbalance in conventional military power in Europe have in fact been coupled with proposals (as in the June 1986 Budapest appeal) to include short-range nuclear forces in conventional force negotiations. Such negotiations would probably be intended, from a Soviet viewpoint, to eliminate — or, at least, to help to delegitimize — the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. To give an impression of movement and of Soviet willingness to address Western concerns about Soviet conventional forces, the Soviets may engage in some minor troop movements of little military significance — limited withdrawals from Czechoslovakia and/or East Germany.[38]

[37] For a recent survey focused on Western Europe's three greatest contributors of defense resources (Britain, France, and West Germany), see Todd Sandler and James C. Murdoch, "Defense Burdens and Prospects for the Northern European Allies," in David B. H. Denoon, ed., *Constraints on Strategy: The Economics of Western Security* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brasseys, 1986), pp. 59-113.

[38] David Fouquet, "Soviet Division May Leave Czechoslovakia," *Washington Post*, March 21, 1987, pp. A23-A24.

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The Legacy of MBFR

Long-term Soviet objectives could be consistent with more immediate goals. Some of the predictable Soviet attempts to pursue measures that would asymmetrically affect Western security interests might, however, be countered by reaffirming certain principles, the positive legacy of MBFR:

- Soviet efforts to impose restrictions on Western mobilization and reinforcement exercises could be opposed by recalling the MBFR principle of exceptions to force ceilings for these purposes.[39]
- Soviet attempts to create sub-ceilings on the forces of specific allies (e.g., West Germany) or on specific types of units could be thwarted by upholding the MBFR principle of collectivity.
- Soviet endeavors to interfere with the operations of transiting forces could be resisted by re-instating two MBFR principles: the right of transit and the exclusion of naval forces.

On the other hand, some MBFR principles could constitute an ambivalent or even negative heritage for a new forum:

- The principle of collectivity could collide with proposals to establish maximum ratios for foreign and indigenous troops in any country. The collectivity principle is, moreover, incompatible with the French view that an alliance-to-alliance framework should be avoided; the collective approach would equate French soldiers with those of other Western allies. Some West European observers nonetheless favor retaining the collectivity principle as a way to avoid national force ceilings and/or an explicit legitimization of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.
- The principle of verifiability conceals the profound and enduring East-West disagreements on verification requirements. MBFR leaves what many would regard as an unfortunate precedent for Western interests in negotiations on conventional arms: the abandonment, in December 1985, of the principle of clarification of data before making any force reductions.
- The principle of undiminished security for all participants might necessitate the creation of sub-zones within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone. Without such sub-zones, the Soviets could readily shift forces to locations threatening Western allies. But sub-zones would run counter to one of the arguments for a wider forum than MBFR: the need to avoid creating confined zones with a special security status.
- The principle of reductions to parity in manpower would, as in MBFR, collide with Warsaw Pact claims of an existing East-West parity. The MBFR data dispute would therefore probably recur.
- The principle of asymmetrical reductions should be constructive, but the Soviets accepted this in MBFR only with reference to U.S.-Soviet initial reductions, and only in conjunction with a biased Soviet interpretation of the existing ratio of U.S. and Soviet forces in the guidelines area. Even with respect to "token" U.S. and

[39] It is hard to devise behavioral constraints that would not have asymmetrical effects in inhibiting crisis decision making and force employment options. If NATO's conventional defense posture is to have any deterrent credibility, it is vital to hold periodic exercises such as Reforger, in which U.S. troops go to West Germany to join units based there and move to assigned locations with their equipment. During the past decade, the Soviets have tended to reduce the number and size of their large-scale maneuvers, apparently because their units are already in Central Europe or in immediately adjacent territory. This means that constraint measures regarding reinforcement and out-of-garrison activities could amount to equal rules with unequal effects asymmetrically damaging to NATO. Even if the Warsaw Pact observed such constraints, its flexibility and operational credibility would be hampered less than NATO's.

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Soviet reductions, therefore, the principle is problematic, because it is tied to the never-resolved MBFR data dispute.[40]

Finally, although some have tended to see certain problems as unique to MBFR, any negotiation on conventional arms in Europe would run the risk of legitimizing the Soviet force presence in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the possibility that Western crisis decision making could be inhibited more than it would be facilitated by treaty obligations is inherent in the legal and political traditions of Western democracies and is not an artifact of a specific set of negotiations.

Challenges in Defining Constructive Goals

Champions of a new forum for conventional arms control have underlined the potential opportunities in a wider geographic zone, including the possibility of defining goals and terms of reference that might benefit Western as well as Eastern security interests. In the Brussels Declaration, the NATO allies repeated the objective they had first made public at Halifax in May 1986: "strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels."

The Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone could be beneficial. On the Western side, West Germany might no longer be threatened with inclusion in a narrow zone of special security status; and France's participation could eliminate the never-resolved French issues in MBFR. On the Eastern side, a great weakness of MBFR might be overcome, in that most of the Soviet forces relevant to security in Europe would be included. The new zone would encompass Soviet forces relevant to the flanks as well as Central Europe.

ZONAL UNCERTAINTIES. The new zone might, however, also pose problems, depending on how it is defined. The Western allies do not appear to have agreed yet on the extent to which CDE precedents might apply in a new forum. The zone would not be the same as in the CDE, if the territory and forces of the neutral and non-aligned states were included. Another difference from the CDE zone might be the explicit inclusion of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasus territories of the USSR, so as to inhibit the Soviets in threatening Turkey. On the other hand, it would hardly be fair to include all Turkish territory, since Turkish forces to the south and west face non-participating, non-European countries (Syria, Iraq, and Iran).

[40] Although some Western observers have drawn encouragement from Gorbachev's July 1986 statement that the Soviet Union would be prepared to dismantle its superiority in certain categories of conventional arms, Gorbachev qualified his remarks with a misleading description of the East-West conventional force relationship in Europe as one of overall parity, such that both sides would have to make asymmetrical reductions in their respective areas of advantage. See Gorbachev's speech at the dinner in honor of François Mitterrand, July 7, 1986, in the Tass dispatch of the same date.

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The most problematic CDE precedent is the functional definition of Europe, which makes the operations of air and naval forces in the "adjoining sea area and air space" controllable if they "affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of ground force activities — e.g., combined operations in which naval amphibious units support a larger ground force exercise. This precedent would probably not be helpful to Western security interests in a new forum because the West is far more dependent than the East on air and naval forces that are not based in Europe. It would, in other words, probably be wiser to retain a more static geographic definition of European territory as in MBFR, in order clearly o exclude naval and transiting forces. Western forces based outside Europe should not be subject to unreasonable constraints (e.g., force ceilings), based on anticipations of hypothetical missions.

Should the zone include sub-zones? According to the Brussels Declaration, the "measures involved" should apply "to the whole of Europe but in a way which takes account of and seeks to redress regional imbalances and to exclude circumvention." This formulation implies that sub-zones may be needed to deprive the Soviets of the flexibility that would allow them to shift forces from one region to another, or to maintain or even strengthen certain forces (e.g., the large group of forces in East Germany) while taking their reductions in secondary areas (e.g., east of Moscow). Moreover, a case can be made for devoting particular attention to the greatest concentrations of forces and armaments, especially those in Central Europe. According to the West German minister of defense,

> Our intention is, by eliminating the disparities that threaten the crisis stability of the East-West relationship in Europe, to abolish the capability of the Warsaw Pact [WP], with Soviet forces at its core, to launch a large-scale surprise attack against Western Europe. To that end, the asymmetrical reductions would have to be accompanied by restrictions on the deployment of WP forces in eastern Central Europe . . . a circumvention of the deployment restrictions through the shifting of troops or otherwise must be ruled out.[41]

On the other hand, several Western allies appear to agree with the well-known French reservations about the political-military implications of creating zones of special security status in Europe. The establishment of permitted ratios of foreign-to-indigenous troops in countries along the East-West divide could substitute for sub-zones. This concept might well be helpful in impinging upon Soviet forces in East Germany,[42] but perhaps not elsewhere. The Budapest Ap-

[41] Manfred Wörner, "Security Policy Perspectives and Tasks of the North Atlantic Alliance in the light of Changing West-East Relations," speech at the 24th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Munich, January 31, 1987, text furnished by the German Information Center, New York, p. 19.

[42] This might cause the Soviets some fleeting political embarrassment, but it would probably not result in any significant change in the strength of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). Although demographic problems and labor needs (and other military priorities) may help to dispose the Soviets to accept some conventional force reductions, these are

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peal's allusion to lessening troop concentrations "along the line of contact of these alliances"[43] suggests that the Soviets may have given some consideration to gerrymandering sub-regions designed to give an appearance of local Warsaw Pact parity or inferiority. In contrast, in broad areas such as northern Europe, the disparities are so overwhelmingly favorable to the East that some in the West have reservations about the public credibility of asking the Soviets to make enormous one-sided reductions.

The legitimization of sub-regional security zones could also be dangerous, in that it could (a) erode the West's collectivity principle by moving toward national sub-ceilings and (b) facilitate the establishment of exclusionary (nuclear- or chemical-free) zones. On a simple practical level, the time and energy that would be required to deal with several sub-regions at the same time may make the so-called MIRVing of a new conventional arms control forum into sub-forums undesirable.

Approaches affecting permitted levels of foreign-based forces in the entire zone might nonetheless offer some benefits to the West. The Soviet Union maintains virtually all of the foreign-based troops in the Warsaw Pact, including high-quality combat forces such as those stationed in East Germany. If equal percentage reductions affected only foreign-based units with their armaments (or if lower common ceilings were established for foreign-based troops and armaments in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone), the effects might favor the West — depending in part on compliance and verification. More substantive variations might call for NATO-Warsaw Pact parity in major categories of equipment in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone and include a sub-ceiling on the permitted proportion of foreign-based tanks, artillery, combat helicopters, armored vehicles, and so forth. Essential elements of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority could thus be highlighted; if implemented, such proposals could oblige Moscow to make uncomfortable choices with respect to maintaining allied force levels, forward-deployed Soviet forces, and strategic reserves in the Western USSR. The net result might be greater security for the West, unless some Western governments succeeded in lobbying for interim unequal ceilings, in the interests of "negotiability" with the USSR.

If a decision were made to avoid the establishment of sub-zones or foreign-to-indigenous limits, perhaps only one way would remain to discourage unwelcome shifts of Soviet forces within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone and to assure that Soviet reductions take place within the zone: to require that reduced forces be disbanded or

least likely in the GSFG. The GSFG functions as the "imperial guard" that maintains order in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact, and as the elite vanguard for offensive operations in Western Europe.

[43] Budapest Appeal, in n. 3, p. BB10.

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withdrawn outside the zone. This could result in a buildup of Soviet forces east of the Urals, but that would be better than the alternative the Soviets might propose: the demobilization of forces withdrawn from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone. The latter concept would have to be rejected, because it could be interpreted as a global ceiling on U.S. forces. Given the political geostrategic, and force-generation asymmetries between East and West, it would be more balanced to require the demobilization of Soviet forces withdrawn from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone and to exempt the United States from such a requirement. If this solution were rejected as non-negotiable, the West might have to be compensated in other ways.

UNDEFINED UNITS OF ACCOUNT. The manpower-parity goal in MBFR has been regarded as rather discredited, as it has become more evident that troop numbers are less militarily significant than armaments, readiness, training, and other factors. As noted in NATO's Brussels Declaration,

> Statements by Eastern spokesmen sometimes imply that the present military situation in Europe is stable and balanced. It is not. On the contrary, it is marked by asymmetries and disparities which vary from region to region but which are detrimental to Western security and which are a source of potential instability. The relevant factors include: — the armaments, equipment types, deploy-deployments, numbers, mobility and readiness of the armed forces involved; — the information, predictability and con-confidence about them; — considerations of geography.

This formulation suggests that the Western allies would like to pursue more substantive goals than manpower parity in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone. Some observers have speculated that one of the goals in the Brussels Declaration — "The elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large scale offensive action" — might be addressed through measures regarding force structures and military doctrine.[44] Most attention, however, has been devoted to armaments. As with the expanded zone, the pursuit of limitations on armaments would entail problems as well as advantages.

Armaments would pose issues of definition (e.g., types of tanks, armored personnel carriers, fighter aircraft) and classification (e.g., nuclear and conventional "dual-capable" artillery) even more complex than those already encountered with manpower (e.g., which types of units constitute combat support, combat service support). The definitional difficulties could be simplified by focusing on key items of equipment — e.g., tanks — without which an offensive would not be possible. But this would probably not make a balanced and useful agreement much more likely.

[44] The concept of negotiated constraints on strategies, doctrines, and associated force structures has not been well-defined. It might amount to asking adversary coalitions to exchange highly classified — indeed, vital — data about their plans for the contingency war.

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If the West were, for example, to propose a common ceiling for each major category of conventional armaments,[45] some of the same problems encountered with manpower as a unit of account in MBFR would probably recur: e.g., the East, continuing to deny Western estimates of its superiority, cold propose "mutual example" token reductions or equal numerical or percentage reductions as a substitute for full exchanges of data and other verification measures.

A second objection to concentrating on armaments is that a "double-track" situation could be created: any Western armaments modernization would be questioned by the Soviets as inconsistent with the purposes of the negotiation. In fact, however, the Soviets have for many years objected to Western military efforts and inconsistent with "military détente." Including armaments in Western proposals might furnish an opportunity to turn the tables on the East: if these proposals were well-devised, they could call on the East to account for its offensive force posture and conventional superiority and help Western governments justify countervailing efforts. The Eastern refusal to cut back its conventional force superiority could be shown to be the cause of the failure of conventional arms control efforts. But these potential effects could deter the East from conceding its true level of conventional armaments superiority.

The Soviets might therefore try to establish disadvantageous arms ceilings and restrictions on qualitative force improvements in the West (especially those based on advanced technologies) by trading away obsolete items of equipment or accepting constraints that would protect their numerical predominance. While it would be possible for Western governments to see through such stratagems, it might be difficult to reach an allied consensus on a response. Nor would it be easy to convey complex analyses to public opinion.

This concern is well-founded because the Soviets attach a high priority to slowing down the rate of conventional force modernization in the West and could well attempt to claim compensation for the alleged technological superiority of Western equipment.[46] Some Western elites might take such Soviet arguments seriously, thereby generating an arcane but nonetheless intense and divisive intra-Western debate about the merits and relevance of various technological comparisons. Whether the debate would lead to astute Western arms

[45] See Karber's well-argued proposal for "calibrated reciprocity," in "Calibrating Armament Responses," in n. 21, pp. 355-57.

[46] The Soviets have also emphasized that some types of conventional munitions delivered with high accuracy could have effects approaching those of low-yield nuclear weapons. Despite Soviet work to develop such munitions and delivery means, this nuclear-conventional comparison might serve as a basis for Soviet initiatives to restrict high-technology conventional weapons as "destabilizing." The best-known of many Soviet references to the effects of modern conventional weapons is Marshal Ogarkov's interview in *Red Star*, May 9, 1984 in *FBIS-SU*, May 9, 1984, pp. R19-R20. See also John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000: Implications for NATO," *Washington Quarterly*, Fall 1986, p. 132.

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control negotiating positions — and, ultimately, to balanced agreements — is far from clear.

A third argument against trying to turn the focus to armaments is that it has, in a sense, already been attempted without success. The West's original proposals in MBFR called for removing a Soviet tank army and its equipment. Over the course of time, NATO offered various inducements to the Warsaw Pact in the attempt to achieve this result, even proposing to withdraw 1,000 theater nuclear warheads together with some nuclear delivery means. The Warsaw Pact refused to accept the offer (and went on to add more tanks in the guidelines area), and NATO decided in the context of the intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) decision of 1979 to withdraw the warheads on a unilateral basis and abandoned the tank army goal in favor of a focus on manpower alone. It is not clear, however, why the West's unilateral abandonment of previous armaments proposals should invalidate future attempts to devise proposals and terms of reference that would not undercut Western security interests.

A fourth objection is that the geographic reinforcement asymmetries could make a focus on armaments even more disadvantageous for the West than one on manpower. Because of the logistic hurdles facing the West in any reinforcement of Europe, NATO is far more dependent than the Warsaw Pact on the prepositioning of equipment and the periodic exercising of externally based forces within the region. The situation could be especially risky for most of the indigenous forces, because their armaments reductions could signify such steps as scrapping tanks, while indigenous participants with immediately adjacent territory (e.g., the USSR) could simply withdraw their equipment from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone.

The West could, it has been suggested, propose treaty provisions that would take geographical asymmetries into account. An equitable distance formula, for example, would allow the West higher levels of armaments and materiel stockpiles in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone to compensate the West for the East's numerical and geographic reinforcement advantages. Such provisions would nonetheless be difficult to define and even harder to negotiate, given the USSR's longstanding refusal to admit that it enjoys geographic advantages.

The fifth and most recalcitrant difficulty with armaments is the "non-negotiability" argument noted by Jonathan Dean: the West probably would not wish to codify Warsaw Pact superiority in a treaty, while the East would have no incentive to cut back to Western armament levels. The Brussels Declaration indicates that one of NATO's objectives would be "the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces, geared to the elimination of disparities." But it is not evident how this goal, which includes an East-West "balance of conventional forces," is to be attained through arms control. Nor is the West likely to achieve it through a combination of arms control and

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unilateral effort. The Western allies have not historically demonstrated a willingness to match either Soviet conventional armaments levels or the Soviet rate of conventional armaments expansion. An ongoing comprehensive negotiation or an agreement covering armaments might become another justification for not doing so.

Some Western officials have, it appears, already become concerned about the risk that a new negotiation could create expectations of substantial Western conventional force reductions at a time when Western forces should be maintained and strengthened. Even though the Brussels Declaration alludes to the aim of "conventional stability at lower levels," the French foreign minister has indicated that it would be preferable to speak of "stability and not conventional reductions because it is necessary to recognize that there is at the outset a disadvantage for [Western] Europe." The disadvantage resides not only in the East-West "geographic disparities" but also in "the conventional imbalances in Europe, which are considerable."[47] Any reductions should logically be made by the East alone, if the common goal were conventional parity. As the West German defense minister has noted, "it is only through *asymmetrical* reductions that conventional arms control in Europe can lead to a removal of the Eastern superiority and thus to the elimination of the capability to invade Western Europe . . . the Eastern reductions will in most areas have to be distinctly larger than Western reductions because of the existing imbalance."[48]

But the East's adroit propaganda position — the claim that parity already exists — may, in conjunction with new and more ambitious negotiations, help to make it even more difficult for the West to build an adequate conventional defense posture. Because the Warsaw Pact has no apparent incentive to adjust the existing imbalances in a manner favorable to the WEst, the negotiations may have little positive impact on the East-West conventional force relationship. While some hypothesize that the negotiations might lead to a stabilization of the existing imbalances, it is entirely possible that the imbalances could continue to grow, just as the East-West imbalance in armaments in the MBFR guidelines area has become more lopsided during the course of the negotiations.

VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES. The Brussels Declaration referred to the need for "an effective verification regime (in which detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspection will play a vial part)." The East's refusal to accept even minimal verification arrangements during the MBFR negotiations was not mentioned, but the MBFR experience is quite relevant. If the West judged that thirty inspections a year would be necessary to estimate compliance with manpower

[47] Raimond, *Bulletin d'Information* in n. 28, pp. 1-2.
[48] Wörner, "Security Policy Perspectives," p. 22; emphasis in original.

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levels in the MBFR guidelines area, how many would be required in a zone encompassing all of the European USSR? If the verifiability of manpower parity was doubtful in the relatively small MBFR area, it would hardly be feasible in the wider forum. Entry-exit monitors might be needed not only all around the Eastern and Western points of access to the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, but also at the points of access to any of the sub-zones that might be created — in order, for example, to assure compliance with a ceiling on tanks in a specific sub-zone.

Many factors would combine to make verification even more difficult in a new forum: a much larger zone, a more complex set of compliance standards (owing to the likely pursuit of more substantive aims than manpower parity), the probable Eastern refusal to provide accurate data on its conventional forces (a tradition established in MBFR), the inclusion of Soviet territory, and the Western requirement for higher confidence in the reliability of its verification measures (owing to the increased geographical scope and the substantive content of the measures at issue). However the zonal and unit of account uncertainties are resolved, the MBFR experience suggests that the complexity of the verification terms could well be a major factor in the negotiations.

Conclusion

Conventional arms control and possible nuclear force limitations are related in fundamental ways. As the Brussels Declaration noted, "Reductions in nuclear weapons which are the subject of discussions between the U.S. and the USSR in Geneva would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities."

Conventional force superiority places the Soviet Union in a strong negotiating position with respect to both nuclear and conventional arms control in Europe. The Soviet Union derives "maneuverability" for nuclear arms control through its steadily enhanced conventional force advantages.[49] At the same time, of course, the USSR declines to acknowledge its geographical and numerical advantages in conventional military deployments in Europe. The Western Alliance should logically make reductions in its nuclear forces dependent on reductions in Soviet capabilities for conducting conventional offensives in Europe.[50]

The Soviet Union's interest in conventional arms control and in portraying the existing East-West imbalance in conventional forces

[49] Peter Stratmann, *Aspekte der Sicherheitspolitischen und Militästrategischen Entwicklung in den 90er Jahren*, SWP-AP 2474 (Ebenhausen, West Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1986), p. 29.

[50] This principle has been more widely acknowledged in the Western Alliance since the October 1986 summit in Iceland. See David S. Yost, "The Reykjavik Summit and European Security," forthcoming in *SAIS Review*, Summer-Fall 1987.

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as a relationship of overall parity may be partly explained by the Soviet desire to promote the de-nuclearization of Western Europe; the degradation of U.S. nuclear guarantees would enhance the significance of Soviet conventional (and nuclear and chemical) power in Europe. Given the continuing and, indeed, growing East-West imbalance in conventional forces, the West should oppose the de-nuclearization of Western Europe, and the credibility of U.S. nuclear guarantees should be strengthened. It should also be recalled that even if the East-West imbalance in conventional forces were eliminated, U.S. nuclear forces would still be required in Europe in order to deter and, if necessary, counter Soviet nuclear coercion or aggression. Even though some Western MBFR proposals (in December 1975, for example) have involved short-range nuclear forces, the Western allies generally agree that nuclear forces should be excluded from a new Atlantic-to-the-Urals forum.

Increased investments in conventional capabilities should also be made, even though practical politics in the Western democracies appear to rule out in the foreseeable future any significant improvement in the existing force ratios. Given the demographic and financial constraints of the four principal countries of the Western Alliance (e.g., the for main contributors of defense resources) and the national nuclear and out-of-area power-projection commitments of three of them (Britain, France, and the United States), it will probably be difficult for the Western Alliance to improve its conventional capabilities in Europe in a more than marginal fashion for several years to come. These capabilities may in fact actually deteriorate in relation to those of the Warsaw Pact. According to Peter Stratmann, "Unless current national priorities are realigned, NATO's conventional defense will be even less assured in the 1990s than today."[51]

Improving the conventional force balance has been a standard prescription of Western analysts since the late 1950s, but the relevance of arms control in this context has often been exaggerated. Steadily increasing Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional strength will only be modified through the West's own exertions; for the East has no incentive to surrender in a negotiation the conventional advantages and military options achieved through costly effort, nor had it any interest in aiding the West to devise a more credible deterrent to Warsaw Pact aggression or intimidation. If the West made greater unilateral efforts to improve the conventional force balance, it would probably enhance the prospects for balanced arms control results in the long term; for all arms control agreements tend to reflect existing configurations of strength. The Western Alliance should devote spe-

[51] Peter Stratmann, "NATO Doctrine and National Operational Priorities: The Central Front and the Flanks: Part II," in *Power and Policy: Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control, Part III*, Adelphi Paper no. 207 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1986), p. 40.

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cial attention to significantly improving its ability to make use of warning time through greater readiness, mobilization, mobility, and reinforcement capability.

At the same time, it would be wise to cultivate public awareness of what has been increasingly recognized: the objective difficulties facing conventional arms control in Europe. Some observers doubt whether any conventional arms control design can be devised to advance Western security interests in Europe. After all, NATO has less active duty manpower, a much less well developed military mobilization base, and far less conventional armament in Europe. Moreover, NATO has far less strategic depth in Europe and faces permanent geographic reinforcement disadvantages. The Warsaw Pact is organized under a more centralized command, with more standardized equipment and more "additive" force programs.[52] Skeptical conclusions about prospects for conventional arm control in Europe were reached in the 1960s by the U.S. Army's former "think tank," the Research Analysis Corporation:

> Virtually none of these and other such studies held out any significant hope of achieving reductions in the likelihood of war, in the damage that would result from war, or in the cost of preparation for war. *In fact many such studies concluded that most reduction measures that seemed susceptible to negotiation with the Warsaw Pact would likely worsen NATO's security in Central Europe rather than improve it*; they might also increase U.S. costs — especially of preparing for war — by requiring extensive dual basing of equipment, greater lift capacity, and costly maintenance of strategic reserves in the continental United States (CONUS). If nothing else, the desirability of mutual force reductions from Central Europe always foundered on the geographic asymmetry of the two alliance structures.[53]

[52] "Additivity" is an analytical device that attempts to estimate the collective military capabilities of an alliance that result from national defense efforts. It acknowledges that collective capabilities are less than the sum of individual national efforts. The issue is the relative efficiency of force acquisition methods and likely operational compatibility within an alliance; "additivity" does not, however, include factors of alliance cohesion and political reliability in concrete contingencies. Even though the Soviet Union has devoted more resources to developing military power than the United States since 1968, the NATO allies collectively have probably out-spent the Warsaw Pact allies by roughly 10 percent. NATO's defense spending is, however, judged to be less effective and "additive" because of various uneconomic arrangements in the Western Alliance: duplicative efforts in Research and Development and production, often with a lack of economies of scale, owing to the relatively small quantities of materiel procured; deficiencies in standardization and interoperability; the maintenance of multiple staffs, training facilities, and other overhead expenses; the acquisition of limited stockpiles of ammunition and other consumables; the emphasis on logistic support as a national responsibility; and so forth. Differences in equipment, training, support, doctrine, and command and control structures mean that the defense programs of allies cannot be simply added together. The additivity of the non-U.S. Western allies has been estimated to be 60 percent while the additivity of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact may be as high as 90 percent. Since the Warsaw Pact outspends NATO by about 20 percent in investment (capital acquisitions, as opposed to day-to-day operations and maintenance), the Warsaw Pact's investment advantage over NATO may be as high as 40 percent. For background, see Andrew Marshall, "NATO Defense Planning: The Political and Bureaucratic Constraints," in Stephen Enke, ed., *Defense Management* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 353-58; and Mr. Marshall's unpublished speech to the AFL-CIO, April 14, 1982, p. 3.

[53] Robert A. Gessert, "Force Reductions and Security in Europe," in Richard Burt, ed., *Arms Control and Defense Postures in the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 42; emphasis added.

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These studies acknowledged the inherent difficulties posed by Soviet military superiority in Europe and the geostrategic advantages the USSR derives from effective control over half of Europe. They could not, of course, foresee the dynamism of Soviet nuclear and conventional force modernization since the late 1960s. Soviet nuclear capabilities at all levels have been dramatically improved, partly in order to undermine the credibility of potential U.S. nuclear responses to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression. At the same time, Warsaw Pact conventional forces, particularly those of the USSR, have become increasingly capable of relatively prompt mobilization; once mobilized, they could conduct rapid air and ground offensives with short and/or ambiguous warning that might well be intended to neutralize promptly most NATO nuclear capabilities in Europe by non-nuclear means. The Soviet objective is to develop an ability to control the course of military operations, in order to exert political leverage in peace and to achieve desired political outcomes in non-nuclear terms in the event of war.[54]

The future of conventional arms control matters because these negotiations could affect NATO's options for a strengthened conventional contribution to the West's overall posture for defense and deterrence. To the extent that the Soviet Union has effectively neutralized NATO's nuclear retaliatory capabilities by counter-deterrent nuclear threats, the main operational Soviet military threat in Europe is on the conventional level.

[54] For background, see Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," ORBIS, Fall 1983.

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Documentation

BREAKING THE IRAN/CONTRA STORY

by Daniel Pipes

The biggest journalistic scoop of this generation — the unveiling of the Iran/Contra scandal — was also the most obscure. The report that began the greatest problem of the Reagan presidency was published on pages 24 to 26 of the November 3, 1986, issue of a small and undistinguished Syrian-sponsored weekly magazine published in Beirut, *Ash-Shira'* (The sail). In frustration, President Reagan has referred to *Ash-Shira'* as "that rag in Beirut."

The revelations about U.S. dealings with Iran were buried deep in an unsigned cover story written by the magazine's editor, Hasan Sabra. The article is titled "Between Reason of State and Reason of Revolution: What Happened in Tehran." (This reads better using French terms: "Between raison d'état and raison de révolution: What happened in Tehran.")

Most of the article's three dense pages deal with the rivalries within the ruling circles of Iran, with special attention paid to Mehdi Hashemi, the ally of Ayatollah Husein Ali Montazeri, who had been arrested in October by the rival faction of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of Iran's Parliament. According to Sabra, the information he published was leaked to him by Montazeri's office.

The section dealing with the United States comes near the end of the article, on page 26, and takes up a mere 10 percent of its space. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:

A secret American delegate, Robert McFarlane, visited Tehran clandestinely in the first part of last month (i.e., September). He stayed in Independence Hotel (the former Hilton) and conducted discussions of extreme importance with representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Parliament, and the Army. These included the director of political bureau for Asia and Africa, Dr. Mohammed Lasani, who had spent ten years working for ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia, the vice president of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Parliament, Dr. Mohammed Ali Hadi, as well as one of the leading officers of the Army.

The discussions between McFarlane (who had been the assistant to the National Security officer in the United States, Brzezinski) and the Iranian delegation concentrated on stopping the Gulf War and so-called international terrorism.

Hashemi's supporters report that Tehran's representative made two explicit demands of Washington: end military, material, and po-

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litical support for the Iraqi regime and sell Iran spare parts for its American-made airplanes, tanks, radars, and other weapons. At the same time, Washington demanded through McFarlane that Tehran stop supporting liberation movements around the world, on the pretense that they are terrorist movements, and a guarantee for the security of the states of the Persian Gulf.

The story then ends with the completion of a deal, according to Hashemi's backers. Washington quickly agreed to the Iranian demands. It sent four C300s from a Philippine base with some of the spare parts needed by Iran; it participated to a great extent in improving Iran's air defense system (which then shot down three Iraqi planes in a week, one Sokhoi and two MiG-23s); it strengthened Tehran's defenses; and it improved the operations of Iranian radar.

As for Tehran, its response was to arrest Hashemi and to spread accusations that he [through his actions] had exceeded raison d'état. It said that he wanted to get [Iran] involved in conflicts with Saudi Arabia and Syria.

In addition to the obvious error in identifying Robert McFarlane (who was not Brzezinski's assistant but a national security adviser in his own right) and in the name of the C130 cargo planes, the article makes the mistake of referring to September as "last month." This allowed Mr. McFarlane "categorically" to deny the story, for he had in fact been in Tehran during September.

This short, dry account hardly reads like something that would lead to a precipitous decline in President Reagan's standing, the resignations of many of his senior officials, a suicide attempt, and an international scandal involving more than a dozen countries. It did all this because it forced Hashemi-Rafsanjani — who needed to protect himself from the damaging implication that he cooperated with the United States — to respond.

The *Ash-Shira'* story came out on November 1; on November 4, addressing a rally commemorating the seventh anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Hashemi-Rafsanjani gave his own version of events. He offered a very different account but confirmed that Robert McFarlane visited Tehran offering weapons. A complete translation of his speech was published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, volume 8, November 5, 1986, pp.I1-I6. What follows is Hashemi-Rafsanjani's direct response to the *Ash-Shira'* account:

One of the aircraft which used to bring us arms from one of the European countries asked permission to cross our air space in order to land and deliver its arms in Mehrabad Airport. Of course, the arms consisted of spare parts for some of our complex needs. Those who received permission to land, posing as aircraft stewards, said they were the five who are usually with an aircraft — the captain, the co-pilot and those who are normally on such aircraft — and they gave us Irish names. When the aircraft entered Mehrabad they informed us that these gentlemen who had left the aircraft at the airport were

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saying: We are Americans and have brought your country's responsible officials a message from Mr. Reagan and U.S. officials!

We immediately held a meeting with our friends and the heads of the Armed Forces and said: Arrest these gentlemen in the airport in order to find out what is on their minds! We then moved their aircraft to the fighter base and detained them. They waited for 3 and 1/2 hours in the airport until we were able to decide what to do and could humbly inform the imam. The imam graciously said to us: There should be no talking with these people and do not receive their message, but find out who they are, what their designation is, and who sent them!

We moved them into a hotel where they said Mr. — this is what they claimed, for it is not yet clear to us that that was so — they said that they were Mr. McFarlane and one or two other advisers of Mr. Reagan, who were at that time special security advisers to Reagan, and that they had brought a message for the Iranian authorities and had brought presents from Mr. Reagan for our country's responsible officials. The presents for each one of us consisted of a side arm, and the message was revealed to us in a personal meeting! They also brought along a cake as a key to establishing relations — and that is something we have not heard of before and must be some enigma or another. The boys [the security officers] who were extremely hungry waiting in the airport, the hotel, and elsewhere took the cake and ate it! Well, nothing was left to reach us.

We said: My dear fellows, in the United States we have much better weapons: We have Harpoons there, we have (?Howitzers) and Hawks, we have F-14's. We have such weapons there [referring to arms purchases made by the shah but not delivered to Iran] and now you are sending us Colts! We in no way accept a gift from anyone, have nothing to say to anyone, and do not accept anyone's message. You must tell us how you have arrived illegally in Iran!

We took their passports and we now have their things here. We have made copies of their passports. The photograph is okay and is similar to the face of McFarlane. Of course, we are not yet 100 percent certain that it is him, since no one properly spoke to these people in order to find out whether they were who they said they were or not. Those who dealt with these people were security officials in that area. There was one who engaged in arms purchases and was there with the broker; the arms broker also came with these people. In order to follow their conversations we then introduced them to one of our friends who understood the language well, but who, although a discerning person, was not one of the responsible authorities.

In brief, their purpose was basically to come along, as they put it, and melt the cold ice separating Iran and the United States, to melt the frozen ocean! Their immediate aim was to turn us into interceders in Lebanon, and their distant goal was to create the

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amicable relations and the golden vision that they had in mind! They begged, pleaded, and sent messages requesting that one of our country's responsible officials receive them. They said that since they were bearing a message from the President, our president should receive them! We said: No! He does not wish to meet you! They said: Well, let the Majlis speaker receive us! We said: He, too, will not receive you! They said: Well, let the prime minister receive us! We said: He, too, will not meet you!

The self-styled Mr. McFarlane became angry and said: What crazy people you are! We have come to your doorstep in order to solve your problems! We have come to solve your problems! Your airspace is controlled by Iraqi aircraft, and so on and so forth, and we have come along to solve your problems and this is how you behave towards us?! He said: If I had gone to Russia — this is an interesting thing so listen to this and let the world hear what he said: let the Americans hear this and let the Russians hear it too! — for he said: If I had gone to Russia in order to purchase furs there — since Russian furs are famous and people go there to make purchases — had I gone to Russia to buy furs Gorbachev would have met me three times a day! Who are you not to speak to the special envoy of the U.S. President?! We said: Birds of a feather flock together. So go there!

This is not the place for such talk! We are angry with the United States. We are at war with you. You have kindled the flames of this war. You are responsible for all these calamities besetting our country. How could we meet and talk to you! Have we forgotten that Brzezinski met our ad interim government in Algiers and our ad interim government has been (?swept aside) and now you have come inside our house, our country intending to meet us?! Could our nation be asleep in such matters?!

So they spent five days in detention in the hotel and they were terrified and informed us later that the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces were put on alert. Naturally, we do not know whether this was so or not. At long last, after five days, we permitted them to go. They were angry and we gave them their aircraft, since up to that time they had not seen it. They got into their aircraft in order to establish direct communications, since they did not want to talk on the public telephone and since we had told them that they could not use it. But sometimes they did make contact by telephone and were monitored by us — let them not think of denying that since we have a tape of the voice of this selfsame Mr. Farlane, if that be him, and should they request it later we could give them the voice recording for (?historical interest), since he says an interesting sentence.

So you can see how the Americans took such a risk in coming here and we questioned them, saying: Sir, how dare you come here with false and wrong passports! You have entered our country ille-

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gally. What would happen to you if we were to arrest you as spies and were to declare to the world that you have come to our country?! They said: These brokers told us to do it. They told us: You come to Iran and they will welcome you! In other words, they really deceived them and I am confident they believed them. Of course, a broker who is a counterrevolutionary, one of those refugees who is abroad and sometimes assists us in our purchases, (?has deceived these people and now what would the Americans do to him I have no idea).

Another more interesting fact that, God willing, we might even give you, is [word indistinct] during the messages they sent us and we told them that we did not recognize them, Mr. Reagan took a copy of one of the Bibles chose one of the verses which roughly says that God's religions are together and all God's religions are the same, wrote those verses in his own hand on the cover of the Bible, signed it, and sent it to us in order to win our confidence. Well, we did not need the Bible, but we have a photocopy of Reagan's words, which some day we may publish and you may see.

After Hashemi-Rafsanjani's speech, most information about the American arms sent to Iran came from sources in Washington.

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Book Reviews

APPEASING THE AYATOLLAH

by Laurie Mylroie

Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response to the Middle East. By R. K. Ramazani. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 311 pp. $27.50.

R.K. Ramazani explains why the United States should seek a rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. Ironically, the book appeared just as the covert U.S. approach to Iran was revealed. The White House had, after all, been acting along the lines prescribed by Professor Ramazani. In the ensuing controversy the kind of analysis presented in *Revolutionary Iran* was used to argue why some form of the covert U.S. policy should become overt policy.

The argument was twofold. Iran is an important "geostrategic" country, and the Islamic Republic is increasingly pragmatic. Iran's importance is not in question; Ramazani's argument for Iranian pragmatism rests on a survey of Iran's relations with other states of the Middle East, which constitutes the heart of his book. He argues that the ideological drive behind the Iranian revolution is mellowing. Iran's militant self-imposed isolation, in which every other government in the world was considered heretical and illegitmate, is ending as the revolution copes with running a state in the twentieth century, not to mention fighting a modern war.

The shift began in October 1984 when the ayatollah pronounced that even the prophet Muhammad had sent messengers to the outside world. A flurry of diplomatic activity followed, heralding Iran's "open door" policy. Notably, it coincided with the beginning of an initiative directed to the United States that led to the arms-for-hostages deal.

Iranian pragmatism also means abandoning the export of the revolution. Whereas earlier, for example, Iran had called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, it now demonstrates far less hostility to Riyadh. Indeed in 1985 the Saudis led a Gulf attempt to mediate an end to the war; Saudi and Iranian ministers exchanged visits for the first time since the Iranian revolution. Ramazani puts great weight on that diplomacy.

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Iran's February 1986 offensive at Fao marked the end of Saudi mediation, but still, the Saudis continued to seek good relations with Iran. They agreed to Iran's demand for higher oil prices (i.e., more war revenues), sacking Shaykh Yamani, their long-tenured oil minister; they sanctioned the export of refined fuel to Iran, undermining the impact of Iraqi strikes on Iran's oil refineries (fighting a war takes gasoline); and a private Saudi citizen, Adnan Kashoggi, helped initiate and provided interim financing for U.S. arms sales to Iran; presumably, Mr. Kashoggi did not act in defiance of his own government.

Given Iran's declared aim of pursuing the war to victory, Saudi actions look like appeasement, and Iran's reciprocity seems intended to isolate Iraq from its allies. Iranian pragmatism, then, seems to consist of a willingness to compromise ideological purity — to abandon, for now, the indiscriminate export of the revolution (which was not effective) — in order to concentrate on the most critical front, the war with Iraq. And that war is indeed the key to the export of the revolution.

The Iranian debate resembles that of the Bolsheviks at a similar stage. Lenin, a practical figure, argued for tactial compromise to facilitate the export of the revolution, styling his opponents "infantile leftists." The differences among the Bolshevik "factions" were irrelevant for outsiders; it was a debate about means, not ends. In Iran there is as yet no Stalinist figure ready to settle for "Shi'ism in one country," terminating the war with Iraq; and none is likely to appear soon. In short, the pragmatism Ramazani discerns in Iranian state behavior is really a tactical maneuver.

In fact, *Revolutionary Iran* sometimes seems an apology for the Islamic Republic. That is particularly evident in Ramazani's charge that Iran has been unjustly accused of terrorism, while its "helpfulness" in resolving terrorist incidents (the TWA hijacking) has been ignored.

The claim is outrageous. Were it not for the double standard that the U.S. and Israeli governments (the two whistle-blowers on terrorism) apply to Iran, the story would be widely known. Iran was involved in the bombings of the U.S. embassy, Marine headquarters, and the chancery in Beirut; in the bombing of the French and U.S. embassies in Kuwait; and in the massacre at the synagogue in Istanbul. The Iranian government also funds Lebanon's Hizbullah, as Ramazani notes. But then he adds disingenuously, "the difficult question is whether Iranian money supports terrorists."

When the brother of Hizbullah's security chief was recently arrested in Germany for smuggling explosives into the country, he was found to be one of the TWA hijackers; his arrest triggered a spasm of Beirut kidnappings. The subsequent arrest of another brother entering Germany led to the discovery of a cache of weapons

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and explosives. With such proof, how can anyone doubt that Iranian money supports terrorists?

Another curious apology is elaborated on Iran's behalf. Ramazani found only one Israeli arms sale to Iran, which he says "in all probability" was a one-shot deal and "possibly" never had the approval of high-level Iranian authorities. But even before the November 1986 revelations, there was evidence for many Israeli sales to Iran. Indeed, the Israeli government acknowledged that arms sales had occurred for several years and had stopped only in 1984. These were not a one-shot deal and, like every other major decision in Iran, the arms purchases were sanctioned by the ayatollah.

The Iranian regime has the most anti-Zionist position of any state in the Middle East today, so Israeli arms sales to Iran reveal something important about the Iranian leadership — its deceptiveness. The pragmatism Ramazani discerns is better called Machiavellian flexibility.

Because Iran is strategically important in economic and political terms, almost every country in the world wants good relations with it. Where Iran does have bad relations with a country, in almost every case that is Iran's choice and reflects the internal needs of the revolution. This basic point is absent in *Revolutionary Iran*; ultimately, we learn little of what drives Iran's foreign relations.Instead, Ramazani uses the regime's self-serving line to explain tensions between Iran and others: the United States was too closely identified with the shah; Israel was too close to Savak; and Sadat backed the aborted U.S. rescue mission. The fault always lies abroad, not in the Islamic Republic.

But these are excuses. The United States, embarrassingly quick to drop the shah, has sought to accommodate the revolution at every turn; Israel has consistently supported Iran in the war. Yet anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism prevail. They are the xenophobic fuel for the revolution. Similarly, Iran's animosity towards Egypt had little to do with Sadat's attitude towards Iran. It follows from Egypt's relations with the United States and Israel.

Perhaps most disconcerting are *Revolutionary Iran's* prescriptions for U.S. policy. We are cautioned against "simple explanations" and "easy solutions." But except for the sensible warning against complacency about oil supplies, the advice amounts to drop your friends (Egypt, Israel) and court your enemies (Syria, Iran)!

Because something like Ramazani's recommendations, particularly the overture to Iran, was actually U.S. policy for two years, we can assess its results. Despite many concessions, the United States found itself still confronted by a deeply hostile Iranian government which continued the war against Iraq and held more hostages in Beirut than ever, including the most prominent hostage-negotiator.

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Given this complexity, Americans would do well to accept a "simple explanation" — Iran systematically practices anti-American terrorism because its interests are inimical to those of the United States — and to demand the "easy solution" — the containment of the Iranian revolution.

SOVIET UTOPIA REVISITED

by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present. By Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich. New York: Summit Books, 1986. 877 pp. $24.95.

Western scholars increasingly dilute the importance of ideology in the contemporary Soviet Union. More than one author has claimed that Soviet ideology has lost its appeal and become residual. Some even predict the demise of the Soviet "ideological pretense."

The recent publication of *Utopia in Power*, a monumental synthesis of Soviet history, refutes these efforts. It shows that Stalinism was not an "exceptional" phase, nor a "betrayal" of Leninism. Unlike many Western analysts, Michael Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich regard Leninism as basically similar to Stalinism. They document the striking continuity of Bolshevik political practice and attribute this phenomenon to the supreme role of ideology. Without ideology, many events would not have taken place — not the seizure of power in 1917 by professional revolutionaries, not Stalin's "revolution from above" or the war against the peasantry, not the politically induced famine in the early 1930s, the show trials, nor the expansion of Soviet power internationally. Ideology justified the bureaucratic rigidity of Brezhnev's times as well as foreign expansionism. The Soviet Union, according to Marxism-Leninism, is the avant-garde of the contemporary "revolutionary process," and therefore its intervention in the Third World is always justified in the name of social progress. Even now, Soviet ideologues present Gorbachev's *glasnost'* as a return to genuine Leninism.

Heller and Nekrich know the Soviet system from within. They know its intimate articulations and arcane rationalizations, the techniques of manipulation and the matrix of power. It is precisely this

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on the formation of the Soviet man, published in Paris in 1985. Aleksandr Nekrich, whose book *June 22,1941* provoked the ire of Soviet ideological watchdogs after Nikita Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, is a skilled military and political historian. Their joint undertaking can thus be described as total history; what they offer in *Utopia in Power* is a wide picture of Soviet life from Lenin to the present. Their perception of Soviet realities is not hampered by what some people call the "emigré syndrome." Clearmindedness should not be taken for bias, nor does a viewpoint equal prejudice.

The authors reject the idea that the system can be structurally reformed. They are rightly persuaded that the monopoly of power held by the Communist party remains the most jealously preserved prerogative of the ruling elite. Piecemeal democratization of Soviet institutions is unlikely not because of personal preferences by leaders, but because the system precludes real participation by citizens. Personal differences between successive general secretaries notwithstanding, they all share a commitment to the preservation of the regime. In other words, their margin of maneuver is limited by the vested interests of the social group whose interests they represent — the *Nomenklatura*.

Heller and Nekrich explain the rise of totalitarianism as a consequence of the imperatives contained in Leninism. The belief in an apocalyptic break with the past, the Marxist promise of a "leap from the realm of necessity into that of freedom," are perennial obsessions for the Soviet political mind. Lenin's radical Jacobinism was followed by Stalin's totalitarian pedagogy; and both were messianic and intolerant, fanatic and sectarian. The Soviet regime has always sought to transform human nature; Stalin and Trotsky agreed that the socialist revolution would be incomplete without building a "new man," *Homo sovieticus*. For the first time in history, a political system came into existence whose goal was to engineer a mutation in human nature. Fascination with the new man has been pursued regardless of price.

Ideology played a pivotal role in all this. It contributed to the moral decline of the Bolshevik party; Marxist faith compelled Lenin's comrades to collaborate with their torturers. Their last words celebrated the infinite wisdom of the man responsible for their doom.

Ideology, hackneyed as it may appear to sophisticated Western experts, remains the sole symbolic underpinning of the status quo, a sacred table no leader would dare to defy. "Ideology has a most important function in Soviet society. Just like the stern father of a lazy and disobedient child, ideology teaches Soviet citizens how to understand events in the world around them, how to behave, how to relate to their families, neighbors, and strangers" (p. 657). According to Aleksandr Zinoviev, a pungent critic of the Soviet reality: "It doesn't at all matter what people think to themselves or in private conversations. The only thing that matters is that they are constantly

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in a powerful field of ideological influence and no matter what their attitude toward it, they are still only particles in this field, and from it they receive a certain charge,disposition, orientation, and the like" (p. 627).

The authors provide illuminating details to substantiate the conviction that the Soviet regime would burst in the absence of ideology. They show that Stalin's position in his struggles within the party was ideologically motivated, as was his cooperation with Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941.

Heller and Nekrich also take up the dynamics of the Soviet empire. They agree with Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes, Adam Ulam, and Seweryn Bialer, who see any attempt to overhaul the fossilized Soviet political system as bringing about even greater efforts for change in East-Central Europe. The Twentieth Congress in February 1956 is still remembered for its influence on the coalescence of the anti-Stalinist opposition there.

The authors take ideas seriously. They share Leszek Kolakowski's skeptical view about the possibility of liberalization of the Soviet system. What matters, they say, is not what Soviet leaders profess, but what they practice. Reforms cannot be successful because of ideological conservatism — not because of mere bureaucratic inertia. Gorbachev can replace thousands of bureaucrats, but he cannot alter the Soviet bureaucratic ethos. In foreign matters, expansionism is in the genetic code of the Soviet regime, and no Soviet leader could espouse a political platform that would lead to the disintegration of the empire. Even Khrushchev, the most complex of post-Stalin Soviet leaders, did not hesitate to send tanks to Budapest to suppress the Hungarian revolution.

Completed before Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power, this book anticipates Western enthusiasm with a new, more engaging and better articulated Soviet leader. The authors' understanding of the logic of Communism suggests that the West should have no illusions about the possibility of a sea-change in the system resulting from reforms dictated on high.

Recent events in the Soviet Union, particularly Gorbachev's attempts to seduce Andrei Sakharov, suggest that an alliance is looming between powerful groups in the political elite and intellectuals. *Utopia in Power*, suggests that the *glasnost'* campaign is an exercise in deception, another gimmick devised by the *Nomenklatura* to hold off the inevitable collapse of the system. This may be true; but it is also possible that some leaders are fed up with a hidebound ideology and are searching for new ways to restore the credibility of the system through genuine reforms. No one is better placed than Gorbachev to realize the obsolescence of Leninist cliches. The West must watch changes in the USSR dispassionately avoiding premature exhilaration. Heller and Nekrich suggest that we watch patiently and skeptically.

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Brief Reviews

WAR STUDIES
by John H. Maurer

Managing Nuclear Operations. Edited by Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 720 pp. $39.95 ($18.95, paper). When warning of impending hostilities with Japan arrived too late to alert the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government discovered to its dismay that intelligence and command arrangements can indeed break down during a crisis. Will U.S. command and intelligence systems for the control of nuclear weapons break down during a confrontation or conflict with the Soviet Union? That haunting question engages the authors of this valuable collection of essays, as they examine the vulnerabilities and dangers in the present command and intelligence arrangements. The danger of unintended escalation caused by the two superpowers' competition in readiness alerts with nuclear weapons also merits attention here. The present strategic environment, where neither superpower possesses an overwhelming nuclear superiority and their strategic arsenals are dominated by ballistic missiles and offensive targeting plans, makes this case particularly dangerous during a confrontation. Although none of the authors remarks on the command arrangements for the nuclear forces of Britain, France, and China, the actions of these countries could have profound implications for decisions made by American and Soviet policy makers during a confrontation or war. Finally, more attention should be given to the dynamics of crisis decision making in a world of five nuclear great powers.

Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy. By Michael MccGwire. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 544 pp. $39.95 ($18.95, paper). MccGwire's long-awaited study of Soviet strategy and military programs provides a great deal of information about Soviet weapons programs, but his discussion of Soviet foreign policy and its objectives is less satisfactory. It is difficult to accept MccGwire's conclusion that the Soviet Union has done better than the West in preventing military considerations from dominating the making of foreign policy. This does not square with the Soviet call for equal security, which demonstrates a contempt for the security concerns of its neighbors. In effect, the Soviet Union wants international rec-

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ognition for its building of a nuclear arsenal equal or superior to the forces possessed by all the other nuclear great powers. Moreover, Soviet rejection of U.S.-proposed deep cuts in strategic nuclear systems indicates that the Soviet leadership is unlikely to renounce its superiority in prompt, hard-target kill capabilities — the weapons most suitable for use in a pre-emptive strike. Even MccGwire admits that the Soviet Union would begin the next general war by attempting to intimidate the United States with nuclear weapons while seeking to overrun Western Europe. Thus, the Soviet leaders show no awareness of the security dilemma confronting their country. Indeed, Soviet foreign policy and strategic doctrine are rooted in a different creed: namely, that the insecurity of others promotes Soviet security. Under these circumstances, MccGwire's assessment of Soviet motivations has a hollow ring.

Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion. By Richard Ned Lebow. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987. 232 pp. $24.95. Building on his earlier studies in crisis decision making, Lebow elaborates on the dangers inherent in a diplomacy of brinkmanship during a superpower confrontation. He highlights the psychological dimension of crisis decision making and the role of pre-emptive attack strategies in heightening the risks of war. He warns policy makers against the temptation to acquire strategic gains by resorting to pre-emptive attack plans. Yet, pre-emptive attack plans are generally predicated on perceived enemy weaknesses. The famous Schlieffen Plan offered the prospect of success because of the minimal obstacles in the path of a German offensive across the Belgian plain. Had the obstacles been greater to a German drive through Belgium into the heart of France, even the German general staff's most ardent apostles of the offensive might have faltered when faced with a probable two-front war. Military programs to reduce strategic vulnerabilities prevent a potential adversary's believing in the efficacy of a knockout blow. Thus, Lebow's prescription that the United States should abjure the development of space-based ballistic missile defenses does not necessarily follow from his analysis of crisis decision making. An effective, non-nuclear ballistic missile defense could serve as a strategic *couverture* during a crisis, thereby obviating the need for offensive nuclear forces to be put on high states of alert. Certainly it would be preferable to alert a non-nuclear defensive screen during a crisis than to engage in a competition of readiness alerts in nuclear forces. While Lebow's discussion of past crises is thought provoking, his policy recommendations on strategic defenses fail to convince.

Strategic Defense and the American Ethos: Can the Nuclear World be Changed? By Michael Vlahos. Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS Papers in International Affairs, number 13. Boulder: Westview Press,

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1986. 129 pp. $15.95 (paper). In this thought provoking study, Vlahos examines the breakdown of the strategic consensus on nuclear weapons that existed among policy makers and defense analysts during the 1970s, and the growing public skittishness with a posture of nuclear deterrence based on offensive forces and the mutual vulnerability of the superpowers' urban population centers. The widespread dissatisfaction has expressed itself in diverse and often contradictory ways: the popularity of the freeze movement during the early 1980s, the inability of two administrations to obtain political support for the deployment of a new generation of ICBMs, the failure of arms limitation talks to provide strategic stability at reduced levels of nuclear forces, and the Reagan administration's drive to deploy space-based strategic defenses. By exploiting emerging technologies, space-based defenses undermine ICBMs as the decisive weapon in the strategic balance. Drawing upon history, Vlahos argues that the evolution and decline of the battleship as naval warfare's dominant weapon is a parable for the complex interplay of offense and defense in the contemporary strategic world. This elegant argument shows "the ways in which culture and its dominant assumptions about reality define strategic choices." He concludes: "Strategic defenses . . . can be shaped to achieve apparently contradictory goals. They can shift the strategic balance, if only glacially, away from nuclear dominance while at the same time actually enhancing the concept of deterrence cemented in the traditions of the nuclear world." Vlahos has made a valuable contribution to understanding the interrelationship of American political culture and strategy, and to the heated debate on strategic defenses and the military uses of space.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
by Adam M. Garfinkle

End the Arms Race: Fund Human Needs. Edited by Thomas L. Perry and James G. Foulks. West Vancouver, Canada: Gordon Soules, 1986. 336 pp. $9.95 (paper). Thirty speeches and transcripted panel discussions from the Vancouver Centennial Peace and Disarmament Symposium of 1986. Although not fundamentally different from dozens of similar volumes that cross this desk each year of late, this volume is the epitome of a type and as such deserves review. It is not hard to be somewhat suspicious of books whose titles ring like Soviet propaganda slogans. This one fully justifies such suspicions, being a veritable orgy of "peace" narcissism, each speaker vying with the other to be ever more pure of heart, noble of spirit, and anti-

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American. If there is a theme here, it is the crypto-Marxist conviction that the "arms race" is the fault of the American corporation-government nexus — the fabled and loathed military-industrial complex. The result is that the Third World is threatened and impoverished, the planet endangered, and the Soviet Union forced against its peace-loving nature to arm itself in defense.

Quite a group assembled in Vancouver, including Petra Kelly, Kosta Tsipis, Paul Warnke, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Pax Christi, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Helen Caldicott. One participant is described as "an expert on the responsibility of municipal governments to protect city residents from death and destruction in a nuclear war." A group of this kind would not be complete without a Soviet "academician." So there was Vitaley Zhurkin of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada posing for photographs (a number of which appear in the book) and making the usual statements. When Zhurkin said that "the Soviet peace movement certainly exists completely independently. . . . At the same time . . . it does support the foreign policies of the government," no one took issue. On balance, the book is full of insight-by-example on the psychological architecture of the adversary culture in the West. It is well worth reading, no matter how difficult that may be for some.

The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982 to February 1984. By Eric Hammel. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1985. 448 pp. $19.95. Now that White House foreign-policy disarray has been revealed so starkly through the Iran/Contra scandal, it is interesting to recall that other, now almost forgotten disaster, the 1982-84 debacle in Lebanon. Hammel's account of the U.S. Marine Amphibious Unit in Beirut contains much that smacks of incompetence, misunderstanding, and confusion. Most of *The Root* deals with the human side of the marine's experience, quoting extensively from individual marines, using their language and reflecting their lives. This is not uninteresting; high politics always has its human side and scholarship is the poorer for its being told so infrequently. Hammel had a special advantage in this task, for he alone had direct access to the survivors of the marine contingent.

On the level of strategic political analysis, Hammel says little that is new; nonetheless, his detailed description of military tactics and day-to-day decisions and judgments shows beyond doubt that a military command and control system geared for the ultimate contingency — a big war with the Soviet Union — is not thereby empowered to handle irregular and politically complex assignments like that in Lebanon. For example, Hammel explains: "The placement of illumination rounds in proximity to hostile Moslem batteries . . . was a painstakingly conceived response aimed at showing the power of the United States in a benign fashion. However, American minds did

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not grasp Lebanese realities. Force met with less than equal force was no force at all; a weak response was a sign of weakness, and the weak were put on earth to be beaten."

Attempts at the political micromanagement of the marines from the Pentagon thread the entire narrative. So, too, do depictions of the consequences of bureaucratic in-fighting in Washington on the situation of the marines on the ground in Beirut, although it takes a reader well versed in the former to fully appreciate the latter. In other words, it is not the narrative of *The Root* that holds its greatest value, but its revelations about persistent frailties in American military performance.

The Straw Giant. Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces. By Arthur T. Hadley. New York: Random House, 1986. 314 pp. $19.95. Like many others, Hadley pillories the military establishment; but he is one of the very few to do so out of concern for the military as an institution vital to the preservation of liberty and peace. He opens with a scintillating and detailed recapitulation of the failed U.S. rescue mission in the Iranian desert in 1980; then he identifies six recurrent problems all of which, he prophesies, "will be with us at our next defeat." They are the Great Divorce, Interservice and Intraservice Rivalry, Flawed Organization, Readiness, Overcontrol, and Keeping the Able from Contributing to the Action. Hadley demonstrates how each contributed to failure in the desert.

This prologue is perhaps the best part of the book. Thereafter, Hadley reviews the origins of the Defense Department (DOD) and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1943 and 1950. He argues that the very organization of DOD has been deeply flawed from the start. Savaging Robert McNamara in chapter five — by far the most satisfyingly entertaining part of the book — Hadley notes that McNamara "arrogantly insulted the professionals with whom he had to work" and recruited a "bunch of uniformed yes-men" who were worse than useless. "McNamara approached the armed services like a Victorian divine arriving at some Pacific island to convert the native heathens. . . . McNamara would be laughable, a weapon-wielding Candide, had not the results of his arrogance been so tragic for the armed services, in Vietnam and elsewhere."

Hadley's recommendations include the return of the draft, a broader ROTC program, an end to the rape of readiness budgets, and other sensible changes. Many of his recommendations have been made by others more convincingly; some lack specificity. Hadley's advocacy of reform is most likely to appeal to those on the other side of the Great Divorce, the interested public, the civil society. If Hadley is right to think that such people really matter in the long run, then he has done a great service. If he is wrong, other merits reclaim his effort.

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Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. 288 pp. $18.95. The strengths of this stimulating book are readily apparent: an intellectually bold assessment of the overall U.S.-Soviet rivalry; an informed and applied historical perspective; a thoughtful mesh of geopolitical realities and military relationships; and suggestions for an American strategy that are the result of reflection and experience. Brzezinski holds that the United States should avoid fads and develop a consistent, coherent policy that emphasizes prevailing rather than winning: "For the Soviet Union, prevailing primarily means the end of America's external primacy, followed perhaps by internal changes in the nature of the U.S. system. For the United States, prevailing means the transformation of Moscow's external conduct, which also implies some degree of internal evolution of the Soviet system into a less regimented one."

In his search for a comprehensive approach to dealing with the Soviet Union, Brzezinski slights some key factors, whose autonomous turns have frequently confounded the efforts of both superpowers to establish their pre-eminence and shape events. First, he underestimates the role of domestic considerations in constraining the behavior of the Soviet Union (and the United States). Second, presence is not tantamount to influence: Moscow may have access now to military facilities in Vietnam, for example, but it is far from able to manipulate that tough, non-contiguous power for the promotion of Soviet purposes. Third, he may exaggerate the vulnerability of post-Khomeini Iran to Soviet penetration. Soviet relations with Iran, so promising in the aftermath of the shah's fall in 1979, have deteriorated, certainly as regards the strength of the Left and the prospects for a Soviet takeover. Finally, there are occasional contradictions between the thesis he propounds and the policies he advocates. He worries about Southwest Asia, but his suggestion for American diplomacy to be "active and imaginative" centers on the Palestinian issue, which has little relevance for assuring the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf or ensuring Saudi Arabia's security or helping Afghanistan. While opposed to "diversionary fads," he offers an agenda that seems to call for a renewed American globalism.

— Alvin Z. Rubinstein

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

American Trade Politics: System Under Stress. By I. M. Destler. New York: Institute for International Economics/Twentieth Century Fund, 1986. 353 pp. $18.00. Destler argues in favor of tough bargaining on trade but emphasizes that the motivation should be to increase freedom of global trade, not to correct trade imbalance. Such imbalances, he argues, are the counterpart of capital inflows to finance the budget deficit, with further encouragement from tight monetary policy. Destler offers little to improve the U.S. bargaining strategy; he seems to see movement towards free trade as a good in itself, not as a concession that the United States could offer if others make similar moves. "Free trade is morally just" is not a strong bargaining position, especially when significant forces in the European Community, Japan, and the Third World support managed trade. On industrial policy Destler is supportive, if the term is understood to mean encouraging speedier adjustment by labor and industry to a changing international environment, but he warns that the phrase is often a stalking horse for protectionism. Finally, he makes the obvious recommendation, ignored for many years, to eliminate the duplication between the Commerce Department and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office. A 104-page appendix gives information on every administrative trade case between 1979 and 1985.

Does Aid Work? By Robert Cassen and Associates. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 381 pp. $32.00. Cassen was commissioned to evaluate the effectiveness of aid by the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF, who might be thought of as parties with a bias on the question. Despite his obvious enthusiasm for sustaining and increasing foreign aid, Cassen's most optimistic conclusion is that "the majority of aid is successful in terms of its own objectives." In other words, while aid usually does not make things worse, there is no evidence it has increased the rate of economic growth. To reach even this conclusion, Cassen carefully excludes any considerations of the "moral hazards" problem, namely, whether aid rewards the incompetent. Why not finance high consumption and Swiss bank accounts by running up unmanageable debts if the industrial countries will respond to the mess with more aid? Furthermore, Cassen never asks whether, in order to reach his suggested goals of increasing economic growth and reducing mass poverty, the $40 billion spent annually on aid would be better used elsewhere. Suppose, for instance, that the industrial countries agreed to eliminate all barriers to trade from developing countries and used the $40 billion to finance adjustment for the affected industries in their countries; the effect

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would be a more efficient allocation of the world's resources, one that rewarded the greatest effort. If Cassen has articulated the best possible case for aid, then the critics of aid stand largely confirmed.

Egypt and the Politics of U.S. Aid. By Marvin Weinbaum. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 187 pp. $23.00. In a frank discussion of the impact of U.S. aid on Egypt, including its effects on that country's economic and political sectors, Weinbaum demonstrates the formidable problems associated with a program of extensive aid, no matter how carefully designed. Avoiding large-scale efforts in part from concern about anticipated charges of aid imperialism, USAID became involved in numerous studies to design a myriad of smaller projects — which led to Egyptian resentment at perceived U.S. interference. Furthermore, the emphasis on infrastructure projects, recommended by the "developmentalists" on USAID's staff, meant that the Egyptian public has rarely been aware of the extent of U.S. assistance, particularly since the design of projects has been slow and construction even slower. Weinbaum also shows how aid has often discouraged the adoption of precisely those economic policies the United States was recommending. He shows the great difficulties in constructing a constituency for reform of Egypt's subsidy system or of its bureaucracy. In short, a not-very-encouraging work for those who propose aid on a massive scale to countries throughout the Third World.

Red Multinationals or Red Herrings? Edited by Geoffrey Hamilton. New York: St. Martin's Press. 194 pp. $27.50. This collection of essays on businesses owned by Soviet bloc governments and active in the West and less-developed countries proposes that such enterprises should be of no great concern to the West since, among other factors, they are mostly small trading companies. Hamilton does not point out that it is hardly surprising to discover that the Soviets, like the West, prefer to invest in their political allies. More important, Hamilton never considers the central role of technology acquisition as a motivation for Soviet firms. How can any serious student of Soviet-Western trade ignore reports of Soviet acquisition — at times surreptitious — of Western technology? Unfortunately, the entire issue of trade as technology transfer seems to have escaped Hamilton and his collaborators, all European.

Stockpiling Strategic Materials: An Evaluation of the National Program. By Raymond Mikesell. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1986. 68 pp. $4.95. A useful review of an important program which has been run with "administrative ineptitude," in the author's phrase. For instance, some materials purchased thirty years ago are still in stock because no policy of rotation exists to prevent deterioration. Mikesell is fully sensitive to the importance of minimizing

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government intervention in the economy while simultaneously ensuring that during a war a production surge could be sustained. He argues in favor of stockpiling rather than a "drain America first policy," i.e., subsidizing high-cost domestic production of critical materials. Unfortunately, Mikesell looks only at the National Defense Stockpile, without considering the strategic implications of other large government-run stockpiles, such as the petroleum or food stocks. The food stockpile is interesting because it, unlike most others, would be of use primarily during a nuclear war. One recent study (*Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War* from the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of the International Council of Scientific Unions) suggested the U.S. food stockpiles could effectively prevent starvation caused by a nuclear winter.

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern. New, Revised, and Expanded Edition. By Branko Lazitch in collaboration with Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 532 pp. $44.95. From its founding by Lenin in 1919, the Comintern became an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, spreading revolution to proletarian parties all over the world. Its protégés, the Communist parties, were loyal and enthusiastic supporters of Soviet interests. Under Stalin, the Comintern became an obedient appendage of the Soviet party's international department. This dictionary reveals the social background, the psychological makeup, and the destinies of the men and women who helped Stalin gain total control over international communism. It is also a thoroughly documented analysis of the national composition of the Comintern army. Until the Comintern archives in Moscow are opened — a most unlikely event — this dictionary will remain the definitive synthesis. Pondering these biographies would be useful for anyone interested in the vicissitudes of the Marxist revolutionary idea in this century. The dictionary distinguishes between the various Comintern generations. People like Antonio Gramsci or Boris Souvarine were attracted to Leninism because they thought it a solution to the social tensions of industrial civilization. Others, like Maurice Thorez, Ernst Thalmann, Ana Pauker, or Palmiro Togliatti, were more interested in domination and glory. The dictionary documents the radical transformation of the Comintern: the romantic fervor of the founders, their mystical commit-

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ment to an ill-defined internationalism, and the opportunism and cynicism of the professional survivors.

Eastern Left, Western Left: Totalitarianism, Freedom and Democracy. By Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1986. 287 pp. $37.50. The re-emerging Central European identity is a compelling intellectual development of the last decade. Georg Lukacs's students in the Budapest School have decisively contributed to the criticism of existing Soviet-type regimes. First in Hungary, then in Western exile, they formulated a theoretical alternative to prevailing Marxist orthodoxy. Feher and Heller, disenchanted Marxist intellectuals both, repudiate familiar leftist cliches. The analysis of the social significance of Khrushchevism is particularly significant nowadays, when Mikhail Gorbachev seems tempted to resume the strategy of the shortlived, post-Stalin cultural "thaw." For Feher and Heller, Kadar's Hungary is the "model-state" of Khrushchevism, and they view it less enthusiastically than do some Western socialists. According to them, contemporary Soviet totalitarianism, its revolutionary birth-pangs behind it, is an entirely conservative force whose breakdown is unlikely; they are deeply skeptical about reform. Dictatorship is the social mechanism that guarantees the perpetuation of Soviet-type regimes. They describe "real socialism" as a *bestiarium*, i.e., a society where human subjects are turned into quasi-natural objects important only as ciphers. This is a worthy effort to overcome archaic ideologies and to reassert human dignity and freedom as the purpose of political action.

Of Prisons and Ideas. By Milovan Djilas. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986. 166 pp. $17.95. Coming to terms with one's past, always a difficult undertaking, is even more complicated after deep spiritual change. Milovan Djilas, once an intransigent Communist and a leader in Tito's postwar Yugoslavia, has long since abjured his early faith. Unlike many disappointed Stalinists, he chose the thorny path of public repentance and renounced all the privileges associated with his elite status. Djilas paid with almost ten years of prison for this break with his youthful illusions. We owe him some of the most striking revelations about the nature of Soviet-type regimes, perceptive analyses of the venality of those who claim to incarnate historical rationality. In this volume, Djilas has come to the hour of ultimate conclusions, issuing both a warning and a pledge. He denounces the enormous costs of ideological blindness of all shades. Where ideology rules unchecked, politics runs amok. These bitter thoughts notwithstanding, Djilas is convinced that "projective utopias" are indispensable for the survival of democratic civilizations. While admitting that Marxism necessarily leads to a historical blind alley, he remains persuaded that pluralism is best served by a democratic socialist order.

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Djilas's predicament stems from a willingness to safeguard the "rational kernel" of radicalism, in spite of his own disenchantment with ill-fated endeavors to implement the socialist dream. Hoping against hope, Milovan Djilas has written a confusing manifesto for ambiguous political choices. One is therefore tempted to respectfully disagree with this effort to restore the dignity of utopia.

Shadows and Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. By Dusko Doder. New York: Random House, 1986. 339 pp. $19.95. Doder's account of the prolonged power struggle in the Kremlin during the last months of Brezhnev's rule is an insightful account of behind-the-scenes conspiracies fomented by the main contenders for power. As Doder rightly points out, Western journalists in Moscow often have to operate in the dark. Dissidents may serve as an informative base, but they are prone to wishful thinking or to dismissing the possibility of change at the top. On the other hand, official communiqués offer only self-serving stereotypes and criticism of the West. Though the situation has improved somewhat under Gorbachev, Western analysts are still at a loss when it comes to weighing the nature and the stakes of the struggle at the pinnacle of Soviet power. Doder is at his best in the examination of Yuri Andropov's career, although he indulges in far-fetched psychological speculation about Andropov's alleged political ambivalence. The historical evidence reveals that Andropov quashed internal dissent and manipulated rival Soviet elite factions. It is very debatable whether the former general secretary was tormented by "a deep sense of guilt" for his role in the suppression of the Hungarian revolution. Similarly, Doder portrays Gorbachev as "a child of the Twenty-second Party Congress" (the gathering that decided the expulsion of Stalin's body from Lenin's Mausoleum in 1961). Doder and many knowledgeable Western correspondents are understandably exhilarated by Gorbachev's "new style." They were in Moscow during the long winter of Brezhnev's neo-Stalinism and are impressed by the recent relaxation. Nonetheless, it is premature to speak of a "Moscow Spring" or to assume that the current Soviet leadership endorses a convergence of East and West.

The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine. By Robert Conquest. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 412 pp. $19.95. Conquest documents the scope and mechanics of Stalin's crusade against the Russian and Ukrainian peasantry. By causing the terrible famine of 1932-33, Stalin tried to exterminate entire social and ethnic categories that might resist forced collectivization, especially the Ukrainian peasantry. Stalin used the most ruthless totalitarian techniques to do away with millions of people he scornfully regarded as despicable vermin. The kulaks were for Stalin

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what Jews would be for Hitler. Stalin relied upon the enthusiastic support of the party apparatus and the secret police, and totalitarian institutions usurped the whole political system. While the excesses of collectivization have been deplored by some Soviet writers, no party leader has yet alluded to the martyrdom of the Ukrainian nation. Conquest rightly states that the artificially induced famine can only be understood in the context of the Stalinist belief that the Communist party has the right to any means to accomplish its goals. Stalin's heirs may have less intransigent views, but they govern a country whose social and political fabric is shaped by the events depicted in this shocking historical account. Conquest's analysis is particularly significant today, when Stalin's disciples beyond Soviet borders employ similar abominable practices.

The Kremlin and the West: A Realistic Approach. By Wolfgang Leonhard. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1986. 228 pp. $17.95. Leonhard's early experiences as a "child of the revolution" make him a most knowledgeable explorer of the ideological underpinnings of Marxist-Leninist regimes. He rejects rhetorical anti-Communism in favor of a more sophisticated and more serviceable analysis. His own ideological inclinations lie in "humanist Marxism" or "democratic socialism." This is the meaning of his identification with the "Prague Spring" of 1968 or with the Solidarity movement in Poland. Both of them having been crushed by Soviet (or Soviet-inspired) forces, Leonhard searches for elements to implement reforms in the Soviet Union itself. He shares Mikhail Voslensky's conception about the role and the function of the *Nomenklatura* as a ruling caste in the Soviet-type systems. Leonhard believes change is possible within the Soviet Union as a result of a number of factors: the development of contradictions in the system; the strength of those favoring reform; the economic situation; and the cohesion of the ruling elite. Leonhard recommends that Western policy makers encourage those forces seeking genuine reform. He also assumes that a reform-oriented Soviet leadership is less prone to foreign-policy adventurism and imperial expansion. But the Cuban missile crisis occurred after the Twenty-Second CPSU Congress, at the pinnacle of Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist offensive in the early 1960s; internal reforms and foreign-policy moderation are not inextricably linked.

The Origins of Stalinism. By Pavel Campeanu. Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1986. 186 pp. $35.OO. Another neo-Marxist attempt to distinguish between Leninism and Stalinism and to brush aside the issue of totalitarianism. Stalinism is, for Campeanu, an ambivalent answer to the incompleteness of the Leninist revolution. A life-long Marxist with personal knowledge of the dynamics of Stalinism in his native Romania, Campeanu seems satisfied with

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the conceptual framework offered by traditional dialectical categories. The Hegelian veneer of his prose does not change the commitment to an orthodox Marxist approach. Also, his views on the possibility of change in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe are debatable. Perhaps Campeanu's next research effort will come to terms with the real implications of Sovietism as a new type of organization.

U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986: Who Wins? By Yale Richmond. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986. 170 pp. $26.50. A well-documented, balanced overview of the evolution and significance of cultural relations between the superpowers. An experienced diplomat, the author is familiar with the thorny process of establishing continuous cultural contacts with the Soviet Union. In his view, a lucid management of these exchanges on the part of the U.S. specialized agencies would be of long-term benefit to the international climate. While Richmond is sure that the Soviets will attempt to capitalize on these contacts, he is persuaded that this danger should not be exaggerated. An American cultural presence in the Soviet Union has promoted modernizing intellectual trends in that country and familiarized the public with American values. To be sure, the Soviet authorities control what can be exhibited and disseminated in their country, but even under these frustrating conditions, it is important to bridge the cultures. Greater skepticism should greet the testimonials to Soviet culture uttered by the groups and delegations sent West to polish the image of communist reality. This is not to deny the value of exchanges, but only to emphasize the timeliness and accuracy of Richmond's approach.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

A History of Israel: From the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War By Howard M. Sachar. Oxford University Press, ca. 340 pp. $19.95. Much of what Howard M. Sachar writes is familiar to anyone who follows the news — Israel's difficult years coping with rising oil prices, the decline of the Labor party, the election of Menachem Begin, the peace treaty with Egypt, the failed war in Lebanon, and, since 1984, the National Unity government's unlikely success. But reading about them in *A History of Israel*, volume II (the first volume covered Israel from the early Zionists and ended with the 1973 war) makes them newly comprehensible. When a clear-sighted historian like Sachar recounts recent events, he turns a jumble of facts into an ordered,

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meaningful progression. Sachar has strong views on Israeli politics. While giving the Likud party and Menachem Begin their due, and castigating the Labor party for its faults, his account is suffused with a preference for Labor. Indeed, the moral underlying *A History of Israel* is of Israel's deterioration under Begin and its need to recover with another term of Labor.

American Public Opinion Toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. By Eytan Gilboa. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. 367 pp. $34.00. Chaim Herzog (Israel's current president) made a telling comment in 1975 about the Arab-Israeli conflict: "The main battlefield now is the theater of opinion in the United States." While Gilboa does not explicitly say so, he clearly believes this statement to be true — thus his very detailed treatment, which includes virtually every study of American public opinion ever conducted on the matter of the Arabs and Israel. He shows that Americans have long favored Israel's cause. As early as November 1945, 42 percent of them supported the creation of a Jewish state; only 17 percent opposed it. The peak of Israel's popularity came in 1967; one poll taken during the Six Day War showed 41 percent sympathetic to Israel and but 1 percent to the Arabs.

Gilboa, a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, concludes from these data that Americans have consistently sympathized more with Israel than with the Arabs. Second, Americans approve of Israel's goals more than they do its means. Third, with only a few exceptions, decreases in pro-Israel attitudes have not implied increases in pro-Arab attitudes. Fourth, the informed public views Israel more favorably than does the general public. Finally, Gilboa suggests that popular American support for Israel is not diminishing over time but remains the stable basis of an enduring relationship.

Guerres secrètes au Liban. By Annie Laurent and Antoine Basbous. Paris: Gallimard, 1987. 371 pp. FF95.00. A French and a Lebanese analyst join forces to review the past dozen years of warfare in Lebanon. They blame Palestinians and Iran for much of what happened but hold Syria and Israel responsible for the tragedy. Indeed, like some Middle East analysts, they discern an 'Alawi-Jewish conspiracy. All this means going very easy on the Lebanese who began the whole conflict — indeed, the Lebanese come out of this account looking like innocents. While adding little new on the matter of PLO, Iranian, and Israeli efforts, Laurent and Basbous provide important new information on Syrian efforts in Lebanon. They make a strong case that President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria has succeeded in a double game, "first acting as a pyromaniac, then donning the uniform of a fireman to put out the fire." Although the net effect has been effective Syrian dominion in Lebanon, they see no likelihood of Damascus taking

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legal control of Lebanon — not because this would offend international opinion, but because it entails responsibilities Asad would rather avoid.

Iran: At War With History. By John W. Limbert. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 186 pp. $28.00. Limbert, a Foreign Service officer with much experience in Iran, has written a superb profile of that country. Well-crafted, smart, and knowledgeable, his book deserves to become the standard introductory account in English. How refreshing for an admirer of Iranian culture not to apologize for the current regime; and how unusual to find not a trace of Swedish syndrome in a former hostage.

Limbert identifies four historical patterns that have formed the Iranian sense of national identity over the centuries: "charismatic leadership, a deep religious impulse, concern with justice, and acceptance of foreign ways adapted to Iranian tastes." While the Khomeini regime certainly fulfills the first two, its radical rejection of the latter two, Limbert argues, means it has "declared war on its citizens' most deep-rooted and humane values." This explains much of its erratic, harsh behavior.

Limbert identifies a tight, long-standing network of some twenty mullahs who attended school together, endured prison together, and today rule Iran together. Looking to the future, he believes these radical clerics will, barring unforeseen disasters, "probably stay in control as long as they preserve their underlying unity." After Khomeini's death, they will probably inherit his real power and moderate many of his extreme positions.

Islam in a World of Nation-States. By James P. Piscatori. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 193 pp. $34.50 ($12.95, paper). Piscatori tries to prove — contrary to theory, historical record, current circumstances, and common sense — that "in Islam, the nation-state is no less possible, or no more fraught with problems, than it is in the non-Muslim world." Going even further, he declares that a consensus has emerged among Muslims "which says that the nation-state is, or can be, an Islamic institution." He calls this view "conformist thinking"; and he banishes those powerful forces that disagree with this so-called consensus by calling them the "nonconformists" — a neat, if ineffectual verbal trick.

I do not know whether Piscatori is a Muslim. If he is, then this is one more apologetic effort to prove that Islam is compatible with modern life. As such, it fits into a long tradition; only most of them are not purveyed as works of scholarship and published by Cambridge University Press. If Piscatori is not a Muslim, then this is a learned curiosity — a Western scholar who devotes years to prove to Muslims

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that one of modern life's central dilemmas for them is really no problem at all.

Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume VIII, 1983-84. Edited by Haim Shaked and Daniel Dishon. Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1986. Distributed by Westview Books. 900 pp. $80.00. The unique strengths of Israel's Middle East scholarship are displayed in the annual volume from the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University. The center's vast clipping archive underpins the country studies that constitute the heart of this effort. Particularly valuable are the studies on those countries for which Western reporting is most inadequate, including Iran (by David Menashri), Iraq (Ofra Bengio), Jordan (Asher Susser), and Saudi Arabia (Joseph Kostiner). The thematic essays are no less original: Eliyahu Kanovsky's sixty-seven-page essay is the only analysis of the Syrian economy available, and Martin Kramer's annual chapter on Islamic diplomacy stands alone. This is an extraordinarily valuable reference work; and to make the good news complete, changes in the publisher mean that this volume costs well under half of previous ones.

The Arab Radicals. By Adeed I. Dawisha. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. 173 pp. $17.50 ($8.95, paper). Defining Arab radicalism as "a movement determined to challenge the Arab status quo, whether inside a particular Arab country or within the Arab regional state system, and to undermine Israeli and American interests in the area," Dawisha argues that the phenomenon reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. By contrast, the period he covers, 1970 to the present, is one of confusion and contradictory impulses. Following an incisive survey of radical movements and states in recent years, Dawisha ends with an analysis of the new radicalism — fundamentalist Islam. He argues that "the tide of militant Islamic fundamentalism reached its peak during the three-year period, February 1979-February 1982" and has since waned. This should serve as an important counterweight to the routine predictions that Islam as a political force is still gaining power.

The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902-1918. By Jacob Goldberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 231 pp. $22.50. Goldberg argues that a profound transformation in the nature of Saudi relations with the outside world occurred during the years under study. In contrast with earlier Saudi rulers, who expanded territorially without limit and disdained alliances only to lose their kingdoms in the end, Ibn Saud (r. 1902-53) pursued an extremely sophisticated Realpolitik that laid the foundations of today's Saudi state. This meticulous and thorough account shows Ibn Saud's ability to deal with political complexities and confirms Goldberg's view of

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Ibn Saud as a political genius. The author argues that Ibn Saud's foreign relations lastingly influenced the Saudi state in two ways. Externally, they set the parameters of Saudi expansion and defined its generally moderate policies toward neighbors and the great powers. Domestically, they facilitated the process of modernization. Goldberg makes a convincing case that Ibn Saud engaged in radically new acts that continue profoundly to influence the course of Arabian history.

The PLO Under 'Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch. By Shaul Mishal. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986. 190 pp. $21.00. Why does Yasir 'Arafat always prevaricate? Why doesn't he finally give up the illusion of defeating Israel militarily and accept the need for a political solution? According to Mishal, 'Arafat's "yes-no" policy of relying simultaneously "on a political process he does not trust and on an armed struggle whose outcome is increasingly doubtful" makes sense: given the realities of Israeli policy toward the PLO and the views of PLO members, anything more decisive would entail more dangers than gains. 'Arafat knows what he is doing: the yes-no policy and the preference for relying on third parties (such as the United States) "may preclude the chance of a rapid solution to the Palestinian problem. Yet if offers 'Arafat's followers hope that something may be saved rather than all being lost." We may, therefore, expect the PLO to pursue this approach for yet many years.

Unfortunately, Mishal, author of an earlier book about the Palestinians in Jordan, treats the PLO as though it were in a political isolation ward. He ignores some of the most salient factors in its decision making — such as the influence of its patrons, the Arab governments, and the venality of its leaders. As a consequence, his analysis has an unreal quality. Put differently, this well-informed and intelligent investigation contains too much political science and too little political reality.

Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. By John P. Entelis. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 239 pp. $30.00.This broad-ranging yet economical survey of Algeria by a well-respected specialist on North Africa offers a careful sociological portrait of contemporary Algeria. Entelis has a thesis: "more than most nation-states of the Third World, Algeria has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adjust and adapt, in a relatively nonviolent manner, to changing circumstances both at home and abroad. That it has still managed to maintain a sense of historic purpose consistent with the revolutionary principles articulated thirty years ago is testimony to the authenticity and durability of the Algerian experience." But Entelis's deft chronicle — which traces bureaucratization of the revolution from Ben Bella to Boumedienne to Benjedid, and the turning away from socialist economic

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policies — suggests a different reading too. What Entelis sees as a pragmatic adaptation that maintained revolutionary principles can be seen as wholesale revisionism. Revolutionary ideals today are vestigial — they build Third World solidarity and serve as a domestic palliative but mean very little. Whatever one thinks of Entelis's upbeat interpretation of Algerian politics, the book is the best introduction to Algeria we are likely to have for some time to come.

— A.M.G.

Libya: Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State. By Lillian Craig Harris. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 155 pp. $24.95. Harris informs the reader of her bias: while the Libyan revolution has not been a total failure — its earlier nationalist and redistributive goals having been reached — "Qadhafi's more ambitious goals for international influence continue to evade him, and the Libyan people continue to pay the price." Clearly, there is another bias; Harris explains that the book "goes to press" just after the April 1986 strike on Libya "against which most U.S. government Libya analysts and regional specialists, including myself, have argued for years." Her description of the raid and its aftermath are colored by her righteous indignation, to the point that the farcical Libyan attack on Lampedusa is made to sound ominous. She adds: "History will, as international opinion does now, condemn the U.S. action as counterproductive and conducive to further violence." Aside from the fact that history will do no such thing, it is very unfortunate that the editors of the series allowed the vitriol of the moment to intrude on an otherwise useful text. While not as entertaining as John Cooley's *Libyan Sandstorm* or as analytically sophisticated as Lisa Anderson's works, Harris does a basic yeoman's job. The sections on the Libyan economy and the implications of economic mismanagement for political stability are particularly good.

— A.M.G.

The Parliamentary System of Israel. By Samuel Sager. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985. 259 pp. $29.95. Six years on the staff of the Canadian House of Commons followed by fifteen years as a staffer in the Knesset, give Sager the experience and the perspective to write on Israel's parliament. Although very thorough about procedural matters — thirty pages are devoted to how questions are read to the floor on the first, second, and third times — this volume is more than a Rules of Order. The author recounts the history of the Knesset, relates the role of the early Provisional State Council, covers election financing and the role of the judiciary, and briefly assays the perennial questions about Israel's lack of a formal constitution. And yet, for all its erudition, inclusiveness, and competence, the book neglects a central curiosity, alluded to in a three-paragraph foreword

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by Abba Eban: how is it that a collection of largely impromptu processes and procedures, crushed together in a time of war and crisis for a community of 600,000 in 1948-49, has managed as successfully as it has to contain and direct the political volubility of modern Israel?

— A.M.G.

The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict Over North Yemen, 1962-1970. By Saeed M. Badeeb. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 148 pp. $18.50. Badeeb, a deputy minister without portfolio in the Saudi government, has written a comprehensive, if somewhat slanted, account of the Yemeni civil war. He covers the period from the republican takeover in 1962 to the end of the conflict in 1970 and examines the conflict on the domestic, inter-Arab, and superpower levels, with special emphasis on the Egyptian-Saudi. Badeeb blames Egypt for the civil war, citing evidence that "the coup d'état of 1962 was apparently engineered and prearranged by President Nasser" and seeks to legitimize the Saudi involvement in the conflict. Saudi foreign policy during this period is given detailed attention; this fills in certain gaps in Western literature, but the resulting bias leaves it not good for much else.

— A.M.G.

The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League. By Tawfig Y. Hasou. Boston: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1986. 228 pp. $49.95. Hasou offers a detailed recounting of how Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd an-Nasir came to dominate the Arab League and use it as an instrument of Egyptian foreign policy. Four case studies illustrate this thesis: Nasser's isolation of Iraq after it joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955; how Nasser turned aside Lebanese complaints against Egyptian harassment in 1957; Nasser's domination of the League after Syria quit the United Arab Republic in 1961; and how Nasser tried, but failed, to manipulate the League in order to extricate Egyptian troops from Yemen in 1963. Hasou concludes that Nasser used his considerable personal charm to manipulate the League to serve his ambitions. The narrative, built upon documentary records as well as secondary sources in Arabic, English, and French, fills a number of gaps about the period and contributes to the growing literature on Nasser. This more than compensates for the book's stylistic awkwardness.

— A.M.G.

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ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
by Arthur Waldron

The Tiger and the Trojan Horse. By Dennis Bloodworth. Singapore: Times Books International, 1986. 353 pp. No price given. This outstanding book should be read by everyone concerned about the future of freedom, in particular by those who wonder whether determined communist subversion can be stopped without completely sacrificing democracy and civil liberties in the process. The Communist party of Malaya came within a hair's breadth of taking power in Singapore after independence in 1959, and if it had, one can imagine what a grim place that resource-poor and racially divided city would have become by now. But the communist threat was beaten back, and Singapore today is what no one then thought possible — prosperous and pluralistic. Bloodworth, veteran foreign correspondent and resident of Singapore since 1956, documents this achievement in an absorbing tale. Singapore's story also has obvious practical relevance today to a whole range of countries, from the Philippines to El Salvador. Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action party defeated the Communists with a delicately balanced blend of tactics. While not shrinking from the use of secret police and preventive detention to neutralize party activists, they were careful to calibrate repression so as to hit only their targets and avoid alienating the innocent. Even while repressing the subversives, they increased political freedom for everyone else proportionally as the threat was controlled (surely a lesson for the Chilean and similar regimes). As freedom became possible, they educated the populace, fostered economic growth, and fought free elections hard. Bloodworth has told Singapore's complex and important story brilliantly, producing a book to buy and to read and re-read.

Cambridge History of China: Volume 13 Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2. Edited by John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 1,092 pp. $99.50. This authoritative work of scholarship is unlikely to be superseded for some time. Its fourteen chapters, each by a recognized authority, complete the comprehensive treatment of China between the end of the Qing dynasty and the rise of the Communists begun in Volume 12. International relations, the development of governmental institutions both locally and at the national level, cultural trends, and the impact of World War II are among its central themes. Researchers will find excellent bibliographical essays and 184 pages of bibliography in Asian and Western languages. Like other Cambridge Histories, this one does reflect the flavor of the time in which it was being written, in this case the 1970s. This is Chinese history conceived

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as the interplay of systems, movements, and trends — all words found in the chapter titles — rather than as a political story. Here and there as well are traces of the now-vanished certainty about the nature of the change unfolding in China. Still, the political narrative is there, as too is a sense of the possible directions of change: the last subtitle "Toward a People's Democratic Modernizing Autocracy?" certainly captures the ambiguity about the road ahead in 1949, and by implication, about the ultimate historical significance of the period under consideration.

Towards Capitalist Restoration? Chinese Socialism after Mao. By Michel Chossudovsky. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 252 pp. $29.95 ($12.95, paper). For those who understood that Maoist economic policies never worked in China, their abandonment after Mao Tse-tung's death in 1976 was a surprising but welcome confirmation that even communist leaderships can learn from mistakes. But those who believed Maoism successful — or even more, who had seen in the "Chinese model" a viable way forward for other poor countries — have been disquieted by China's abandonment of it. Chossudovsky, a leading exponent of theories of dependent development, belongs to the latter group. To him, the current policies seem destined to lead to China's gradual reincorporation of capitalism, and consequently to poverty and chronic underdevelopment. Maoist policies, by contrast, were on the right track. Even that appalling disaster, the Great Leap Forward of 1958, becomes merely an "economic downturn" which was partly "the consequence of bad weather . . . and the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid." But if Maoism was a success, why did Mao's successors discard it? Chossudovsky tells us that the revolution was incomplete, and left certain classes intact, ready to reassert themselves. The People's Communes, for example, "failed to eliminate the rich peasantry as a class," and as a result, "decollectivisation emerged from within the structure of collective agriculture." Though his argumentation may sometimes seem forced and over-complex, Chossudovsky correctly sees events in today's China as more than a variation on socialist themes. In many areas capitalist and pre-1949 practices are being restored. Nonetheless, disagreement exists over their prospects; Chossudovsky thinks they will not work. In a few decades this judgment will perhaps seem as idiosyncratic as his judgment of Maoism appears today.

Human Rights in East Asia: A Cultural Perspective. Edited by James C. Hsiung. New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1986. 165 pp. $10.95. Seeking a basic cultural orientation for thinking about human rights questions in Asian countries, this valuable collection of essays compares rights in two divided countries, Korea and China, and takes Japan, which all agree to be free, as a control case to examine the

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effects of cultural factors. The essays are all good; Manwoo Lee's on North Korea is particularly eye-opening. James Hsiung's thoughtful introduction outlines the book's two main themes: first, Westerners, accustomed to an individualistic notion of freedom, are often led by the legacy of Confucianism and of a "consensual (not adversarial) model of democracy," which all the states treated share, to miss important distinctions among them and to see them all as more or less equally unfree. Thus the State Department in 1980 described both Taiwan and Mainland China as "authoritarian one-party states." True enough, but they are still fundamentally different, as are North and South Korea. According to Hsiung, the difference lies in the way that government interacts with the consensual heritage. In Taiwan and South Korea "the sluggish pace at which human rights of the Western type are being grappled with by both government and people is due to the continuation, though weakened by rapid industrialization, of the familial-communal group tradition," a point supported by Ardath W. Burks's treatment of Japan, where cultural restraints remain powerful despite the existence of free institutions. In the communist states there is no such tension between culture and change, for the "traditional group orientation has been harnessed to serve the totalitarian purpose of the system." This collection succeeds in recognizing cultural differences without utterly relativizing the concept of freedom: one hopes its approach will be noted carefully by all who deal with issues of human rights.

The Balance of Power in East Asia. Edited by Michael Leifer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 155 pp. $27.50. Based on a series of lectures at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, this uneven group of papers covers regional history, the contemporary scene, and the future. A strong essay by Ian Nish treats Asia's most important power, Japan, and specifically the transition from the "bleak period" of the 1970s, (when the United States failed to inform Japan about the new opening to China, while insisting that Japan do more to defend herself) to the "Ron-Yasu" cordiality of the 1980s. Nish's point is that Japan frequently runs into trouble with alliances ("When Germany, her partner in the Anti-Comintern treaty, concluded the Nazi-Soviet pact ... it caused the fall of the Japanese government"), and therefore turns to *jishu gaiko*, autonomous diplomacy. In a muted way this process is repeating itself today. Much attention is also devoted to China and the Soviet Union, and particularly welcome is the clear understanding of Indochina's important role in their relationship. Concluding, Leifer points out the inherent competitiveness of the Asian states left to themselves, stresses the important role of the major powers in keeping East Asia stable, and rejects the oft-proposed "regional order."

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China Through the Ages: History of a Civilization. By Franz Michael. Boulder: Westview Press. 278 pp. $33.00 ($14.95, paper). Michael's theme is the continuing importance of China's culture to her history. Most previous treatments have taken their cue from the Chinese iconoclasts of the twentieth century, portraying tradition as an incubus that had to be banished before real modernization could get under way. Michael, however, sees the Chinese tradition — a twisting together of Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, and other strands — as a source of strength, while rejecting the idea that the Communist system, usually thought of as the great force for modernity, has contributed much. Some apparent confirmation of this idea is now being provided both by the experience of Chinese development under non-communist auspices (as in Taiwan) and by the rejection of much of Maoism in China itself in the post-Mao period. Such trends have engendered a new school of analysis that stresses the positive contribution of the Confucian heritage to development. But as critics of that view point out, questions can be raised about the relative importance of cultural factors as opposed to specific economic policies in creating that success. In this engaging book, however, Michael leaves us in little doubt that China is more than a polity or an economy: it is a civilization. And it would be hard to improve on his summary of its prospects, facing "the problem of modernization under the handicap of afailing Communist system, aggravated by the economic, social, and intellectual decline created by the late Mao Tse-tung's utopianism."

Human Rights in Contemporary China. By R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, and Andrew J. Nathan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 193 pp. $25.00. Much of this book deals directly or indirectly with the question of whether there is something different about human rights in the Chinese context: whether Chinese culture and history mean that words such as "freedom" and "democracy" are understood differently there. It is a careful and scholarly analysis of Chinese ideas and assertions about rights, mostly from the contemporary period, and gathered from constitutions, law codes, and works of legal and political philosophy. All three authors seem to agree that Chinese tradition, far more than that of the individualistic West, views rights and constitutions as means to social goals, rather than as ends in themselves. Their essays examine this pattern in legal usage and philosophy today, as well as trace its roots in late Imperial times and its recurrences in the various pre-1949 Chinese constitutions. The distinction endures today: "socialist" and "bourgeois" democracy, the key words of the debate that got under way in January of 1987 can be read as "Chinese" and "Western" respectively. And the vigor with which many Chinese advocate the "bourgeois" version suggests that while the alternative may have deep resonances with

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the Chinese past, that fact alone is insufficient to legitimate it any longer. The book provides an invaluable historical perspective on such contemporary controversies in China, while those who want to know about practice will find plenty of sources in the very useful bibliography.

Modern China and Its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order 1850–1920. By Robert A. Scalapino and George T. Yu. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. 814 pp. $65.00. This landmark study in modern Chinese history treats familiar territory but with a difference. Many writers who have described China's "revolution" see it as an almost disembodied force. Scalapino and Yu, however, stress its embodiment: the way it unfolded through, and was decisively affected by, individuals, events, and circumstances. This approach implies a long book, one that assembles indispensable information previously available only through scattered sources in several languages. In the solid insightful narration there is a real sense of how Chinese politics works. Unlike most other treatments of the subject, this one does not omit or simplify those periods, such as that from 1912 to 1920, that fit imperfectly into explanatory schemes. Scalapino and Yu understand that it is precisely in such periods that the many conflicting potentialities of Chinese society, which usually are hidden by strong rule and orthodoxy imposed from the top, can be seen clearly, and they bring them out brilliantly (one wishes they had continued right up to 1928). This ability to get beneath the often-misleading surface of Chinese politics gives us, in effect, the inside story for seventy crucial years, and makes the book absolutely essential reading for anyone hoping to understand contemporary China.

China Takes Off: Technology Transfer and Modernization. By E. E. Bauer. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986. 227 pp. $20.00. Boeing's man in China from 1980 through 1984, Bauer evaluates the Chinese ability to accept technology transfer in the aircraft industry. This would seem a good test of transfer acceptance capability since aircraft engineering is sometimes referred to as the "flower of industry." Bauer's style is not scholarly, but anecdotal and acute. China's problem in adapting technology are in some respects particularly Chinese. The Chinese penchant to *xiuxi wufenzhong* (rest five minutes), a euphemism for an after-lunch siesta, has a base in culture and protein-deficient diets. In other respects, China's problems parallel those of other developing countries. Mechanics of peasant origin tend to get by with little and have what Bauer calls a "bailing-wire-and-rope philosophy," not adequate for dealing with "aircraft quality." Finance tends to be approached on a petty cash basis in which limited funds are put toward capital expenditures, like airplanes, but

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the necessary correlates of budgets for training and maintenance are inadequate. Bauer analyzes his struggle to communicate and implement workable procedures for Chinese handling of its recent Boeing purchases, ten 707s in 1973 and three 747s in 1979. Bauer's assessment of Chinese adaptation to airplane technology is basically optimistic, as is his assessment of Chinese modernization as a whole. China will not surpass Britain in fifteen years, as the Chinese predicted in 1958. But over the course of the next few generations Bauer sees the Chinese attaining a steadily higher standard of living and standard of technology. His observation is that the will is there, the ability is there, and that the political climate has been there since 1979. Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism is the essential ingredient. Bauer concludes that "China will look back but will never turn back."

— Grant Rhode

China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger? Edited by Lillian Craig Harris and Robert L. Worden. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986. 174 pp. $29.00. The enduring American fascination with China led to widespread exaggerations of Peking's international role and influence, nowhere more than in its relations with Third World countries. In great measure, these fed on growing Sino-Soviet tensions in the 1960s and 1970s, when the colossi of communism turned on each other with dramatic and far-reaching consequences. The 1980s, however, have witnessed the ascendancy of traditional great power interests and the subordination of ideological rivalry.

China seeks to identify itself with the Third World in its foreign-policy positions, but, as this collection of eight thoughtful essays shows, the record suggests something quite different. China may be a low-income country, but it ranks "well above other developing nations in per capita GNP, GNP growth rate, physical quality of life, life expectancy, literacy and public education, and military expenditures. China is also well below Third World averages for birth and death rates, does not share the direct colonial occupation experience of many Third World states, and unlike most developing countries, is an extremely large country blessed with a variety of development resources." It is no more a Third World country than is Japan, South Korea, or Spain. Still, China has sought to utilize identification with the Third World, initially, to break out of diplomatic isolation in the 1950s and 1960s and foster the derecognition of Taiwan; and, currently, to acquire credibility as a great power in its relations with the superpowers and on the international stage in general.

The ambiguities and contradictions in China's policy toward the Third World are expertly developed in the essays that compose this useful volume. What distinguishes them are their high analytical

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quality and their grasp of China's actual policy toward specific countries, regions, and issues. The reader will learn much from all the essays, for example, Harris and Worden's perspective on China's overall pragmatism as a power; Bruce D. Larkin's essay on China's emergence as a competitor as well as a market for Third World wares; and Harris's analysis of the self-serving way it applies the doctrine of "People's War."

— Alvin Z. Rubinstein

AFRICA
by Michael Radu

South Africa: A Plural Society in Transition. Edited by D. J. van Vuuren, N. E. Wiehahn, J. A. Lombard, and N. J. Rhoodie. Stoneham, Mass.: Butterworth, 1985. 510 pp. $37.95. In a balanced and unemotional manner, the authors provide much-needed factual background to the reactions by South African blacks, whites, coloreds and Asians to the Botha government's changes. The abundant data offered, as well as the public opinion samples, confirm few and contradict many common assumptions. For example, Zulu-speaking men on the question of cooperation with the government: 11 percent said that a black leader should never cooperate with the government, while 85 percent said that black leaders "should criticize, but cooperate where beneficial." Such examples demonstrate that South Africa is not a hopelessly polarized society and strengthen confidence in the pragmatism and sophistication of the majority of all races.

Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional Directions after the Nkomati Accord. Edited by Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw. Boulder: Westview Press, 1987. 315 pp. $29.95. In this run-of-the-mill product of left-wing wishful thinking the contributors seem to have forgotten that the Mozambique-South Africa "détente" symbolized by the Nkomati accord of 1984 was an act of self-preservation on the part of Mozambique, which chose survival over suicide. For A. K. Mhina, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA is a "puppet" (so, presumably are his approximately 40,000 black Angolan followers). Horace Campbell, in his chapter on Namibia, goes one step further along the path of fiction: SWAPO, the Marxist-Leninist insurgent group, founded in 1959 is allegedly an answer to the (very real) militarization of the country, a phenomenon that started about five years ago. For Campbell the complex events of 1975-76 in Angola

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are a simple question of the "Angolans" defeating the "Boers" (i.e., the South Africans), "with the help" of Cuba. The realities of the war in Namibia, including SWAPO's pathetic military decline, are nowhere found in the chapter. Meaningless terms like "the people" (of Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa) abound, while serious analysis, except in part for Colin Legum's piece on the Nkomati accord, is nonexistent.

A History of Communism in South Africa. By Henry R. Pike. Christian Mission International of South Africa, Sigma Press, Pretoria, 1985. 601 pp. $32.00. This massive effort is flawed throughout by a loose definition of "communism" based on a dichotomy between Christian values and non-Christian ones. Thus, each group, party, or individual not sharing a strict, almost fundamentalist view of Christian values, or what Pike considers to be Christian values, is invariably seen as communist or pro-communist. Nonetheless, this volume is by far the best-documented history yet available of the communist movement in South Africa in general and of the South African Communist Party (SACP) in particular. The baroque blossoming of communist fronts after the party was banned in 1950 and its successful infiltration of the African National Congress (ANC) are particularly well examined. Pike clearly benefits from access to otherwise unreachable sources in the government's possession, and from a commendable patience in reading and analyzing even the most obscure SACP or front documents and publications. These merits are to some extent diluted by confusing footnote references.

Politics and Government in African States: 1960-1985. Edited by Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson. Stanford: Croom Helm and Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 442 pp. $36.95. An excellent, non-ideological and sound analysis of the political systems of countries in all the major regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. The repeat analysis of Cameroon is largely unwarranted, while the material on the smaller Portuguese-speaking states (Sao Tome, Cape Verde, and Guinea Bissau) is skimpy, probably because of lack of data. The unusually solid quality of the volume whets the appetite of the serious reader, who wishes there were more comparative efforts and more detailed introductory and concluding chapters. The most refreshingly unusual characteristic of this volume is its approach to African states and institutional structures as normal, if specifically interesting, objects of scholarship, devoid of the morality-play approach that dominates the field.

Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia. By J. K. Cilliers. London 1985: Croom Helm. 265 pp. $19.95. An artillery officer in the South Africa Defense Force (SADF), Cilliers has written perhaps the best recent

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book on counter-insurgency. Based on Rhodesian and South African military and intelligence sources, many of them unavailable to the public to this day, Cilliers looks at Rhodesian performance, mentalities, and tactics from the 1960s to the end of the war in 1979. He concludes, sometimes unfairly to the Rhodesians, that the Ian Smith regime consistently misunderstood the nature of the war it was fighting, badly underestimated the political factors involved, erroneously overextended itself by using expensive and ultimately ineffective means (the cordon sanitaire on the eastern borders being a case in point), and failed to develop an adequate integrated military or intelligence command system. This volume is indispensable for the study of counter-insurgency and has great significance for those presently examining SADF doctrine and performance against both the *African National Congress* (ANC) and the *South West Africa People's* Organization (SWAPO).

Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa. By Gerry S. Thomas. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985. 157 pp. $21.00 (paper). Although Thomas clearly has the expertise to provide an informative analysis of a significant phenomenon, the size and structure of his book conspire against that outcome. Ideological commitments of mercenaries are largely neglected; the leftist reading of the term, despite the clear definition in international law, is often if implicitly accepted. Most noticeably, what makes this little book less useful than it might have been, is its haphazard treatment (factually and analytically) of the relevant case studies. For instance, in the case of the 1977 Benin events, it might be argued that the mercenaries' ability to escape practically unscathed, rather than the bad luck that followed them is the main lesson to be drawn — and the same with Mike Hoare's 1981 Seychelles caper. Mercenaries in Africa remain a subject in need of a good book-length study.

Military and Politics in Black Africa. Edited by Simon Baynham. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 333 pp. $32.50. This far from original collection combines all the predictable pitfalls of efforts to improve and expand on well-examined topics by using well-known scholars. The result is that experts like Samuel Decalo, Claude Welch, Dennis Austin all repeat their influential but standard theories. The real disappointment comes with the attempt to introduce novelty in the field — such as Annette Seeger's chapter on the Zimbabwean and Mozambican armies, or J. E. Spence's predictable piece on South Africa's military impact on southern Africa. Seeger's chapter is the least useful of all; the author appears not fully to realize that both the Zimbabwean and the Mozambican armies now face irregular enemies at least as ruthless and dedicated as their militants used to be before taking power: the Renamo insurgents in the case of Moz-

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ambique, and the former Ndebele guerrillas as well as Renamo in the case of Zimbabwe. Little, if anything, is said about this fascinating phenomenon — former guerrillas now in power having to fight guerrillas (sometimes their former counter-insurgency enemies) and, as the record shows so far, unable to cope with the challenge. This situation, as well as similar occurrences in Angola and Ethiopia, raises the essential issue of whether African armies are able to plan, train, equip, and structure themselves along flexible and professional lines, or are they militarily irrelevant players in an environment determined by non-African actors?

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